William Boynton, Sherman's Historical Raid

This letter, lying at General Sherman's very elbow, is dated at Headquarters Department of the Missouri, St. Louis, January 20, 1862. The following extracts are sufficient to settle the question at issue:

I have received no information in respect to the general plan of campaign, and therefore feel much hesitation in recommending any line of operations for these and other troops which I may be able to withdraw from Missouri. Of course this line must be subordinate to some general plan. I take it for granted General, that what has heretofore been done has been the result of political policy rather than military strategy, and that the want of success on our part is attributable to the politicians rather than to the generals. * *

I am aware General, that you are in no way responsible for this; these movements have been governed by political expediency, and in many cases directed by politicians in order to subserve party interest. * * * But is it not possible, with the new Secretary of War, to introduce a different policy, and make our future movements in accordance with military principles. On this supposition I venture to make a few suggestions in regard to operations in the West.

The idea of moving down the Mississippi by steam, is in my opinion impracticable, or at least premature. It is not the proper line of operations, at least now. A much more feasible plan is to move up the Cumberland and Tennessee, making Nashville the present objective point. This would threaten Columbus, and force the abandonment of Bowling Green. * * * *

This line of the Cumberland and the Tennessee is the great central line of the Western theater of war, with the Ohio below the mouth of Green River as the base, and two great navigable rivers extending far into the theater of operations. But the plan should not be attempted without a large force—not less than sixty thousand effective men. * * * The main central line will also require the withdrawal of all available troops from this State, also those in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Ohio, which are armed, or still to be armed, and also the transfer to that route, or near it, of all the Kentucky troops not required to secure the line of Green River.

The force at Cairo and on the Ohio River below the mouth of Green River is now about fifteen thousand. Seven regiments have just been ordered there from Missouri.

By the middle or last of February I hope to send fifteen thousand more. If thirty thousand or forty thousand can be added from the sources indicated, these will be sufficient for holding Cairo, Fort Holt, and Paducah, and form the column proposed. * * *

These suggestions are hastily written out, but they are the result of much anxious inquiry and mature deliberation. I am confident that the plan, if properly carried out, will produce important results. I also believe it to be feasible.

I have not designated any particular line or lines of movement; that must