Edward Alfred Pollard, The lost cause; a new Southern history of the War of the Confederates ... Drawn from official sources and approved by the most distinguished Confederate leaders.

[262] In the first part of the year 1862, the Federal Government, with plans fully matured, had under arms about six hundred thousand men; more than one-third of whom were operating in the direction of Richmond. What Gen. McClellan himself said of the vast and brilliant army with which he designed to capture the Confederate capital was not extravagant. It was, indeed, “magnificent in material, admirable in discipline and instruction, excellently equipped and armed.” On March 1, 1862, the number of Federal troops in and about Washington had increased to 193,142, fit for duty, with a grand aggregate of 221,987.

Such was the heavy and perilous force of the enemy that, in the spring of 1862, hung on the northern frontier of Virginia. Let us see what was in front of it on the Confederate line of defence. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston had in the camps of Centreville and Manassas less than thirty thousand men. These figures are from an official source. “Stonewall” Jackson had been detached with eleven skeleton regiments to amuse the enemy in the Shenandoah Valley, passing rapidly between Banks and Shields, and giving them the idea that he meditated a formidable movement. Such was the force that in North Virginia stood in McClellan's path, and deterred him from a blow that at that time might have been fatal to the Southern Confederacy.

It had been the idea of the Washington authorities to despatch the Confederacy by a combined movement in the winter. The order of President Lincoln for a general movement of the land and naval forces against the Confederate positions on the 22d of February (Washington's birthday), directed that McClellan's army should advance for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwest of Manassas Junction. But McClellan urged a different line of operations on the Lower Rappahannock, obtained delay, and did not advance.

In the mean time, Gen. Johnston had not been an idle spectator of the immense and overwhelming preparations of the enemy in his front. As a commander he was sagacious, quick to apprehend, and had that peculiar military reticence in connection with a sage manner and decisive action, that obtained the confidence of his men instead of exciting criticism, or alarming their suspicions. In the first winter months of 1862, he had determined to change his line on the Potomac. All idea of offensive operations on it had long ago been abandoned. It had become necessary in Gen. Johnston's opinion that the main body of the Confederate forces in Virginia should be in supporting distance of the Army of the Peninsula, so that, in the event of either being driven back, they might combine for final resistance before Richmond.

During winter, Johnston had been quietly transporting his immense stores towards the Rappahannock, removing every cannon that could be