Chapter 12: eyes of the government
- Appointment as Assistant Secretary of War recalled -- buying cotton at Memphis -- Proposes regulation of the trade -- appointed Commissioner of the army pay Department -- Joins Grant in front of Vicksburg -- correspondence with Secretary of War
Having presented the Cairo report to the Secretary of War, Dana returned to New York to look after his private business. He continued there, or in the vicinity, till the middle of November, when he was again summoned to Washington, as he supposed, to enter upon another investigation; but when he reported at the War Department the secretary offered him the position of second assistant secretary, which he at once accepted. Now occurred an incident which well illustrates the capricious temper of Stanton, and the uncertainty of all his actions till they were beyond the hope of recall. After hearing from the secretary that he should consider the matter settled, the new assistant took his leave, but unfortunately on his way out he met Charles G. Halpine, a bright Irish newspaper man who had served as adjutant-general on General Hunter's staff at Port Royal, and had afterwards gained some distinction as a writer over the signature of “Miles O'Reilly.” Nothing had been said to put Dana on guard against telling about his appointment, which must have become known to everybody immediately, and so, naturally enough, without a thought of harm, he told his friend, who repeated it to the reporters, and they in turn sent it to the New York papers as an item of news. The irascible [195] secretary was offended and recalled the appointment at once. Whether Stanton and Dana met again at that time, or what passed between them in regard to the incident, has never been stated. Dana certainly had a right to regard himself as badly treated, but without wasting time to set matters right, he returned to New York, where he entered into partnership with George W. Chadwick, of that city, and Roscoe Conkling, of Utica, for the purpose of buying cotton in such parts of the Mississippi Valley as had been occupied by our armies. The strictness of the Atlantic blockade had brought about a great scarcity of cotton in England, and the state of war along the border of the cotton States had cut off the supply of our own mills. There was a great outcry, in consequence of which the government had adopted the policy of allowing the trade in this staple to be carried on through the military lines. As there had already been a great rise in price, the business, where it could be carried on at all, was highly profitable. Dana and Conkling each contributed ten thousand dollars, against Chadwick's services as buyer and manager, and after revisiting Washington, where they obtained letters of introduction and commendation from Stanton to General Grant and other commanders in the field, Dana, accompanied by Chadwick, went to Memphis, where they arrived in January, 1863. They made their headquarters at the Gayoso House, and at once began operations. Dana had already expressed his doubts to the secretary as to the wisdom and propriety of the policy which had been adopted, but it produced no perceptible effect at the time. He had hardly got fairly started in the trade before he became persuaded that the business was bad for the government, and particularly so for the army, and should be stopped. With him to think was to act, and he therefore at once wrote to the Secretary of War, restating his views, and strongly urging their [196] adoption. He pointed out that the mania for sudden fortunes to be made by the speculators had already to an alarming extent corrupted and demoralized the army — that every colonel, captain, and quartermaster had already formed a secret partnership with some operator; that the private soldiers were dreaming of adding a bale of cotton to their monthly pay; that the resources of the South were inordinately increased by the trade through the lines, and that no private purchaser could be allowed in any part of the occupied region without injury to the public interests. He therefore advised that the trade should be prohibited, and that the army quartermasters should be directed to buy such cotton as might be offered at a fixed price, and forward the same by army transportation to designated markets, to be sold at auction for cash on fixed days for government account. He pointed out that two hundred thousand dollars would probably be sufficient to conduct the business, and that the money thus used “would be more than equal to thirty thousands when added to the national armies.” His own pecuniary interest clearly favored the continuance of the business, but he declared that he should be false to his duty if on that account he failed to implore the government “to put an end to an evil so enormous, so insidious, and so full of peril to the country.” His first impulse was to go to Washington and present his views more fully in person, but instead of taking that course he called upon General Grant, who fully agreed with his statements and recommendations, except such as imputed general corruption to the officers, which he had not literally intended to do. He thought, perhaps without proper reflection, that his suggestions if adopted would make the quartermasters' department of Grant's army self-supporting, and that officers and men would become honest again, while the slave-holders would find that the Rebellion, instead of quadrupling the price of the great staple, had only doubled it. [197] It is a matter of history that Grant hastened to put his personal views into effect within his own department, but, unfortunately, in doing so he acted against the advice of Rawlins, and couched his order in such terms as made it most objectionable to a class of traders who had influence enough with the President to secure from him an order countermanding the one issued by Grant. But before this was done Dana went to Washington, and after repeated interviews with the President and the Secretary of War, in which he claimed the support of General Grant as well as of every other general he had met, he succeeded in convincing then that they ought to adopt comprehensive measures not only to put an end to the cotton trade through the army lines, and to prohibit army officers from engaging in it, but that it should pass entirely under the control of the Treasury Department, and be conducted under rigid regulations which should be prepared and carried into effect under the supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury himself. This suggestion was not only an unselfish and disinterested one for Dana, but it was a most timely and important one for the government. The greed for money which it was intended to counteract was a natural one, especially among that class of army officers which had been drawn from commercial life; the industrial needs of the countries with which we were on friendly relations were pressing; our own manufacturers and merchants were most persistent in the desire to secure a supply of cotton and cotton goods, and therefore it was both natural and proper that the government, until it was correctly informed, should desire to see the trade continued. But till Dana intervened, with his statement of the evils and his practical plan for eradicating them, it is not too much to say that no one connected with the administration appeared to understand the subject or to know how to deal with it. Fortunately, both the President and the Secretary of War became deeply interested in it, [198] and as the result of their consultations with Dana, Lincoln issued his proclamation declaring all commercial intercourse with the States in rebellion to be unlawful, except when conducted in compliance with regulations to be prescribed and carried into effect by the Secretary of the Treasury. It, is to be noted that these regulations were generally efficacious, but the navy, operating on the Mississippi and its tributaries, had its own law of prize under which it took possession of all cotton within reach as captured property. Military commanders and quartermasters of outlying districts still occasionally engaged in or connived at the trade, and in certain cases shared in the profits, but the new regulations and orders were generally observed in good faith, to the great benefit of both the army and the public interests. Valuable as were Dana's services afterwards in connection with the military administration, it may be well doubted if in any single instance they were worth more to the Union cause and especially to the Treasury Department than they were in connection with the illicit cotton trade which he did so much to break up or bring under proper regulation. Having received assurances that his views in reference to the cotton trade would be carried into effect, Dana returned to New York, and arranged with his partners to withdraw from the business. The profit which they had realized was hardly worth the effort made to get it, but the renewed relations which it speedily led to with Stanton were most important. It is well known that Grant, who had by the beginning of 1863 come to the front as one of the most important officers engaged in active operations against the Southern Confederacy, although a good and successful general, was a poor correspondent. He had but few friends and no intimates connected with the government, and notwithstanding his great victories was more or less in disfavor. Besides, he [199] had ambitious and active rivals in his own command, who, aided by the unfriendly correspondents, were doing all they could to discredit him with the country. It should be remembered also that Lincoln, without fully appreciating the difficulties of creating independent commands within the departments and armies already established, had promised the command of the expedition against the Confederate stronghold at Vicksburg to General McClernand, a gallant but somewhat untrained and insubordinate volunteer from Illinois. As a politician he had been a leading Democrat with strong pro-slavery leanings, but with Logan and other Western leaders of his party had finally followed Douglas to the support of the administration's war policy. The President was therefore favorable to his ambitions. He had authorized him, shortly after the battle of Antietam, to raise a special force in the Northern and Western States, to be used in clearing the enemy front the banks of the lower Mississippi, and this force was now about ready to take the field. Up to this time Grant's actual command had been confined to western Kentucky and western Tennessee, with no precise definition of its limits or of the policy which was to prevail within them. The situation was somewhat cleared up by Executive orders dividing the Army of the Tennessee into four army corps and designating the army and corps commanders, but the danger of conflict or supercession did not even then pass entirely away, for McClernand, under the President's personal assurances, still counted upon commanding his own corps, the Thirteenth, and such other forces as might be united with it on the expedition down the river against Vicksburg. Having received timely warning of this important fact, along with the suggestion that the greatest operation in his department lay in that direction, Grant decided, as was his right and duty, to take personal control and direction of this as well as of all other operations in his department. This still further exasperated [200] General McClernand; and, inasmuch as certain Western newspapers had come out against Grant's continuance in command, it must be conceded that his fortunes not only then but up to the end of the Vicksburg campaign hung upon a slender thread. When it is recalled that it was in this period that the temperance people laid before the President the charge that Grant was drinking to excess and could not properly be intrusted with the command of a great army, it will be seen, notwithstanding the fact that the President had dismissed them with his famous question, “Can you tell me where Grant buys his liquor? for I would like to distribute a few barrels of the same brand among my other major-generals,” that the general was clearly in need of friends who could command the attention of both the President and the Secretary of War, and keep them correctly informed on all matters of importance connected with him and the forces under his command. It was at this juncture that Dana came into Grant's military life as well as into great influence with the government. He had been at home only a few weeks when Stanton again summoned him to Washington, and on his arrival asked him to go to Grant's army for the purpose of reporting its daily proceedings and giving such information “as would enable Mr. Lincoln and himself to settle their minds as to Grant, about whom there were many doubts, and against whom there was some complaint.” 1 Dana's ostensible function was to be a “special commissioner of the War Department to investigate and report upon the condition of the pay service in the Western armies,” but his real duty was to report daily what he might see and learn. There was never the least misunderstanding about this. Everybody of importance in that army, and especially at Grant's headquarters, understood the matter just [201] as it is set forth above. How the real purport of Dana's mission reached the army before he did it is impossible to state, but immediately after it became known that he was coming, it also became known that his mission was largely a personal one, which could not fail to affect Grant and his army most seriously. I had joined Grant's staff in October, 1862, and had been at once received into his official family on the most friendly footing. As there was at the time only three other regular officers or graduates of West Point on the staff, one absent sick and two with the supply departments, I was intrusted with many confidential duties. No secrets were withheld from me. Every plan of operation and every important movement was necessarily made known to me, and as I was besides an Illinoisian well acquainted with most of the leading generals, several of whom were my warm personal friends, I soon became well informed as to the undercurrents and feelings of the army. It is now a matter of history that from October, 1862, to June, 1863, or for a period of eight months, Grant's tenure of command was uncertain, and that at times he was in imminent danger of being removed, not only for personal reasons, but because the country needed success which he had not so far been able to achieve. Hence, as soon as it became known that Dana was coming, it was believed by many that if he did not bring plenary authority to actually displace Grant, the fate of that general would certainly depend upon the character of the reports which the special commissioner might send to Washington in regard to him. About that time I became inspector-general of Grant's army, and my relations with Rawlins, who was not only the adjutant-general but the actual chief of staff, were necessarily of the most intimate character. Headquarters were then at Milliken's Bend, and I was temporarily away, but the first night we got together we went over the entire [202] situation much more fully than it is set forth here and agreed that Dana must be taken into complete confidence, that nothing should be withheld from him, and that everything personal as well as official, unfavorable as well as favorable, must be made known to him, without any reservation whatever. We felt that it would be better for all concerned that he should be received in this manner than left in doubt, suspicion, and concealment to learn what would doubtless be poured into his ears by Grant's enemies. We sincerely believed that Grant, whatever might be his faults and weaknesses, was a far safer man to command the army than any other general in it, or than any that might be sent to it from another field. Indeed, we felt sure that we should win with him, if his hands were loyally upheld while carrying out the plans which were surely coming to the front. At all events, we acted on this theory with Grant's full concurrence, and the magnificent results which followed more than confirmed our theory and vindicated our conduct. After the foregoing statement it will be understood that Dana was received with every mark of respect and consideration. He was taken into one of the headquarters' messes on the footing of an officer of the highest rank. Horses were furnished him when we had them, tents and transportation were provided for him, and he became our trusted companion and friend, to whom every important fact was made known, from whom nothing was concealed. His eyes were still weak; it was almost impossible for him to write by candle or lamp light, and as mine were good he frequently asked me to act as his amanuensis. While he did not necessarily show us his despatches sent or received, he did not conceal their contents nor his views from us, but interchanged them fully for ours, and from the first to the last day of his connection with us showed himself in every way to be worthy of the respect and confidence of Grant [203] and his staff, as well as of the President and Secretary of War. His position was a difficult one, even with all we did to make it easy for him; but as this narrative will show, he filled it with tact, ability, and patriotism to the end. He was at all times not only modest and unobtrusive, but alert and ready to go where he might observe and learn for himself. In the full vigor of life, an excellent horseman and athlete entirely without timidity or fear, he was a helpful and encouraging influence upon all with whom he came in contact, and with no one more than with General Grant, who adopted towards him the most friendly and cordial manner and seemed to take special pleasure in his company both in camp and on the march. In fact, Dana was in a certain sense a revelation to Grant as well as to those of us who were younger. He was not only genial, unaffected, and sympathetic in his manners, but far and away the best educated and most widely informed man that any of us had up to that time ever met. His companionship was therefore most acceptable and beneficial to all.
