From these most urgent dispatches it is evident that a prompt movement of Sherman's relieving column, as well as the repair of the railroad, was expected by the authorities at Washington. The railroad was in fair condition from the start as far as Corinth, as General Sherman says, and one of his divisions had reached that point on the 2d of October, as he also relates. On the 27th of that month he was at Bear Creek, only thirty miles east of Corinth, where he was ‘still busy in pushing forward the repairs to the railroad bridge,’ and ‘patching up the many breaks between it and Tuscumbia,’ when he received the dispatch from General Grant at Chattanooga, by way of Huntsville, to drop railroad work and hurry to Chattanooga with all possible speed. All this time Rosecrans' army had been suffering for supplies—a suffering which Sherman, by prompt movement, might in great degree have prevented. But instead, before he could move his small command from Corinth, two corps had been sent from the Army of the Potomac, and, as Halleck surmised, had reached and relieved Rosecrans first; in fact had done so before Sherman began to exhibit any special activity in his advance. Thus Sherman failed Rosecrans. How much that was unfortunate in the situation, which he now treats as if it were altogether the fault of Rosecrans, might have been avoided had he then moved with due haste to his assistance! Returning to Rosecrans' movement, and following him for a time, it will be seen that, with twenty-five days supplies and ammunition for two great battles he had crossed the Tennessee, passed over three difficult mountain ranges, and coming down into the valley south of Chattanooga, compelled Bragg
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