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Gens. Carter,
Manigault,
Quarles,
Cockrell, and
Scott were wounded, and
Brig.-Gen. Gordon captured.
Battle of Nashville.
The next morning
Gen. Hood advanced upon
Nashville, where
Schofield had retreated, and where
Thomas lay with his main force.
He laid siege to the town on the 2d December, closely investing it for a fortnight.
The opinion long prevailed in the
Confederacy that in this pause and the operations of siege,
Hood made the cardinal mistake of his campaign; and that if he had taken another course, and struck boldly across the
Cumberland, and settled himself in the enemy's communications, he would have forced
Thomas to evacuate
Nashville, and fall back towards
Kentucky.
This was the great fear of
Gen. Grant.
That high Federal officer, in his report of the operations of 1864, has written: “Before the
battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay.
This impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the
Cumberland into
Kentucky.
I feared
Hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble here.
After urging upon
Gen. Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started west to superintend matters there in person.
Reaching
Washington city, I received
Gen. Thomas's despatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed.
I was delighted.
All fears and apprehensions were dispelled.”
On the night of the 14th December,
Thomas decided upon a plan of battle, which was to make a feint on
Hood's right flank, while he massed his main force to crush in
Hood's left, which rested on the
Cumberland, and where the cover of the
Federal gunboats might be made available.
The k runt of the action did not fall until evening, when the enemy drove in the Confederate infantry outposts on the left flank.
Hood, however, quickly ordered up troops from his right to stay the reversed tide of battle; and the remainder of the day was occupied by the enemy in sweeping the
Confederate entrenchments with artillery fire, while here and there his infantry attempted, in vain, to find a weak spot in their lines.
Under cover of the night
Hood re-formed his line, and in the morning was found in position along the
Overton Hills, some two miles or so to tile rear of his original line.
The new position was a strong one, running along the wooded crests of closely-connecting hills; while the two keys to it were the
Granny White and Franklin pikes, leading to
Franklin,
Columbia,
Pulaski, and so down the country to the
Tennessee River.
Thomas' overwhelming numbers enabled him to throw heavy columns against
Hood's left and centre.
But every attack of the enemy was repulsed.
It was
