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mile and a half further forward.
In taking the new position, the Tenth Alabama Regiment, Wilcox's Brigade, had a sharp skirmish with the body of the enemy who had occupied a wooded hill on the extreme right of my line. * * * Shortly after the line had been formed, I received notice that Lieutenant General Longstreet would occupy the ground on my right, and that his line would be in a direction nearly at right angles with mine, and that he would assault the extreme left of the enemy and drive him toward Gettysburg.
From a narrative of
General McLaws, published in 1873, I copy the following:
On the 30th of June, I had been directed to have my division in readiness to follow General Ewell's Corps.
Marching toward Gettysburg, which it was intimated we would have passed by ten o'clock the next day (the 1st of July), my division was accordingly marched from its camp and lined along the road in the order of march by eight o'clock the 1st of July.
When the troops of Ewell's Corps (it was Johnson's Division in charge of Ewell's wagon trains, which were coming from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains) had passed the head of my column, I asked General Longstreet's staff officer, Major Fairfax, if my division should follow.
He went off to inquire, and returned with orders for me to wait until Ewell's wagon train had passed, which did not happen until after four o'clock P. M. The train was calculated to be fourteen miles long, when I took up the line of march and continued marching until I arrived within three miles of Gettysburg, where my command camped along a creek.
This was far into the night.
My division was leading Longstreet's Corps, and, of course, the other divisions come up later.
I saw Hood's Division the next morning, and understood that Pickett had been detached to guard the rear.
While on the march, about ten o'clock at night, I met General Longstreet and some of his staff coming from the direction of Gettysburg, and had a few moments conversation with him. He said nothing of having received an order to attack at daylight the next morning.
Here, I will state, that until General Pendleton mentioned it about two years ago, when he was on a lecturing tour, after the death of General Lee, I never heard it intimated even that any such order had ever been given.
I close the testimony on this point by an extract from a letter from
General Hood.
He writes:
I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning of the 2d of July.
My division soon commenced filing into an open field near me, when the troops were allowed to stack arms and rest until further orders.
A short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of the same morning, we were both engaged in company with Generals A. P. Hill and Lee in observing the position of the Federals.
General Lee, with coat buttoned to the throat, sabre belt around his waist, and field-glasses pendant at his side, walked up and down in the shade of large trees near us, halting, now and then, to observe the enemy.
He seemed full of hope, yet at times buried in deep thought.
Colonel Freemantle, of England, was esconced in the forks of a tree not far off, with glasses in constant use, examining the lofty position of the Federal army.
General Lee was seemingly anxious that you should attack that morning.
He remarked to me: “The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him, he will whip us.”
You thought it better to await the arrival of Pickett's Division, at that time still in the rear, in order to make the attack, and you said to me, subsequently, while we were seated together near the
