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as modest people are thought to do, for an equitable man is apt to
take less than his due—this is a case of acting unjustly towards oneself. But
perhaps this also requires qualification. For the man who gave himself the smaller share
may possibly have got a larger share of some other good thing, for instance glory, or
intrinsic moral nobility. Also the inference may be refuted by referring to our definition
of acting unjustly: in the case supposed, the distributor has nothing done to him against
his wish; therefore he does not suffer injustice merely because he gets the smaller share:
at most he only suffers damage.
[10]
And it is clear that the giver as well as the receiver of an undue share may be acting
unjustly, and that the receiver is not doing so in all cases. For the charge of injustice
attaches, not to a man of whom it can be said that he does what is unjust, but to one of
whom it can be said that he does this voluntarily, that is to say one from whom the action
originates; and the origin of the act in this case lies in the giver and not in the
receiver of the share.
[11]
Again, ‘to do a thing’ has more than one meaning. In a certain sense
a murder is done by the inanimate instrument, or by the murderer's hand, or by a slave
acting under orders. But though these do what is unjust, they cannot be said to act
unjustly.1
[12]
Again, although if a judge has given an unfair judgement in ignorance, he is not guilty
of injustice, nor is the judgement unjust, in the legal sense of justice (though
the judgement is unjust in one sense, for legal justice is different from justice in the
primary sense), yet if he knowingly gives an unjust judgement,
1 It is not clear whether this is meant to apply, in certain circumstances, to the distributor, or to the receiver, or to both.