William Boynton, Sherman's Historical Raid

[61] his men; to dispose his artillery so as to fire at the enemy across the bayou, and produce the effect of a diversion. His other brigade, Landrum's, occupied a key position on the main road, with pickets and supports pushed well forward into the tangled abattis, within three-fourths of a mile of the enemy's forts, and in plain view of the city of Vicksburg.

Our boats still lay at our place of debarkation, covered by the gun-boats and by four regiments of infantry, one of each division. Such was the disposition of our forces during the night of the 28th.

The enemy's right was a series of batteries or forts, seven miles above us on the Yazoo, at the first bluff, near Snyder's house, called Drumgould's Bluff; his left, the fortified city of Vicksburg; and his line connecting these was near fourteen miles in extent, and was a natural fortification, strengthened by a year's labor of thousands of negroes, directed by educated and skilled officers.

My plan was by a prompt and concentrated movement to break the center, near Chickasaw Creek, at the head of a bayou of the same name; and once in position to turn to the right (Vicksburg), or left (Drumgould's Bluff), according to information then obtained. I supposed their organized forces to amount to about fifteen thousand, which could be reenforced at the rate of about four thousand a day, provided General Grant did not occupy all the attention of Pemberton's forces at Grenada, or Rosecrans those of Bragg in Tennessee. Not one word could I hear from General Grant, who was supposed to be pushing south, or of General Banks, supposed to be ascending the Mississippi.

Time being every thing to us, I determined to assault the hills in front of Morgan on the morning of the 29th; Morgan's division to carry the position of the hills, Steele's division to support him and hold the county road. I had placed General A. J. Smith in command of his own division (First) and that of M. L. Smith (Second), with orders to cross on the sand spit, undermine the steep bank of the bayou on the further side, and carry at all events the levee parapets and first line of rifle pits to prevent a concentration on Morgan.

It was near twelve o'clock (noon) when Morgan was ready, by which time Blair's and Thayer's brigades of Steele's division were up with him and took part in the assault, and Hovey's brigade was close at hand. All the troops were massed as close as possible, and all our supports were well in hand.

The assault was made and a lodgment effected on the hard table-land near the county road, and the heads of the assaulting columns reached different points of the enemy's works, but then met so withering a fire from the rifle pits and cross-fire of grape and canister from the batteries, that the columns faltered and finally fell back to the point of starting, leading many dead, wounded, and prisoners in the hands of enemy.

For a more perfect understanding of this short and desperate struggle I refer to the reports of Generals Morgan, Blair, Steele, and others inclosed.

General Morgan's first report to me was that the troops were not discouraged at all, though the losses in Blair's and DeCourcey's brigades were heavy,