[30] Worthington had been alarmed for safety. As soon as I heard the cannon, I and my staff were in the saddle and off to the front. We overtook a party of Buckland's and Hildebrand's brigades going forward to the relief of the pickets. On reaching a position in advance of the guard-house, a mile and a half from Shiloh, they deployed into line of battle and I awaited the return of my cavalry and infantry, still to our front. ‘Colonel Buckland and Major Ricker soon returned and reported encountering infantry, artillery, and cavalry near the fallen timbers six miles in front of our camp. We then knew that we had the elements of an army in our front, but did not know its strength or destination. The guard was strengthened, and, as night came on we returned to camp, and not a man in camp but knew we had an enemy to the front before we slept that night. But even I had to guess its purpose. No general could have detected or reported the approach of an enemy more promptly than was done.’The positive contradiction between these statements, and those of the book which deny that infantry and artillery had been discovered as early as Friday afternoon, will be observed. On that very afternoon, however, General Sherman had written to General Grant, giving the result of the cavalry reconnoissance. That this did not agree with the present statement, that up to the night of the 4th, ‘we had not positively detected the presence of infantry,’ the following report by General Grant will show:
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