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Little became known at the time, of the real character of this battle.
The surrender of
Lee, which occurred before the facts connected with
Bentonville could be disclosed, and the appalling death of
Mr. Lincoln, occupied the full attention of the country.
By the time it so recovered as to turn its mind toward
North Carolina,
Johnston had offered to surrender, and so
Bentonville passed almost unnoticed.
It is just to
General Sherman to say, that in his Memoirs he brings the real facts connected with this action into bolder relief than any other of his mistakes of which he treats.
But the official record supplies some important omissions.
Concerning the start from
Savannah northward,
General Sherman writes:
‘I knew full well at the time that the broken fragments of Hood's army (which had escaped from Tennessee) were being hurried rapidly across Georgia, by Augusta, to make junction in my front, estimating them at the maximum, twenty-five thousand men, and Hardee's, Wheeler's, and Hampton's forces at fifteen thousand, made forty thousand, which, if handled with spirit and energy, would constitute a formidable force, and might make the passage of such rivers as the Santee and Cape Fear a difficult undertaking.’
His whole army reached
Fayetteville, North Carolina, and crossed the
Cape Fear to move on
Goldsboro, where he expected to make a junction with
General Schofield, then advancing from
Newbern.
From this point, in a letter to
General Grant, dated March 12, 1865, he said:
‘Jos. Johnston may try to interpose between me here and Schofield about Newbern, but I think he will not try that, but concentrate his scattered armies at Raleigh, and I will go straight at him as soon as I get our men reclothed and our wagons reloaded.’
And in another letter of the same date to
General Terry, he wrote:
‘I can whip Jos. Johnston provided he does not catch one of my corps in flank, and I will see that the army marches hence to Goldsboro in compact form.’
