Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up the
Red River against
Shreveport, Louisiana, (which had been organized previous to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of March, of the importance it was that
Shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days more time than
General Sherman had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the time specified by
General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of the
Red River expedition, for this force was necessary to movements east of the
Mississippi; that should his expedition prove successful, he would hold
Shreveport and the
Red River with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the
Spring campaign to move against
Mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition; also, that I had directed
General Steele to make a real move from
Arkansas as suggested by him (
General Banks), instead of a demonstration, as
Steele thought advisable.
On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, he was instructed as follows:
1st.
If successful in your expedition against
Shreveport, that you turn over the defense of the
Red River to
General Steele and the navy.
2d.
That you abandon
Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon the
Rio Grande.
This can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions.
At least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops.
3d.
By properly fortifying on the
Mississippi River, the force to guard it from
Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number.
Six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the river.
According to your last return, this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against
Mobile.
To this I expect to add five thousand men from
Missouri.
If, however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as
