J. Adam, A. M. Adam, Commentary on Plato, Protagoras
J. Adam & A. M. Adam, Ed.

31. καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία. This—the MSS. reading—is undoubtedly right. Plato coins the word ἀναξία for ‘unworthiness’ to complete the parallel with D above: cf. ll. 17-21 οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων νικᾶν—κατὰ τί δὲ—ἀνάξιά ἐστιν τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν κτλ. Similarly in Phaedo, 105E, Plato coins ἀνάρτιος, in 106A ἄθερμος (rightly accepted, in spite of MS. authority, by editors) and ἄψυκτος (see MSS., but Wyttenbach's ἄψυχρος is—we think rightly—accepted by some editors) as pointed and convenient negatives to ἄρτιος, θερμός, ψυχρός. Cicero's translation ‘quae igitur potest esse indignitas voluptatis ad molestiam, nisi in magnitudine aut in longitudine alterius utrius posita?’ (Nobbe's Cicero, p. 1313) shows that ἀναξία was read in his time: so in Ficinus' ‘quae vero alia inest ad dolorem indignitas voluptati quam excessus inter se atque defectus?’ The word ἀναξία hardly took root in Greek, though occasionally found in the writings of the Stoics, whose regular word for this notion is ἀπαξία. ἡδονῇ (now found to be the reading of some MSS.) for ἡδονή is due to Heindorf.

33. ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστί: as Sauppe remarks, we should expect ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ μείζω—γίγνεσθαι, but the words are said as if for καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία κτλ. had been written καὶ πῶς ἄλλως ἀνάξια τὰ ἡδέα ρπὸς τὰ λυρηπά, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὑρεπβάλλοντα ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐλλείποντα;

35. μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον: this case is not given above (D-E) because the notion of intensity is more applicable to pleasure (and pain) than to good (and evil): cf. Phileb. 24A ff. with 27E ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχετον, ἢ τῶν τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένων ἐοτόν; ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι. So far we have reached this point. To be overcome by pleasure is to choose in place of lesser pleasures greater pains and the like. But here the element of time comes in: a man might fairly say—yes, but the pleasures are now, the pains remote. Socrates tries to show that this makes no real difference.

36. τὸ παραχρῆμα ἡδύ. When we are overcome by pleasure, we do the pleasant, not the painful: therefore the contrast is between the present pleasure and the remote consequences, whether pleasure or pain. For this reason it would be wrong to supply καὶ λυπηρόν after ἡδύ.