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the defect, in others the excess, is more opposed to the mean; for
example Cowardice, which is a vice of deficiency, is more opposed to Courage than is
Rashness which is a vice of excess; but Profligacy, or excess of feeling, is more opposed
to Temperance than is Insensibility, or lack of feeling.
[7]
This results from either of two causes. One of these arises from the thing itself; owing
to one extreme being nearer to the mean and resembling it more, we count not this but
rather the contrary extreme as the opposite of the mean; for example, because Rashness
seems to resemble Courage more than Cowardice does, and to be nearer to it, we reckon
Cowardice rather than Rashness as the contrary of Courage; for those extremes which are
more remote from the mean are thought to be more contrary to it.
[8]
This then is one cause, arising out of the thing itself. The other cause
has its origin in us: those things appear more contrary to the mean to which we are
ourselves more inclined by nature. For example, we are of ourselves more inclined to
pleasure, which is why we are prone to Profligacy [more than to
Propriety].1 We therefore rather call those things the contrary of
the mean, into which we are more inclined to lapse; and hence Profligacy, the excess, is
more particularly the contrary of Temperance
1 These words are probably an interpolation, since the sense requires ‘more than to Insensibility’.