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and the return of the expedition.
The reembarkation was accomplished by the morning of the twenty-seventh.
On the return of the expedition, officers and men — among them Brevet Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) M. R. Curtis, First Lieutenant G. W. Ross,------regiment Vermont volunteers, First Lieutenant George W. Walling, and Second Lieutenant George Sumpson, One Hundred and Forty-second New York volunteers--voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have been taken without much loss.
Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a despatch from the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken.
The natural supposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition the navy would do so also.
Finding it had not, however, I answered on the thirtieth of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I would send a force and make another attempt to take the place.
This time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H. Terry to command the expedition.
The troops composing it consisted of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train.
The latter it was never found necessary to land.
I communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the follow-instructions:
Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-decamp (now brevet brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned in orders as chief engineer to this. It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those given for the first expedition; and that in neither instance was there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer. The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the sixth, arriving on the rendezvous off Beaufort on the eighth, where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the twelfth, when it got under way, and reached its destination that evening. Under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the thirteenth, and by three o'clock P. M. was completed without loss. On the fourteenth, a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort. This reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. In the afternoon of the fifteenth the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with its entire garrison and armament. Thus was secured, by the combined efforts of the navy andCity Point, Va., January 3, 1865.General: The expedition entrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., and Wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls. You will, then, proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear river, and report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. The first object to be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. You want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters. My own views are that, if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear river, while the balance of it operates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cut it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in the possession of the enemy. A siege train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can be drawn from Beaufort as you need them. Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders. In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed. General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to Baltimore, and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops will be brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. Should you require them, they will be sent to you.
