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morning, and have no information of the condition of affairs and the position of your troops.
When you were urged to move down the river to
General Rosecrans' assistance, that operation was deemed safe and of great importance.
The condition of affairs may now be different.
You certainly should hold
Kingston, and as far below as may seem prudent.
‘
Hood will probably send a part of his army to the south-west.
Whether to
Bragg or by
Abingdon is uncertain.
I think your available force at
Kingston and above should be held in readiness to move up the valley, should the enemy appear in force in south-
west Virginia.
A copy of this is sent to
General Grant.’
‘
October 18th.—
General Rosecrans still calls for your cooperation with him at
Chattanooga, and again suggests that
Kingston should be made your main point of defense.
In this I agree with him. If he can not hold
Chattanooga, you can not hold
East Tennessee, as that place threatens the gateway from
Georgia.
Why is it that you make no report of your position and movements?
We are left entirely in the dark in regard to your army.’
‘
October 24th.—It now appears pretty certain that
Ewell's corps has gone to
Tennessee, and its probable object is
Abingdon.
His force is estimated at from twenty to twenty-five thousand.
It is reported that he left
Lee's army on Monday last, but did not pass through
Richmond.
It is therefore most probable that he passed through
Lynchburg taking the road to
Abingdon.’