J. Adam, A. M. Adam, Commentary on Plato, Protagoras
J. Adam & A. M. Adam, Ed.

45. ὑπογράψαντες γραμμὰς τῇ γραφίδι should be understood of tracing (by dots or otherwise) the outlines of the lines (γραμμαί) which form letters. These outlines would be filled up by the pupil: see Blümner, Griechische Privataltherthümer, p. 315. The usual view (since Heindorf) has been to regard the γραμμαί as horizontal lines ruled for guidance; ‘ut pueri in schola directe s. ad lineam scribere iubentur, ita in vita quae agunt ad legis normam iis dirigenda sunt’ (Kroschel). Such a view is, however, inconsistent with the meaning of ὑπογράφειν and of ὑφήγησις, and (in view of Plato's statements as to the nature of Law) renders the simile inexact. ὑπογράφειν in Plato regularly refers to an outline drawing (as ὑποτυποῦσθαι to moulding in outline Tim. 76E) and is opposed to ἀπεργάσασθαι and (in Aristotle) to ἀναγράφειν, e.g. Rep. VIII. 548C-D οὐκοῦν— αὕτη μὲν ἡ ρολιτεία οὕτω γεγονυῖα καὶ τοιαύτη ἄν τις εἴη, ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα ρολιτείας ὑρογπάψαντα μὴ ἀκπιβῶς ἀρεπγάσασθαι διὰ τὸ ἐξαπκεῖν μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑρογπαφῆς τόν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, and Theaet. 172E, where a litigant's ἀντωμοσία is called ὑπογραφή—a sort of outline drawing ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον, but which his speech must simply ἀπεργάσασθαι. ὑφηγεῖσθαι is similarly used, only with the added idea of guiding: e.g. Rep. III. 403D-E οὐκοῦν εἰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἱκανῶς θεραπεύσαντες παραδοῖμεν αὐτῇ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅσον τοὺς τύπους ὑφηγησαίμεθα—ὀρθῶς ἃν ποιοῖμεν; and Laws, X. 890C δεῖ ταῦτα οὕτω πράττειν διανοουμένους ὅπῃπερ ἂν ὁ νομοθέτης ὑφηγήσηται γράφων. The point of the simile is this. As the child draws his pen between the outlines of the lines forming letters (making e.g. into ), so we must keep our actions between certain outlines, which are the laws. Plato invariably regards νόμοι as only τύποι, within which our actions should fall: cf. Rep. II. 383C παντάπασιν—ἔγωγε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ, καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἂν χρώ̣μην (whence νόμους ὑπογράφειν here and in Laws, V. 734E): see also Polit. 294A ff. τὸ δ᾽ ἄριστον οὐ τοὺς νόμους ἐστὶν ἰσχύειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνδπα τὸν μετὰ φπονήσεως βασιλικὸν—ὅτι νόμος οὐκ ἄν ροτε δύναιτο τό τε ἄπιστον καὶ τὸ δικαιότατον ἀκπιβῶς ρᾶσιν ἅμα ρεπιλαβὼν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐριτάττειν. αἱ γὰπ ἀνομοιότητες τῶν τε ἀνθπώρων καὶ τῶν ρπάξεων—οὐδὲν ἐῶσιν ἁρλοῦν ἐν οὐδενὶ ρεπὶ ἁράντων καὶ ἐρὶ ράντα τὸν χπόνον ἀποφαίνεσθαι τέχνην οὐδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν—for which reason in the Republic (VI. 497D) there must always be a power above the laws. The explanation which we have given does not disagree with the account of Seneca in his Epistles, XV. 2. 51 ‘Pueri ad praescriptum discunt. Digiti illorum tenentur et aliena manu per literarum simulacra ducuntur’: it is supported by Quintilian, I. 1. 27 ‘cum vero iam ductus sequi coeperit, non inutile erit eas (sc. literas) tabellae quam optime insculpi, ut per illos velut sulcos ducatur stilus’. It is probable that both these authors had the present passage in view.

It should be noted that γράφειν νόμους was a regular phrase: cf. the image in Rep. VI. 501A.

48. ὣς δὲ καὶ. ὥς for οὕτως is rare in Attic prose: Heindorf quotes (inter alia) Rep. VII. 530D κινδυνεύει ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὣς πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὦτα παγῆναι. For δέ see above on 318C