[
498]
The following is the total of casualties in the division:
| officers. |
| Killed | 15 | | |
| Wounded | 38 | | |
| Missing | 11 | -- | 64 |
| enlisted men. |
| Killed | 223 | | |
| Wounded | 943 | | |
| Missing | 400 | -- | 1,566 |
| | | | |
| Total | 1,630 |
Of the eleven officers and four hundred enlisted men missing, many are known to be wounded and in the hands of the enemy.
Prisoners were captured from the enemy by my division, as follows:
| Majors | 1 |
| Captains | 1 |
| Lieutenants | 3 |
| Enlisted men | 216 |
| | |
| Total | 221 |
I am, sir, Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the troops under my command, in the engagement with the enemy on
Stone River:
On Tuesday morning, December thirtieth, 1862, the Eighth division, composed of the Seventh and Twenty-ninth brigades,
Schultz's,
Marshall's and
Wells' batteries, was posted on a rolling slope of the west bank of
Stone River, in advance, but joining the extreme right of
General Crittenden's line, and the left of
General McCook's.
In the rear and on the right, was a dense cedar-wood with a broken, rocky surface.
From one position, several roads were cut through the woods in our rear, by which to bring up the artillery and ammunition trains.
In front, a heavy growth of oak timber extended toward the river, which was about a mile distant.
A narrow thicket diagonally crossed our left, and skirted the base of a cultivated slope, expanding to the width of a mile, as it approached the
Nashville pike.
This slope afforded the enemy his commanding position (in the centre), on the crest of which his rifle-pits extended (with intervals) from the oak timber immediately in my front, to the
Nashville pike, with a battery of four
Napoleon and two iron guns, placed in position, near the woods, and about eight hundred yards from my position.
Behind this timber, on the river bank, the enemy massed his columns, for the movements of the next day.
His skirmishers were driven from our immediate front after a sharp contest; in which the Nineteenth Illinois and Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania volunteers displayed admirable efficiency.
The position of my command was held, under a heavy fire, until darkness terminated the skirmishing in our front, by which time we had inflicted considerable loss upon the enemy.
In the meantime,
General Sheridan's division caine up and formed “line of battle” (his left resting on my right), and began to advance, driving the enemy, until he had passed the centre of my brigade.
While
General Sheridan was in this position, I changed my front slightly, bearing it more to the left, to avoid masking a portion of
Sheridan's command.
The troops remained in this position and in “order of battle” all night, cheerfully enduring the cold and rain, awaiting the morrow's sun, to renew the contest.
Early the next morning, and before the heavy fog had drifted from our front, the enemy, in strong force, attacked
General McCook's right, commencing a general engagement, which increased in intensity toward his left.
Sheridan's division stood its ground manfully, supported by the Eighth division, repulsing and driving the enemy at every advance.
The enemy still gained ground on
General McCook's right, and succeeded in placing several batteries in position, which covered my right; from these, and the battery on my left, which now opened, the troops were exposed to a converging fire, which was most destructive.
Houghtaling's,
Schultz's,
Marshall's,
Bush's, and
Wells' batteries were all ordered into action in my front, pouring destructive volleys of grape and shell into the advancing columns of the enemy, mowing him down like swaths of grain.
For four hours the Eighth division, with a portion of
Sheridan's and
Palmer's divisions, maintained their position, amid a murderous storm of lead and iron, strewing the ground with their heroic dead.
The enemy, maddened to desperation by the determined resistance, still pressed forward fresh troops, concentrating and forming them in a concentric line, on either flank.
By eleven o'clock,
Sheridan's men, with their ammunition exhausted, were falling back.
General Rousseau's reserve and
General Palmer's division had retired in the rear of the cedars, to form a new line.
The artillery ammunition was expended, that of the infantry reduced to a few rounds.
The artillery horses were nearly all killed or wounded; my ammunition train had been sent back, to avoid capture; a heavy column of the enemy was marching directly to our rear, through the cedars.
Communication with
Generals Rosecrans and
Thomas was entirely cut off, and it was manifestly impossible for my command to hold the position, without
