the enemy on its left, its battery captured, and the General needed aid. Passing a short distance towards the left, and meeting General Wright, he informed me that his brigade had fallen back, leaving his battery in the hands of the enemy. This, at least, was the substance of what he said, according to my recollection. Brigadier-General Brown was immediately ordered to advance, and, soon after, it was discovered that Clayton's brigade had obliqued to the left and was moving forward in our front. After a severe engagement of near an hour, during which he sustained a loss of nearly four hundred officers and men, General Clayton withdrew to replenish his exhausted ammunition, and his place was supplied by General Brown. This gallant officer with his veteran command advanced rapidly, driving the enemy before them several hundred yards through a dense undergrowth, and routing his first line, driving it back upon his second, which was posted on a slight ridge, and supported by artillery. Advancing upon this line, under a terrific fire from all arms, the enemy were forced from the ridge, which was occupied, but from which the brigade soon withdrew, in consequence of a force of the enemy threatening its right. After passing the dense undergrowth mentioned, the horses were killed and gunners driven from several field-pieces opposite the centre and right of the brigade. Three of them, six-pounder rifled brass pieces, were brought off by Lieutenant Anderson, commanding Dawson's battery, and two others by other troops of the division. The left regiment (Twenty-sixth Tennessee) also drove the enemy from another battery, three pieces of which were left between the opposing lines, but were not brought off. The brigade sustained, during this engagement, a heavy loss in officers and men. It being necessary to relieve Brown, Bate's brigade was brought up, and received by the enemy with as hot a fire as had successively greeted Clayton and Brown. Attacking, however, with their usual impetuosity, they drove the enemy back, forcing him to withdraw his batteries and to abandon one position after another, losing and re-capturing a piece of artillery, and wresting from him the flag of the Fifty-first Tennessee regiment, Wright's brigade. Clayton's brigade being again brought forward as a support to Bate, the two pressed on, driving the enemy beyond the road leading to Chattanooga. Clayton's brigade, with a portion of Bate's, continued the pursuit for half a mile beyond this road, when, in consequence of threatening movements on the right and left, they fell back leisurely about sunset, re-forming on the east side of the road. In these charges the Fifteenth and Thirty-seventh Tennessee regiments, Colonel Tyler commanding, captured four pieces of artillery, and Clayton's brigade, aided by the Fifty-eighth Alabama, of Bate's brigade (Colonel Bush Jones commanding), captured three pieces. During the whole of these several engagements the enemy's fire was very heavy and destructive, and each brigade suffered severely, both in officers and men. Their conduct was most gratifying, and needs no praise from me. As the result of the afternoon's work, to which each brigade contributed its full share, I claim that we rescued the battery of Wright's brigade and the flag of one of his regiments; that twelve pieces of artillery were wrested from the enemy, from two to three hundred prisoners were captured and several hundred stands of small arms secured and sent to the rear, and the enemy's line pierced near its centre and driven back beyond the Chattanooga road. Among the prisoners was Lieutenant-Colonel Von Schraden, Assistant Inspector-General on the staff of the Federal General Thomas. Of the artillery actually captured, I am unable to ascertain how many pieces were ultimately secured. After night, Major Eldridge, Chief of Artillery, sent four pieces and one caisson beyond the Chickamauga. The men being exhausted, and night approaching, after distributing ammunition, Brown's brigade was formed in front, facing the Chattanooga road; Clayton on the right and facing in that direction, as there were no troops of ours within half a mile of us towards the right. Bate's brigade on the left, and in rear of Brown's. During the night a number of stragglers from the ranks of the enemy were picked up and sent to the rear by my skirmishers or pickets. I should have stated that owing to the difficulties of the ground, its advantages being altogether with the enemy, it was found impracticable to use artillery. During the night the enemy were heard constructing defences, and moving artillery towards his left. After leaving General Bragg, as mentioned, I saw no officer whose rank was superior to my own for the rest of the day. Having been separated from the corps to which the division was attached, a staff officer was sent after night — the earliest moment practicable — to report to Major-General Buckner, who directed that we should remain in position until further orders. Early the next morning, twentieth, Lieutenant-General Longstreet, who had arrived during the night, came to see me and informed me that I would receive my orders on that day directly from him, that the attack was to commence on our extreme right at daylight, was to be followed on the left, and gradually, or rather successively, to extend to the centre, and that I should move after the division on my right or the one on my left had moved, according to circumstances. Apprising him of the fact that there were no troops to the right, at least within a half mile, he directed me to move something more than a quarter of a mile in that direction. This was done, Brown's brigade forming on the front line on the crest of a slight ridge, and constructing a breastwork of logs; Clayton's a few hundred yards in rear, on a parallel ridge, and Bate with his left resting on Brown's right, his line extending
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Doc . 62 .-Hoisting the Black flag — official correspondence and reports.
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