William Boynton, Sherman's Historical Raid

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headquarters Department of the Ohio, Louisville, January 3, 1862.
General W. H Halleck, Commanding Department of the Missouri.

General: I received your dispatch, and, with more delay than I meant, proceed to the subject of it, in compliance with your request, and I may add also, at the wish of the President.

I do not underrate the difficulties in Missouri, but I think it is not extravagant to say that the great power of the rebellion in the West is arranged on a front, the flanks of which are Columbus and Bowling Green, and the center about where the railroad between those points crosses the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, including Nashville and the fortified points below, It is, I have no doubt, within bounds to estimate their force on that line at eighty thousand men, including a column about Somerset, Ky. In rear of their right flank it is more.

Of their force, forty thousand may be set down as at Bowling Green, twenty thousand at Columbus—though you, doubtless, have more information on that point than I have—and twenty thousand at the center. Considering the railroad facilities, which enable the enemy to concentrate in a few hours on any single point of this front, you will at once see the importance of a combined attack on its center and flanks, or at least of demonstrations which may be converted into real attacks, and fully occupy the enemy on the whole front. It is probable that you may have given the subject, as far as Columbus and the center are concerned, more attention than I have. With reference to the former, at least, I can make no more than the general suggestion already expressed, that it should be fully occupied.

The attack upon the center should be made by two gun-boat expeditions, with, I should say, twenty thousand men on the two rivers. They should, of course, be organized with reference to the depth of water in the rivers; and whether they should be of equal or unequal strength, would depend upon that and other considerations, and can hardly be determined until the moment of departure. The mode of attack must depend on the strength of the enemy at the several points and the features of the localities. It will be of the first importance to break the railroad communication, and, if possible, that should be done by columns moving rapidly to the bridges over the Cumberland and Tennessee. The former probably would not be reached at first, being some thirty-one miles above the first principal battery that I know of at Dover. The other is eighteen miles above Fort Henry—the first I know of on the Tennessee. If the expeditions should not be strong enough to do the work alone, they should establish themselves firmly at the nearest possible point, and remain at least until they ascertained that reenforcements from my columns, or some other source, would not reach them. By uniting, they could establish themselves permanently under the protection of the gun-boats.

I say this much rather to lay the subject before you than to propose any definite plan for your side. Whatever is done should be done speedily, within