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Purchase bacon for this department; if possible, buy several million pounds; also send, if you can, a few thousand live hogs to Port Hudson and Vicksburg.
If the present navigation should be interrupted, try to get the hogs across the river, so that they can be driven to the interior of the State, and rendered available for the use of the troops.
If nothing better can be done, you will contract with energetic men to get from Texas two or three hundred wagons loaded with bacon, the meat to be paid for by the Chief of Subsistence of this department, the transportation to be settled by the Quartermaster, and the wagons and teams to be taken by the government at a fair valuation.
You had better attend to salt first, bacon next, and to sugar afterwards.
You are properly accredited to commanding Generals elsewhere, who are requested to assist you in accomplishing my wishes, as herein indicated.
I was extremely desirous at this time to procure a sufficient supply of salt, to enable me to cure bacon, and with that purpose, an order was issued prohibiting the exportation of hogs from the department.
The difficulty in obtaining salt in sufficient quantity at the proper seasen, prevented the success of this plan to any great extent.
Though extremely anxious at this time to purchase all the meat possible, I did not think it advisable to make large purchases of corn from the Trans-Mississippi, for Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and Lieutenant-Colonel Broadwell was so notified.
It has already been shown that the large amount at Port Hudson had not been properly secured, and more was still being delivered.
The enemy's attempt on Vicksburg, via Chickasaw Bayou, had just signally failed, and his troops been withdrawn and re-embarked.
Before the first of January supplies from Deer Creek and Sunflower, could not be brought down owing to the low stage of the water, and when the rise of the river admitted their being landed at “Snyder's Mills,” the character of the soil, and the roads over which wagons must pass, was such as to render transportation almost utterly impracticable.
I had, however, appropriated one hundred wagons for that special purpose.
In a communication dated February twenty-sixth, General Stevenson says: “During wet weather we cannot use the dirt road from Haines' Bluff to this point (Vicksburg). The passage of our train of over one hundred wagons would render it impassable in one day; besides, not being able to haul more than a quarter load, it would prevent its being kept in good order.
To relieve it at such times, grain should be obtained by railroad, but it, as now managed, cannot be relied on.”
There was an abundance of corn in the department, but in very many instances planters refused to sell, except for cash payments, and the great delay in forwarding funds embarrassed me accordingly.
On the twentieth of January I telegraphed as follows to the Honorable Secretary of War: “Unless funds are sent immediately to Major Thomas Johnston, Chief C. S. of Department, the army cannot be supported; estimates have been forwarded.
Please have money sent at once.”
During this time stores were being rapidly collected at various depots, but the difficulty of transportation, owing to the wretched condition of the S. R. R., the obstacles that were being continually thrown in the way by the railroad authorities, and the clamor made at any attempt of mine to make private interests subservient to government necessities, had the effect of preventing effectually the rapid accumulation of supplies.
Positive prohibition had been issued by the War Department against the interference of commanding Generals, or other officers, with railroad transportation.
Immediately on the reception of this prohibition I telegraphed the A. and I.
General, Richmond: “If I cannot control the railroads in this department, the business of the department, and the subsistence of the troops, will fail.
I beg that Colonel Wadley may be sent here at once.”
Arrangements had been made, as already stated, as fully as the means at my disposal would admit, to transfer supplies from Snyder's Mills to Vicksburg, and the Chief of Subsistence was positively ordered to keep constantly on hand a supply of not less than sixty days. Similar instructions were given to the Chief Quartermaster of the department.
Every possible effort was made to carry out my orders.
If I failed in the full accomplishment of my wishes, it was from circumstances utterly beyond my control.
It must be remembered that almost continuous movements of troops and ordnance were necessary in consequence of the persistent efforts of the enemy from about the middle of December to the date of the investment of Vicksburg.
About the fifteenth of February, the enemy began his movement through the Yazoo Pass.
None but our smallest boats could be employed in the upper waters.
From this date until the enemy abandoned his designs not only by the Pass and Tallahatchie, but also by the Sunflower and Deer Creek, the boats which were employed in bringing down supplies from those small streams were frequently and necessarily diverted to the transportation of troops and munitions of war. Early in February the enemy also succeeded in passing two of his gunboats by our batteries at Vicksburg; this at once rendered the navigation of the Mississippi and Red Rivers dangerous, and from that time forth it was only by watching opportunities, and at great risk of capture, that supplies could be thrown into Port Hudson and Vicksburg; nevertheless, large amounts were successfully introduced into both places, into the latter via Black River; Port Hudson, however, received much the larger portion, being easier of access.
In addition to efforts made by agents under my own instructions to supply Port Hudson, the Chief of Subsistence of the department was ordered on the eighteenth of February, to furnish Major-General Gardner's command with ample funds to meet the demands of the service.
About the middle of the same month, believing it highly probable that not only the subsistence of my own army,
