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this being determined by principle, that is,1 as the prudent man would determine it.
[16]
And it is a mean state between two vices, one of excess and one of defect. Furthermore,
it is a mean state in that whereas the vices either fall short of or exceed what is right
in feelings and in actions, virtue ascertains and adopts the mean.
[17]
Hence while in respect of its substance and the definition that states
what it really is in essence virtue is the observance of the mean, in point of excellence
and rightness it is an extreme.2
[18]
Not every action or emotion however admits of the observance of a due mean. Indeed the
very names of some directly imply evil, for instance malice,3 shamelessness,
envy, and, of actions, adultery, theft, murder. All these and similar actions and feelings
are blamed as being bad in themselves; it is not the excess or deficiency of them that we
blame. It is impossible therefore ever to go right in regard to them—one must
always be wrong; nor does right or wrong in their case depend on the circumstances, for
instance, whether one commits adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the
right manner; the mere commission of any of them is wrong.
[19]
One might as well suppose there could be a due mean and excess and
deficiency in acts of injustice or cowardice or profligacy,
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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