Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 10.
Frank Moore, Ed.

[665] want of rest and regular food, with a heroic endurance which is beyond all praise. That the enemy succeeded in passing a large portion of his fleet by the forts on a dark night, under a heavy fire, is due to no fault of the garrison of the forts. They did their whole duty, nobly and heroically, and had they been seconded, as they should have been, by the defences afloat, we should not have to record the fall of New Orleans.

To the officers of my staff, who underwent months of severe and arduous labor, collecting supplies, creating resources, with the most limited means, and preparing all sorts of materials and munitions of war by ingenious makeshifts, I return my thanks. Left in the city with a small force of badly armed militia, all opportunity for distinction or glory was cut off; yet they never flagged in their zeal and devotion to the cause. When the country knows all that was done, and under what disadvantages it was accomplished, I feel confident that their verdict will do ample justice to those who shared equally in the labors of preparation, while they were denied the glory of taking part in the defence. The battle for the defence of New Orleans was fought and lost at Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

The extraordinary and remarkable conduct of the garrisons of these forts, in breaking out in open mutiny, after covering themselves with glory by their heroic defence, is one of those strange anomalies for which I do not pretend to account. The facts are recorded and speak for themselves. The causes will, probably, never be known in full.

For the detailed accounts of the bombardment of the forts, and the engagements at the time of the passage of the fleets by them and the batteries at Chalmette, you are respectfully referred to the accompanying reports of Generals Duncan and Smith. There were no batteries except at these two points, for the reason that no guns could be procured to place in them. I had frequent occasion to regret that it was found impossible to give me control of the defences afloat as well as here. A single controlling head might have made all the resources more available and efficient in working out the desired result.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

If the people are willing to stand the result, I will bring four thousand five hundred men down, as soon as I can give them arms and powder, and stay as long as a brick remains. It is their interest I am endeavoring to consult, not the safety of my men. I have nothing but infantry and two batteries of field artillery, which would be of no use against ships. I will come down myself if they wish it, and bring the men along as fast as ready. They are newly raised regiments, and are being now armed and equipped, as you know. Can begin to bring them down tomorrow, if that is the desire of the citizens. Shall I come down myself to-night? Will do so if I can be of any assistance, and leave General Smith to complete the organization, and bring down the five regiments when ready. The citizens must decide as to the consequences. I will come if it is wished, cheerfully.

I shall start down myself with an aid now, and am perfectly ready, if it is the desire of the city, to hold it to the end. It is for them to say, not me.

Sir: I have the honor to report, that while I was in the city of New Orleans, on the twenty-seventh of April, executing your orders to assist in removing the government and State property, and while the negotiations were going on between the city authorities and the Federal officers for the surrender, I was informed that the nature of the replies to the naval commander was such as to throw some censure upon yourself, for leaving them, as the Mayor styled it, without military protection.

I deemed it my duty to advise you of this immediately, the result of which was the enclosed despatches from you, offering to return with your troops, and afford them all the protection in your power, but that the responsibility of any results that might ensue must rest upon the citizens themselves. I read your despatches to the city council, which was then in session, in presence of Mr. Pierre Soule, who happened to be there at the time. That gentleman, who seemed to speak for the Mayor and council, most emphatically declared that you ought not to return with your troops, as did also the Mayor and members of the council. Several of them, however, declared that they would be glad to have you return alone, and see matters for yourself, to which effect I telegraphed you. You came to the city that evening, with a single Aide-de-Camp, and went with me to the Mayor's house, where you, in my presence, told him that the citizens should have no cause to say that they were obliged to submit for want of military protection; that you were ready and willing to bring your whole command into the city within twenty-four hours, and undergo a bombardment with them, if that was their desire, That you had withdrawn, to enable the citizens to decide the matter for themselves as it was they, and not you, who had their families and property at stake. In reply, the Mayor earnestly declined your offer, stating that you