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The next day he was gone, and had retreated on Smithfield; and, the roads all being clear, our army moved to Goldsboro.
The heaviest fighting at Bentonville was on the first day, viz.: the 19th, when Johnston's army struck the head of Slocum's column, knocking back Carlin's division.
But as soon as General Slocum had brought up the rest of the Fourteenth Corps into line, and afterward the Twentieth on his left, he received and repulsed all attacks, and held his ground, as ordered, to await the coming back of the right wing.’
General Sherman's formal report of this battle, dated
Goldsboro, April 4, 1865, contains the following very contradictory statements concerning the attack:
‘All the signs induced me to believe that the enemy would make no further opposition to our progress, and would not attempt to strike us in flank while in motion.’
A few paragraphs below, in the same report, he again refers to the matter, as follows:
‘Johnston had moved, by night, from Smithfield, with great rapidity, and without unnecessary wheels, intending to overwhelm my left flank before it could be relieved by its cooperating columns.
But he reckoned without his host.
I had expected just such a movement all the way from Fayetteville, and was prepared for it.’
From the above extracts it is quite evident that
Johnston attempted to concentrate his forces, fall upon the left wing of
Sherman's army, crush it before the others could arrive, and then, in turn, attack the right, and that he came much nearer success than it is pleasant to contemplate.
The warnings of such a concentration, as will be seen, were abundant.
That they were not heeded seems marvelous and the extreme of carelessness.
Some of the telegrams accompanying a former printed report of
General Sherman make the situation still clearer.
The advance of the left wing began at seven o'clock on the 19th of March, and was stubbornly contested from the first.
About ten o'clock
General Slocum became convinced that he had encountered the enemy in force.
He therefore concluded to assume the offensive, and communicate with General
