William Boynton, Sherman's Historical Raid

3. Notwithstanding it was so imprudent to stretch out any more, that an assault was necessary instead, still Schofield, while the assault was in progress, moved off to the right, across Olley's Creek, while the cavalry extended his line still further, to the Sweetwater.

4. Satisfied of the bloody cost of assaulting the position at Kenesaw, General Sherman concluded to flank it by extending his lines to the right as far as Fulton, and possibly to the Chattahoochee River, still further beyond.

5. ‘General Thomas, as usual, shook-his head, deeming it risky to leave the railroad,’ but something had to be done, and so he (Sherman) decided to extend his lines as above.

6. The moment Johnston detected this movement, he promptly, and as a matter of course, let go Kenesaw and Marietta without a fight.

In answer to the contradictions implied by the third point above, it may be claimed that it was the assault which fixed Johnston's attention, and required help from his flanks, that made it possible for Schofield to extend his lines. But the official records show that Schofield was actually prolonging his lines the whole day preceding the battle—that is, during the 26th—in spite of the statements in the text that, ‘during the 24th and 25th, he had extended his right as far as prudent.’ If, on the other hand, it be claimed that Schofield's movement on the 26th was to compel the enemy to withdraw part of his force from Kenesaw to strengthen the flank in front of Schofield, and thus make the assault practicable, it would appear that a stronger flanking movement might have caused the enemy to withdraw entirely, without the necessity of an assault, exactly as did occur a few days after.

The records have much to say about Kenesaw that is not even referred to in the Memoirs.

The following field dispatches from General Sherman to General Schofield, who was operating on the right, will be