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each man's conception of his end is determined by his
character, whatever that may be. Although therefore, on the hypothesis1 that each man is in a sense responsible for his moral
disposition, he will in a sense be responsible for his conception of the good, if on the
contrary this hypothesis be untrue, no man is responsible for his own wrongdoing. He does
wrong through ignorance of the right end, thinking that wrongdoing will procure him his
greatest Good; and his aim at his end2 is not of his own choosing. A man needs to be born with moral vision, so
to speak, whereby to discern correctly and choose what is truly good. A man of good
natural disposition is a man well endowed by nature in this respect; for if a thing is the
greatest and noblest of gifts, and is something which cannot be acquired or learnt from
another, but which a man will possess in such form as it has been bestowed on him at
birth, a good and noble natural endowment in this respect will constitute a good
disposition in the full and true meaning of the term.”
[18]
Now if this theory be true, how will virtue be voluntary any more than vice? Both for the
good man and the bad man alike, their view of their end is determined in the same manner,
by nature or however it may be; and all their actions of whatever sort are guided by
reference to their end as thus determined.
[19]
Whether then
a man's view of his end, whatever it may be, is not given by nature but is partly due to
himself, or whether, although his end is determined by nature, yet virtue is voluntary
because the good man's actions to gain his end are voluntary, in either case