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117]
Immediately after the above,
Thomas telegraphed the following inquiry, having in view, evidently, the possibility that his pontoons might be needed:
How far is
Fulton from the crossing of Olley's Creek?
Will we have to cross any other streams of much size?
When do you wish to start?
And yet with these telegrams in the record, showing prompt approval of his move, and a disposition to cooperate in it immediately,
General Sherman ventures the above fling at
General Thomas.
These last dispatches were answered as follows,
Sherman to
Thomas, June 27th, 9:30 P. M.: ‘According to
Merrill's map it is about ten miles. Nickajack the only stream to cross.
Time for starting day after to-morrow.’
Sherman to
Thomas, June 27, 9:45 P. M.: ‘If we move on
Fulton, we must move with the whole army, leaving our railroad on the chance of success.
Go where we may, we will find the breastworks and abattis, unless we move more rapidly than we have heretofore.’
The dispatches thus far quoted, have been at all times accessible to
General Sherman, and they are quite sufficient to show that the correct history of the
battle at Kenesaw is not set forth in his Memoirs.
Of the immediate effect of the flanking movement on
Kenesaw, begun on the night of the 2d of July following the assault,
General Sherman says:
‘As before explained, on the 3d of July, by moving McPherson's entire army from the extreme left, at the base of Kenesaw to the right, below Olley's Creek, and stretching it down the Nickajack toward Turner's Ferry of the Chattahoochee, we forced Johnston to choose between a direct assault on Thomas' intrenched position, or to permit us to make a lodgment on his railroad below Marietta, or even to cross the Chattahoochee.
Of course he chose to let go Kenesaw and Marietta, and fall back on an intrenched camp prepared by his orders in advance on the north and west bank of the Chattahoochee, covering the railroad crossing and his several pontoon bridges.
I confess I had not learned beforehand of the existence of this strong place, ’
