[733]
next morning about the same hour that General Rosecrans' messenger arrived.
For the particular troops engaged, and the part taken by each regiment, I will have to refer you entirely to the accompanying reports of those officers who were present..
Not occupying Iuka afterward for any length of time, and then not until a force sufficient to give protection for any great distance arrived the battle was fought about two miles out), I cannot accompany this with a topographical map. I send, however, a map showing all the roads and plans named in this report.
The country between the road travelled by General Ord's command, to some distance south of the railroad, is impassable for cavalry, and almost so for infantry.
It is impossible for artillery to move southward to the road travelled by General Rosecrans' command.
Soon after despatching General Ord, word was brought by one of my staff, Colonel Hillyer, that the enemy were in full retreat.
I immediately proceeded to Iuka and found that the enemy had left during the night, taking every thing with them except their wounded and the artillery taken by them the evening before.
Going south by the Fulton road, Generals Stanley and Hamilton were in pursuit.
This was the first I knew of the Fulton road; with it occupied, no route would have been left them except east, with the difficult bottom of Bear Creek to cross, or north-east, with the Tennessee River in their front, or to conquer their way out. A partial examination of the country afterwards convinced me, however, that troops moving in separate columns by the route suggested, could not support each other until they arrived near luka.
On the other hand an attempt to retreat, according to the programme, would have brought General Ord, with his force, on the rear of the retreating column.
For casualties and captures, see accompanying reports.
The battle of Iuka foots up as follows:
On the sixteenth of September we commenced to collect our strength to move upon Price, at Iuka, in two columns; the one to the right of the railroad, commanded by Brigadier-General (now Major-General) W. S. Rosecrans; the one to the left commanded by Major-General E. O. C. Ord.
On the night of the eighteenth the latter was in position to bring on an engagement in one hour's march.
The former, from having a greater distance to march, and through the fault of a guide, was twenty miles back.
On the nineteenth, by making a rapid march, hardy, welldisciplined, and tried troops arrived within two miles of the place to be attacked.
Unexpectedly the enemy took the initiative and became the attacking party.
The ground chosen was such that a large force.
on our side could not be brought into action; but the bravery and endurance of those brought in was such that, with the skill and presence of mind of the officer commanding, they were able to hold their ground till night closed the conflict.
During the night the enemy fled, leaving our troops in possession of the field, with their dead to bury and wounded to care for. If it was the object of the enemy to make their way into Kentucky, they were defeated in that; if to hold their position until Van Dorn could come up on the south-west of Corinth, and make a simultaneous attack, they were defeated in that.
Our only defeat was in not capturing the entire army, or in destroying it, as I had hoped to do.
It was a part of General Hamilton's command that did the fighting, directed entirely by that cool and deserving officer.
I commend him to the President for acknowledgment of his services.
During the absence of these forces from Corinth, that post was left in charge of Brigadier-General T. J. McKean.
The southern front from Jacinto to Rienzi was under the charge of Colonel DuBois, with a small infantry and cavalry force.
The service was most satisfactorily performed, Colonel DuBois showing great vigilance and efficiency.
I was kept constantly advised of the movements of flying bodies of cavalry that were hovering in our front.
The wounded, both friend and enemy, are much indebted to Surgeon J. G. F. Holbrook, Medical Director, for his untiring labor in organizing hospitals and providing for their every want.
I cannot close this report without paying a tribute to all the officers and soldiers comprising this command.
Their conduct on the march was exemplary, and all were eager to meet the enemy.
The possibility of defeat I do not think entered the mind of a single individual, and I believe this same feeling now pervades the entire army which I have the honor to command.
I neglected tomention in the proper connection that to cover our movement from Corinth, and to attract the attention of the enemy in another direction, I ordered a movement from Bolivar towards Holly Springs.
This was conducted by Brigadier-General Lauman.
Before completing this report the report of Major-General Ord was received, and accompanies this:
I am, Colonel, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
U. S. Grant, Major-General.
