his report and memoirs, that the Confederate army at Dalton
was brought to the verge of ruin by his movement through Snake Creek gap.
This operation had been provided against by making Resaca
strong enough to hold out at least a day against twenty thousand or thirty thousand men, and by the making of roads by which the Southern
troops at Dalton
could reach Resaca
before their antagonists.
was held, instead of Snake Creek gap, because it was nearer than the latter to the main Confederate position, and much farther from the Federal
main body, and could be held by a smaller body of troops.
This operation could have produced no better result than that gained — the abandonment of Dalton
by the Southern
, instead of covering Dalton
, completely covered the Federal
flank march to Snake Creek gap, and, therefore, was advantageous to him (General Sherman
), and not to his adversary.
On page 32, General Sherman
, gives the impression that the position in front of Dalton
was very strong, and he says in his report (page 73): “To strike Dalton
in front was impracticable, as it was covered by an inaccessible ridge.”
This ridge covered the left flank, not the front, and terminated but two miles north of the position, which was east of the mountain, in ground as fit for the maneuvres of a large army as a tactician can expect to find in the interior of the Southern
On page 35, the General
writes that the bulk of the Southern
army was “found (on the 13th) inside of Resaca
... A complete line of intrenchments was found covering the place.”
The two armies were formed in front of Resaca
nearly at the same time; so that the Federal
army could give battle on equal terms, except as to numbers, by attacking promptly — the difference being about ten to four.
The two armies intrenched that day. There was very brisk fighting all day of the 14th-greatly to our advantage, for we were assailed in our intrenchments.
was misinformed as to the taking of an important ridge by the advance of McPherson
's whole line, and bloody repulses of Confederate attempts to retake it-this on the 15th; there were no such occurrences.
But on the 14th, about dusk, the left of our line of skirmishers-forty or fifty men — was driven from a slight elevation in front of our left; but no attempt was made to retake it.
The first paragraph on page 36 is inaccurate.
The fighting on the 15th was to our advantage (none of it at night), for we were on the defensive-behind breastworks.
As to capturing a four-gun intrenched battery with its men and guns: On the morning of the 15th, General Hood
advanced one, eighty or one hundred yards. Soon after its fire opened the men and horses were driven off by an