By the last of February, General Sherman having been meantime in the depths of his raid to Meridian, the preparations for the campaign thus marked out by General Grant had progressed so far that General Thomas was sending in estimates of the number of troops needed to guard the roads and bridges from Nashville south, both by way of Decatur and of Stevenson, on to Chattanooga, and south to[136] however, will be able to collect about twenty thousand men from that part of his command now along the Mississippi River available for a movement eastward from Vicksburg. He expects to have these ready to start about the 24th inst. He will proceed eastward as far as Meridan, at least, and will thoroughly destroy the roads east and south from there, and, if possible, will throw troops as far east as Selma; or if he finds Mobile so far unguarded as to make his force sufficient for the enterprise, will go there. To cooperate with this movement, you want to keep up appearances of preparation of an advance from Chattanooga. It may be necessary even to move a column as far as Lafayette. The time for the advance, however, would not be before the 30th inst., or when you might learn the enemy were contemplating an attack. Logan will also be instructed to move, at the same time, what force he can from Bellefontaine toward Rome. We will want to be ready at the earliest possible moment in the Spring for the advance. I look upon the line for this army to secure in the next campaign to be that from Chattanooga to Mobile, Atlanta and Montgomery being the important intermediate points. I look upon the Tennessee River and Mobile as being the most practicable points from which to start, and to hold as bases of supplies if the line is secured. I have so written to the General-in-Chief, only giving my views more fully, and shall write him to-day, giving my views of the cooperation we should have from the Eastern armies. I shall recommend that no attempt be made toward Richmond by any of the routes heretofore operated upon, but that a moving force of sixty thousand men be thrown into Newbern or Suffolk, favoring the latter place; and move out, destroying the road as far toward Richmond as possible. Then move toward Raleigh as rapidly as possible, hold that point, and open communication with Newbern, even Wilmington. From Raleigh the enemy's most important line would be so threatened as to force them to keep on it a guard that would reduce their armies in the field much below our own. Before any part of this programme can be carried out, Longstreet must be driven from East Tennessee. To do this it may be necessary to send more force from your command. I write this to give you an idea of what I propose, and at the same time to hear such suggestions as you may have to propose.U. S. Grant, Major-General.
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By the last of February, General Sherman having been meantime in the depths of his raid to Meridian, the preparations for the campaign thus marked out by General Grant had progressed so far that General Thomas was sending in estimates of the number of troops needed to guard the roads and bridges from Nashville south, both by way of Decatur and of Stevenson, on to Chattanooga, and south to
Cincinnati: Wilstach, Baldwin & Co. 1875.
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