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the valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania, which, on the thirtieth, burned Chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry toward Cumberland.
They were met and defeated by General Kelly, and with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia.
From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down between Washington and City Point, making it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat.
It took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get despatches through and return answers back; so that often orders would be given, and then information would be received showing a different state of facts from those on which they were based, causing a confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise would have been.
To remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the departments of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehana, and the Middle Department, and I so recommended.
On the second of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in person to Major-General Halleck, Chief of Staff, at Washington, with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces against Early.
At this time the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, while our forces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, leaving open to the enemy Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania.
From where I was, I hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington.
Therefore, on the fourth, I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and determine for myself what was best to be done.
On arrival there, and after consultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the following instructions:
The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached Hallton that night. General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by the morning train, with orders to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on General Hunter at Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. I remained at Monocacy, until General Sheridan arrived, on the morning of the sixth, and, after a conference with him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way of Washington. On the seventh of August the Middle Department and the Departments of West Virginia, Washington and Susquehanna were constituted into the “Middle military division,” and Major-General Sheridan was assigned to temporary command of the same. Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached him at Harper's Ferry about the eleventh of August. His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement took place. TheMonocacy bridge, Md., August 5, 1864--8 P. M.Genera: Concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in this concentrating, the railroads, if by so doing time can be saved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him whereever found; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander a sufficient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force, the brigade of cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville may be taken into account There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you on the south side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start tomorrow. In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed — they should rather be protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards. Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this, you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes. Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march.
