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to astound the people of the
South, to involve the practical loss of another mass of rich territory, and to alarm the hopes of men in all parts of the world for the success of the
Confederates.
This unexpected event was the fall of New Orleans.
With respect to this disaster, we have to develop a long train of the secret history of the
Confederate Administration — a history replete with evidences of mismanagement and shiftlessness that will be almost incredible to the world accustomed to read of the administration of governments in time of war, and to expect, at least, an average of intelligence in the conduct of public affairs.
The fall of New Orleans.
New Orleans had been so long threatened with attack, that popular opinion in the
Confederacy was disposed to take it as impregnable.
For months the Federal fleet cruised about the
Gulf with evident indecision, until people in New Orleans began to smile, and say: “They would think twice before attempting a rehearsal of the scenes of 1812.”
It was declared, on the authority of newspapers, that the city was inpregnable; the forts,
Jackson and
St. Philip, sixty or seventy miles below the city, were considered but as the outer line of defences; the shores of the river were lined with batteries; and in the harbour were reported to be twelve gunboats, and certain iron-clad naval structures which, it was asserted, were superiour to the famous “
Virginia,” and would deal with a Federal fleet as hawks might with a flock of pigeons.
But penetrating this popular conceit and confidence, and going to official records for proofs, we shall discover that the facts were that New Orleans was in a shamefully defenceless condition; that the
Richmond authorities had persisted in the strange errour that the attack on the city was to come from above; that they had consequently stripped it almost entirely of troops, and neglected the armament of its interiour line of defence; and that the naval structures, which the authorities had declared would be fully able to protect the city under any circumstances, were, by the most wretched and culpable mismanagement, neglected, delayed, and finally found in a condition in which they were not of the slightest avail.
Gen. Mansfield Lovell assumed command of the defences of New Orleans late in October, 1861.
The city at that time had been “drained of arms, ammunition, medical stores, clothing and supplies, which had been sent to other points,” and the defences were in a thoroughly incomplete condition.
The troops raised in
Louisiana had been principally sent to
Virginia and
Pensacola, and those that remained were necessarily inadequate to the end desired, and required organization.
