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rear, and within a few miles of his railroad.
I got a short note from McPherson that day (written at 2 P. M., when he was within a mile and a halt of the railroad above and near Resaca), and we all felt jubilant.
I renewed orders to Thomas and Schofield to be ready for the instant pursuit of what I expected to be a broken and disordered army, forced to retreat by roads to the east of Resaca, which were known to be very rough and impracticable.
‘That night I received further notice from McPherson that he had found Resaca too strong for a surprise; that in consequence he had fallen back three miles to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, and was there fortified.
I wrote him next day the following letters, copies of which are in my letter-book; but his to me were mere notes in pencil, not retained.’
The letters referred to are both dated May 11th.
The material points affecting the question under discussion, are as follows:
General: I received by courier (in the night) yours of 5 and 6:30 P. M. of yesterday.
You now have your twenty-three thousand men, and General Hooker is in close support, so that you can hold all of Jos. Johnston's army in check should he abandon Dalton.
He can not afford to abandon Dalton, for he has fixed it up on purpose to receive us, and he observes that we are close at hand waiting for him to quit.
He can not afford a detachment strong enough to fight you, as his army will not admit of it.
Strengthen your position; fight anything that comes; and threaten the safety of the railroad all the time.
But, to tell the truth I would rather the enemy would stay in Dalton two more days, when he may find in his rear a larger party than he expects in an open field.
At all events we can then choose our own ground, and he will be forced to move out of his works.
I do not intend to put a column into Buzzard Roost Gap at present.
McPherson had startled Johnston in his fancied security, but had not done the full measure of his work.
He had in hand twenty-three thousand of the best men of the army, and could have walked into Resaca (then held only by a small brigade), or he could have placed his whole force astride the railroad above Resaca, and there have easily withstood the attack of all of Johnston's army, with the knowledge that Thomas and Schofield were on his heels.
Had he done so, I am certain that Johnston would not have ventured to attack him in position, but would have retreated eastward by Spring Place, and we should have captured half his army and all his artillery and wagons at the very beginning of the campaign.
‘Such an opportunity does not occur twice in a single life, but at the critical moment McPherson seems to have been a little timid.
Still, he was perfectly justified by his orders, and fell back and assumed an unassailable defensive position in Sugar Valley, on the Resaca side of Snake Creek Gap.
As soon as informed of this, I determined to pass the whole army through Snake Creek Gap, and to move on Resaca with the main army.’
