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if somewhat annoyed by it. He said that it was idle to suggest that he should attempt to negotiate, when it was certain, from the attempt previously made, that his authority to treat would not be recognized, nor any terms that he might offer considered by the Government of the United States.
I reminded him that it had not been unusual, in such cases, for military commanders to initiate negotiations upon which treaties of peace were founded; and proposed that he should allow me to address General Sherman on the subject.
After a few words in opposition to that idea, Mr. Davis reverted to the first suggestion, that he should offer terms to the Government of the United States—which he had put aside; and sketched a letter appropriate to be sent by me to General Sherman, proposing a meeting to arrange the terms of an armistice to enable the civil authorities to agree upon terms of peace.
That this course might be adopted at once, I proposed that he should dictate the letter then to Mr. Mallory, who was a good penman, and that I should sign and send it to the Federal commander immediately.
The letter, prepared in that way, was sent by me with all dispatch to Lieutenant-General Hampton, near Hillsboro, to be forwarded by him to General Sherman.
It was delivered to the latter next day, the 14th, and was in these terms:
The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed the relative military condition of the belligerents.
I am, therefore, induced to address you, in this form, the inquiry whether, in order to stop the further effusion of blood and devastation of property, you are willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and to communicate to Lieutenant General Grant, commanding the armies of the United States, the request that he will take like action in regard to other armies—the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war.
After mentioning the means taken to secure a meeting, the Narrative continues with an account of the interview, which
General Sherman thus indorses:
‘General Johnston's account of our interview, in his Narrative (page 402, et seq.), is quite accurate and correct, only I do not recall his naming the capitulation of Loeben to which he refers.’
Johnston's statement, thus referred to and indorsed, is as follows:
When General Sherman understood what seemed to have escaped him in reading my letter, that my object was to make such an armistice as would give opportunity for negotiation between the ‘civil authorities’ of the two countries, he said that such negotiations were impossible, because the Government of the United States did not acknowledge the existence of a Southern
