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the force available about
Pulaski, he writes, as already quoted:
‘This force aggregated about thirty thousand men, was therefore inferior to the enemy; and General Schofield was instructed, in case the enemy made, a general advance, to fall back slowly toward Nashville, fighting till he should be reenforced by General Thomas in person.’
General Sherman also knew well that only a portion of the veteran reenforcements ordered to
General Thomas had succeeded in reaching
Nashville the day of the
battle of Franklin, and that the rest did not arrive till the day succeeding that battle.
Among the last dispatches he sent to
General Thomas at
Nashville, before starting on the March to the
Sea, was this order, dated October 31st:
‘You must unite all your men into one army and abandon all minor points if you expect to defeat Hood.’
And the very last dispatch, before starting south, was one notifying
Thomas of his belief that all information seemed to indicate that
Beauregard (
Hood) would attempt to work against
Nashville:
‘I can hardly believe that Beauregard would attempt to work against Nashville from Corinth as a base at this stage of the war, but all information seems to point that way.’
Why
General Thomas did not turn on
Hood at
Franklin appears from the following field dispatches from
General Schofield, who was fighting a splendid battle at that place:
Your dispatch of 10:25 A. M. is received.
I am satisfied that I have heretofore run too much risk in trying to hold
Hood in check while so far inferior to him in both infantry and cavalry.
The slightest mistake on my part, or failure of a subordinate, during the last three days, might have proved disastrous.
I don't want to get into so tight a place again.
I will cheerfully act in accordance with your views if you think it expedient to hold
Hood back as long as possible.
When you get all your
