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even contemplation may on occasion be injurious to
health.
[5]
(1) (d) Neither prudence nor any other quality is
hampered by its own pleasure, but only by alien pleasures1;
the pleasures of contemplation and study will enable us to contemplate and study
better.
[6]
(1) (e) That there should be no art devoted to the
production of any form of pleasure is only natural; an art never produces an activity, but
the capacity for an activity. Though in point of fact the arts of perfumery and cookery
are generally considered to be arts of pleasure.
[7]
The arguments (1) (b) that the temperate man avoids
pleasure, and (1) (c) that the prudent man pursues
freedom from pain, and (1) (f) that animals and
children pursue pleasure, are all met by the same reply. It has been explained2 how some pleasures are absolutely good,
and how not all pleasures are good.3 Now it is those pleasures which are not absolutely good that both animals
and children pursue, and it is freedom from pain arising from the want of those pleasures
that the prudent man pursues4: that is, the pleasures that involve desire and pain, namely
the bodily pleasures (for these are of that nature) , or their excessive
forms, in regard to which Profligacy is displayed. That is why the temperate man avoids
excessive bodily pleasures: for even the temperate man has pleasures.
1 i.e., the pleasures arising from the exercise of other qualities.
2 Cf. 4.5.
3 i.e., not good absolutely or in themselves, though good (in moderation) as means to life: the ‘necessary’ and ‘neutral’ pleasures of 4.2,5.
4 i.e., the prudent man both satisfies his natural desire for the bodily pleasures in moderation, and trains himself not to mind their absence; but does both not for the sake of pleasure, but to avoid the disturbance of pain.