must, therefore, have heard the guns. But, besides this, Colonel Clendenin was effectually contesting the road which offered the enemy the advantage I have mentioned. That gallant officer — as true a cavalry soldier as ever mounted a horse — while fighting on Ricketts' extreme left, found himself cut off from the main body at the time the retreat began. Throwing himself into the village of Urbana, he repeatedly repulsed the pursuing rebels, and, in one bold charge, sabre in hand, captured the battle-flag of the Seventeenth Virginia. The three regiments in Monrovia joined me at New Market, and afterward served a good purpose in covering the march of the weary column, which bivouacked for the night about twelve miles from the battle-field. It would be a difficult task to say too much in praise of the veterans who made this fight. For their reputation, and for the truth's sake, I wish it distinctly understood that, though the appearance of the enemy's fourth line of battle made their ultimate defeat certain, they were not whipped: on the contrary, they were fighting steadily in unbroken front when I ordered their retirement; all the shame of which, if shame there was, is mine, not theirs. The nine regiments enumerated, as those participating in the action, represented but thirty-three hundred and fifty men, of whom over sixteen hundred were missing three days after-killed, wounded, or prisoners lost on the field. The fact speaks for itself. “Monocacy” on heir flags cannot be a word of dishonor. As to General Ricketts, attention is respectfully called to the mention made of him in the telegraphic report subjoined. Every word of it is as deserved as it was bravely earned. If we had had intrenching tools in time, no doubt the losses of the veterans would have been greatly lessened. Another deficiency existed in the want of ambulances and wagons; but this I designed remedying by the use of the cars. That the dead and so many of the wounded were left suffering on the field, and in the hands of the enemy, is justly attribtableu to the base desertion of the railroad agent. I will also add that my despatches would have reached the War Office several hours sooner, if the telegraph operator had remained at his post, or within calling distance. My intention, upon leaving the battle-field, was to march the troops directly to Baltimore, which, by the concentration at Monocacy, had been left almost defenceless. Had this purpose been carried out, they would have reached the city on the evening of the tenth, in time to have driven off the marauders, who, under Johnson, had moved by the Liberty road from Frederick City, and taken post in the vicinity of Cockeysville. Such a result would very probably have saved the bridges on the Philadelphia railroad. But, under an order, received while en route to Ellicott's mills, directing me to “rally my forces and make every possible effort to retard the enemy's march on Baltimore,” I thought it my duty to halt Ricketts' division, with the cavalry and battery, at the mills, that being the first point on the pike at which it was possible to resupply the men with rations and ammunition. In doing this, however, I was careful to leave General Ricketts trains sufficient to bring his whole force away at a moment's notice; and as soon as it was certainly known that the enemy had marched against Washington, I ordered him to Baltimore. Before lie arrived, however, I was temporarily superseded in the command of the troops by Major-General Ord. The evening of the tenth I returned to Baltimore, and found the city very naturally in a state of alarm, occasioned by the approach of Johnson's cavalry. Thanks, however, to the energy of Lieutenant-Colonel S. B. Lawrence, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant-Colonel John Wooldey, Provost-Marshal, every measure of safety had been taken that intelligence could suggest. The railroad communications north had been the subject of the former's special care. The means of defense for the city, as already remarked, were very meagre; but the direction of them had, as soon as intelligence of the result on the Monocacy was received, very properly been assumed by Brigadier-Generals Lockwood and Morris, whose military experience was of very great value. To the former I feel particularly grateful. Loyal citizens took up arms by the thousands, were organized; manned the works; and did soldiers' duty nobly. Besides the officers mentioned in my informal report of tenth July, the following deserve similar notice, for their excellent behavior in action and the services they rendered: Lieutenant-Colonel Lynde Catlin, Assistant Inspector-General; Major Max. Woodhull, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General; and Major James R. Ross, senior Aid-de-Camp — all of my staff. Also, Captain W. H. Weigle, Assistant Adjutant-General to General Tyler; Captain Adam E. King, Assistant Adjutant-General to General Ricketts; Captain Brown, First (Maryland) Potomac Home Brigade, and Captain N. H. Allen, of the company serving as mounted infantry. General Ricketts has not yet forwarded his official report; when received, I shall promptly transmit it to the War Office. It will, doubtless, disclose many other officers properly entitled to special mention. At this time, I can only speak of commandants of brigades, and regiments, whose names have been already given, and repeat the commendation they have won from commanding officers in many a former battle. They are of the soldiers whose skill and courage have ennobled, not merely themselves, but the army they have belonged to so long. The subjoined report gives my opinion of the rebel strength forwarded by telegram the day after the battle. Information, since obtained,
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Table of Contents:
Doc . 16 . operations in Tennessee .
Doc . 19 . the siege of Suffolk, Virginia .
Doc . 36 . General Rousseau 's expedition.
Doc . 59 . battles of Spottsylvania , Va: battle of Sunday , May 8 , 1864 .
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