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though not in the same way as sailors are fearless, for he thinks
there is no hope of safety, and to die by drowning is revolting to him,1 whereas sailors
keep up heart because of their experience.
[12]
Also Courage
is shown in dangers where a man can defend himself by valor or die nobly, but neither is
possible in disasters like shipwreck.7.
Now although the same things are not fearful to everybody, there are some terrors which
we pronounce beyond human endurance, and these of course are fearful to everyone in his
senses. And the terrors that man can endure differ in magnitude and degree;
[2]
as also do the situations inspiring confidence.2
[2]
But the courageous man is proof against fear so far as
man may be. Hence although he will sometimes fear even terrors not beyond man's endurance,
he will do so in the right way, and he will endure them as principle dictates, for the
sake of what is noble3; for that is the
end at which virtue aims.
[3]
On the other hand it is
possible to fear such terrors too much, and too little; and also to fear things that are
not fearful as if they were fearful.
[4]
Error arises either
from fearing what one ought not to fear, or from fearing in the wrong manner, or at the
wrong time, or the like; and similarly with regard to occasions for confidence.
[5]
The courageous man then is he that endures or fears the right things and for the right
purpose and in the right manner and at the right time, and who shows confidence in a
similar way. (For the courageous man feels and acts as the circumstances merit,
1 i.e., he resents it as inglorious.
2 In using τὰ θαρραλέα as the opposite of τὰ φοβερά Aristotle follows Plato, Plat. Rep. 450e, Plat. Prot. 359c, Plat. Lach. 195b, etc.: but he is original in distinguishing confidence as regards the former from fearlessness as regards the latter, and so considering excessive fearlessness in grave dangers as a different vice from excessive confidence in dangers not really formidable.
3 i.e., the rightness and fineness of the act itself, cf. 7.13; 8.5,14; 9.4; and see note on 1.3.2. This amplification of the conception of virtue as aiming at the mean here appears for the first time: we now have the final as well as the formal cause of virtuous action.