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to that kind of
unrestraint which is co-extensive with Profligacy of the human sort.
[9]
It is clear then that Self-restraint and Unrestraint relate only to the objects to which
Temperance and Profligacy are related, and that unrestraint in relation to anything else
is of another kind, which is only so called metaphorically and with a
qualification.
Let us now consider the point that Unrestraint in anger1 is less disgraceful than Unrestraint in the desires.
Now it appears that anger does to some extent hear reason, but hears it wrong, just as
hasty servants hurry out of the room before they have heard the whole of what you are
saying, and so mistake your order, and as watch-dogs bark at a mere knock at the door,
without waiting to see if it is a friend. Similarly anger, owing to the heat and swiftness
of its nature, hears, but does not hear the order given, and rushes off to take vengeance.
When reason or imagination suggests that an insult or slight has been received, anger
flares up at once, but after reasoning as it were that you ought to make war on anybody
who insults you. Desire on the other hand, at a mere hint from [the reason
or2] the senses that a thing is pleasant, rushes off to enjoy
it.