Edward Alfred Pollard, The lost cause; a new Southern history of the War of the Confederates ... Drawn from official sources and approved by the most distinguished Confederate leaders.

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[585] Confederate army was placed in position in front of his works at that place. During the night, however, the enemy evacuated the town, taking position on the opposite side of the river, about a mile and a half from the town, which was considered quite strong in front. Late in the evening of the 28th November, Gen. Forrest, with most of his command, crossed Duck River, a few miles above Columbia, and Hood followed early on the morning of the 20th, with Stewart's and Cheatham's corps, and Johnson's division of Lee's corps, leaving the other divisions of Lee's corps in the enemy's front at Columbia. The troops moved in light marching order, the object being to turn the enemy's flank by marching rapidly on roads parallel to the Columbia and Franklin pike, at or near Spring Hill, and to cut off that portion of the enemy at or near Columbia.

The enemy, discovering the intentions of the Confederates, began to retreat on the pike towards Spring Hill. About 4 r. M., Hood's infantry forces, Cheatham in the advance, commenced to come in contact with the enemy, about two miles from Spring Hill, through which place the Columbia and Franklin pike runs. The enemy was at this time moving rapidly along the pike, with some of his troops on the flank of his column to protect it. Cheatham was ordered to attack the enemy at once, vigorously, and get possession of this pike. He made only a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated. The great object of Gen. Hood was to possess himself of the road to Franklin, and thus cut off the enemy's retreat. Though owing to delays the signal opportunity to do this had passed at daylight, there was yet a chance of dealing the enemy a heavy blow. Stewart's corps and Johnson's division were arriving upon the field to support the attack. Stewart was ordered to move his corps beyond Cheatham's, and place it across the road beyond Spring Hill. He did not succeed in getting the position he desired, owing to some misunderstanding of orders, and, night falling, he went into bivouac. About midnight, ascertaining that the enemy was moving in great confusion-artillery wagons and troops intermixed-Gen. Hood sent instructions to Cheatham to advance a heavy line of skirmishers against him, and still further impede and confuse his march. This was not accomplished. The enemy continued to move along the road in hurry and confusion, within hearing, nearly all the night. Thus was lost a great opportunity of striking the enemy, and his line of retreat secured in the face of the Confederates without a battle.

Much of the disaster that was now to ensue in his campaign Gen. Hood attributed to the fact that “some of his Generals had failed him at Spring Hill.” There was nothing left now but to pursue the enemy. At daylight Hood's army followed as fast as possible towards Franklin, Stewart in the advance, Cheatham following, and Lee with the trains, moving from Columbia on the same road. The Confederates pursued the