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been saved between the time of the fall of
Fort Donelson and the arrival of the enemy in
Nashville.”
We shall complete this chapter by a brief account of a defeat cf Confederate arms that preceded by several days the fall of
Fort Donelson, and took place on a widely separated theatre of the war. The thread of Confederate disaster takes us here from the tributaries of the
Mississippi to the low and melancholy sea-line of
North Carolina.
About the middle of January, 1862,
Gen. Burnside entered
Pamlico Sound at the head of an expedition, consisting of more than sixty vessels of all kinds, twenty-six of them gunboats, and with at least fifteen thousand men. It readily became apparent that
Roanoke Island was the first object of his attack.
This important island lies in the broad inlet between
Pamlico and
Currituck Sounds, and about midway between the main land and the narrow strip of bank which dykes out the ocean.
It was of great moment to the
South to defend it, for its possession by the enemy would unlock to them
Albemarle and
Currituck Sounds, open to them eight rivers, give them access to the country chiefly supplying provisions to
Norfolk, and enable them to menace that city, and the four canals and two railroads running through the country by which it was surrounded.
Gen. Henry A. Wise, who had been ordered to the command of the department embracing
Roanoke Island, declared that it should be defended at the expense of twenty thousand men, and many millions of dollars.
But to his estimates of the importance of the position he found that the
Richmond authorities had a deaf ear. On the 7th of January, 1862,
Gen. Wise assumed command, and made an examination of the defences.
He found them inadequate, in his opinion, to resist even the force then at
Hatteras, and as the
Burnside expedition began already to point to the
North Carolina coast, he called urgently for reinforcements.
He addressed a letter to
Mr. Benjamin, the
Confederate Secretary of War, and followed it by a personal interview, in which he strenuously insisted that more troops should be sent to the island.
He urged that a large part of
Gen. Huger's command, at
Norfolk, might be safely detached, and used for the defence of
Roanoke.
He argued that the fifteen thousand men under
Huger were idle, and were only kept at
Norfolk in view of a possible attack, and that they would much more advantageously defend the city, by guarding the approaches through the
Sound, than by remaining inactive.
He explained that
Roanoke Island guarded more than four-fifths of all
Norfolk's supplies of corn, pork and forage, and that its capture by the enemy would cut the command of
Gen. Huger off from all its most