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delay of half an hour and there would have been no enemy to attack.
In that event, I should equally have blamed myself for not attacking at once.
I enclose my official report of killed, wounded, and missing.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
A. P. Hill, Lieutenant-General, commanding Third Corps.
Report of General Heth.
Captain; I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division on the fourteenth instant:
The division moved from camp near Warrenton at half-past 5 o'clock A. M., on the fourteenth instant, following General Anderson's division.
When within a mile of New Baltimore, orders were received to pass General Anderson's artillery, by keeping to the right, as it was designed that my division should follow a different road.
After passing through New Baltimore, and about a mile and a half or less from the village, I was directed to take a right hand road, which proved to be a cross-road leading to Bristoe Station, via Greenwich.
Just before reaching Greenwich, some twenty stragglers of the Third corps, Federal army, were captured.
A desultory fire of artillery was heard from just after daybreak, apparently on our right, and continued during the entire day.
It was ascertained at Greenwich that a corps of the enemy had encamped there the evening previous, the last of this corps leaving about eight o'clock A. M., on the fourteenth.
From Greenwich we passed on by the most direct road to Bristoe Station, picking up a number of stragglers on the road.
When within a mile and a half of Bristoe Station, I was directed by General A. P. Hill to form three brigades of my division in line of battle, perpendicular to the road on which we were advancing, holding the Fourth brigade as a reserve, which was to continue its march by the flank.
Cooke's brigade (leading) was formed on the right of the road, its left resting on the road; Kirkland was put in position on the left of the road, his right resting on the road, and forming a continuous line with Cooke; Walker was directed to form on Kirkland's left; Davis's brigade was held in reserve in the road.
Kirkland had not quite completed the formation of his line when orders were received from General Hill to push on with the two brigades then in line (Cooke's and Kirkland's), informing me, at the same time, that the enemy were retreating rapidly, and that expedition was necessary.
Walker's brigade was at this time in rear of Kirkland, his right resting in rear of Kirkland's right.
General Walker was informed of the change, and directed to form on Kirkland's left, if possible, as Kirkland moved forward.
The order was now given to advance.
On reaching a cleared space, some two or three hundred yards in our front, the enemy was discovered about three-quarters of a mile in front of Kirkland's left.
A few shots from one of Poague's batteries threw them into much confusion, and all that were in sight retreated in disorder across Broad Run.
On seeing this, General Hill directed me to move by the left flank, cross Broad Run, and attack the fugitives.
This order was given, and my line halted for the left to commence the flank movement.
Before this movement was commenced, information was received that a heavy column of the enemy had appeared on our right.
I asked General Hill whether the flank movement should continue.
He directed that it should be deferred for the present.
Some ten minutes afterwards I received orders to move forward.
About this time General Cooke in person reported to me that the enemy would take him in flank as he moved forward.
This was reported to General Hill, who informed me that General Anderson's division had been, or would be, ordered to the right.
General Cooke was informed of this, and the forward movement commenced.
Walker had not been able to form line of battle on Kirkland's left.
The two brigades (Cooke's and Kirkland's) moved off in handsome style.
The skirmishers soon became engaged.
The enemy's. strength in my front was only known from the reports made by Captain Johnston, engineer corps.
As subsequently shown, it proved to be Warren's Second army corps.
Marching parallel to the railroad, the enemy was concealed from our view by hills and woods.
On seeing our advance, the enemy formed his line in rear of the railroad embankment, his right resting on Broad Run, and hidden by a railroad cut. In his rear a line of hills ascended to some thirty or forty feet in height, giving him an admirable position for his artillery.
The railroad cut and embankment, at the foot of the hill, gave him perfect protection for his infantry.
In rear of the enemy's right, on the hills just noticed, a circular line of rifle-pits had been thrown up for the protection of the bridge over Broad Run.
These rifle-pits were filled with infantry, and a battery was established in rear and higher up the hills.
As Kirkland moved forward, his left struck the enemy in the railroad out, near Broad Run.
He drove everything in his front along the line of the railroad before him, but was unable to carry the second line of works (rifle-pits) that were in his front.
When in the railroad cut, his men were exposed to an enfilading fire from his right, in addition to a severe fire from a battery on the north side of Broad Run.
The position was untenable.
He was compelled to fall back.
A number of his men, unwilling to expose themselves, remained in the railroad cut, and were captured, General Cooke was wounded
