The Annals of the Civil War Written by Leading Participants North and South
Alexander Kelly McClure, Ed.

[454] shows that the General is mistaken in supposing the rencontre was unexpected on our side. Buford's judgment in believing he would be attacked in heavy force on the morning of the 1st of July, and going out four miles to meet it the night before, was what saved to us the position. Had he waited an attack at Gettysburg, he would have been driven from the place before any support could have arrived.

General Meade had his headquarters on the 1st of July at a place called Taneytown, about eighteen miles to the east of Gettysburg. It was about noon of that day I received a dispatch from General Buford, stating the enemy had attacked him in force early that morning four miles from Gettysburg; that he had fought them desperately for several hours to retard their progress; that Howard, with the Eleventh Corps, and Reynolds, with the First Corps, had arrived on the field; that Reynolds had been killed while bringing his corps into action; there appeared to be no directing head, and if General Meade expected to secure that position, the sooner he marched the army there the better. I immediately showed this dispatch to General Meade, when he decided to move on Gettysburg, and sending for General Hancock, whose corps was nearest to Gettysburg, he ordered him to proceed at once to that point, directing his corps to follow him, and to take command of the forces engaged. At the same time orders were sent to the different corps of the army to march on Gettysburg without delay. The time occupied in making these arrangements detained General Meade until after dark, when we proceeded to Gettysburg, and arrived at General Howard's headquarters on Cemetery Hill after midnight.

At daylight on the morning of the 2d of July, General Meade requested me to ride over the position with him, and we were engaged in that duty until ten o'clock, by which time the disposition of the different corps, as they should arrive, had been decided. In examining the position, General Meade was strongly impressed that our right was our weakest place, and on both the 2d and 3d of July he gave it his attention. On the 3d, during the artillery combat on our left, he took a position on a high mound between the right and left flanks, watching our right, and expecting a heavy attack in that direction. I had six batteries of horse artillery in reserve, and in case our right had given way, these batteries were to be sent to its support. But finding our right could not hold its own, and our batteries on the left had suffered, these splendid batteries were placed in position on the left in time to meet General Pickett's charge. I am not, therefore, surprised when General Longstreet states, “That when the smoke cleared away Pickett's Division was ”