successful in their attack. The brunt of the action was on the left of Polk's brigade and across mine. He alone advanced through an open field and against the defences of logs and rails. Other troops had failed to carry this position during the day, as we heard. The confusion which happened to one of the regiments was the result of some unauthorized person giving a command “to retreat” (see report of Sixteenth Alabama regiment), and that was soon rectified by Major McGaughey. The whole command lay upon their arms during the night, in line of battle. Semple's battery, attached to my brigade, was not under my control during this action. I, however, saw it placed in position by the Division Chief of Artillery, and its fire was of the greatest service in routing the enemy and silencing his batteries. On the morning of the twentieth, the troops were aroused at early dawn, the line rectified, the skirmishers in front relieved, and everything made ready to engage the enemy. Ammunition had been replenished during the night. Shortly after daylight, a day's ration of cooked provisions was brought up and distributed. The morning was cold, and the men were allowed to have small fires and eat their breakfast. At ten o'clock I was notified the line was about to near the enemy, and that the movement would commence on my right. I had already heard that it was probable that my brigade overlapped troops to my left not of this division, and that some irregularity existed in the lines as formed. At a few minutes past ten the brigade on my right moved forward, and I moved with it. Its left soon crowded on my right, when I obliqued to the left to give room. In a few moments it made a rapid movement obliquely to the right, leaving a gap. The brigade was at once ordered to follow this movement and every exertion was made to do so, but we were now under fire of artillery, and had advanced but a short distance when my right was within short range of the enemy's rifles. They were hidden behind logs and timber, covered with bushes. The whole line to the right, was now at a halt, and firing; this was followed by the right of my brigade, Hankins' sharpshooters and Colonel Lowry's regiment. The Major-General passed me at this moment, and I informed him that my left had, passed over some of our troops lying down, and were in front of them. The whole front of the brigade to my left was covered by other troops. He directed me to see to the left of my command, and said that Deshler's brigade would be taken to the right. The Six-teenth and Thirty-third Alabama regiments were ordered to lie down on a line with the troops in the front line to my left, who were also lying down. I found Brigadier-General Bowen at the right of his line, and told him that the batteries now firing on us would enfilade me if I advanced without a corresponding advance to my left. He said he had no orders to advance, but would send to Major-General Stewart for orders. Major-General Stewart came to that position, and having ordered his division forward, I immediately ordered the Forty-fifth Alabama regiment, supporting my battery, up into line with the Sixteenth and Thirty-third Alabama regiments, and ordered them all forward. About this time the line to the right had fallen back, and the position occupied by Colonel Lowry and Major Hankins was taken by Deshler's brigade. The peculiar character of the enemy's works, represented by a diagram annexed, will show that, whilst the right of my command was very near them, an angle was formed in its front, and the enemy's line was thrown back so as to give them the cover of woods, and compel us to advance through a wide field. My brigade advanced into this field. The Thirty-third Alabama, under the lead of its gallant Colonel, crossed the field and the Chattanooga road. The fire of the enemy at this point was most destructive, and though this movement was supported by Brown's, Clayton's, and Bate's brigades, it was not long before all had to return, and were again assembled and formed at the position from which they last advanced. My command, being the right of the line advancing against this returned line of the enemy, was subjected to a cross and enfilading fire, which was very severe on all, but especially on the Forty-fifth Alabama regiment, which was forced back earlier than the Sixteenth and Thirty-third Alabama, and re-formed on Colonel Lowry's regiment. As soon as the position of these regiments could be ascertained, the Sixteenth and Thirty-third were ordered to take their places in the line, they being six or eight hundred yards in advance on the left. During this movement Semple's battery, under the command of Lieutenant Goldthwaite, followed the brigade and opened effectively on the enemy. In the second advance it was not deemed desirable that the battery should advance with the brigade, the batteries of other brigades on our left being ordered to remain in position. After reforming our line, a division was moved to our right (Cheatham's), and I received an order to move up to the support of Polk's brigade. I formed in line with it, threw out skirmishers, and moved to the right a half mile. Our skirmishers were engaged with the enemy until nearly sundown, when, General Polk having advanced and desiring the support of a regiment, I directed Colonel Lowry to go to his support. But the enemy had been routed. In conclusion, it may be stated that no command conducted itself with more spirit or determination. By subsequent examination of the field, it was observed that at no point were the enemy's works so strong as in our front; and the peculiar formation of his lines, which, owing to the heavy timber and under-growth, could not be ascertained by any effort but an assault, subjected the command to a very destructive cross and enfilading fire on Sunday. The reports of the Colonels and commanders of batteries and battalions will show a list of casualties. The loss, at the time, in the brigade, was ninety-six killed on the field, and six hundred and eighty
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Doc . 62 .-Hoisting the Black flag — official correspondence and reports.
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