Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 10.
Frank Moore, Ed.

[654] in a most gallant manner. The report from Armstrong's brigade does not mention any one especially by name. They all behaved with coolness and gallantry.

I am, Major, with high respect,

Your obedient servant,

General: I telegraphed you yesterday that despatches from General Bragg make it almost impossible for me to reinforce General Breckinridge. He says, very pointedly, that West Tennessee is now open to my army, intimating that he expected me to enter it; and I do not feel at liberty to disregard such an intimation, when I consider the very important relations which this army bears to that in East Tennessee. I cannot get possession of the railroad before Thursday. It will then take at least a week to transport to this point the troops, etc., which will be brought hither preparatory to a forward movement. I regret very much that I have to submit to this unavoidable delay, and I cannot think of protracting it, except under compulsion of the greatest necessity. To attempt to reinforce General Breckinridge would protract it indefinitely. The success of the campaign depends now upon the promptness and boldness of our movements, and the ability which we may manifest to avail ourselves of our present advantages. The enemy are still transporting their troops from Corinth and its vicinity eastward. They will, by the end of this week, have reduced its force to its minimum. We should be quick to take advantage of this, for they will soon begin to get in reinforcements under the late call for volunteers. The present obstructed condition of the railroad is another reason for instant action. In fact every consideration makes it important that I shall move forward without a day's unnecessary delay. I earnestly desire your co-operation in such a movement, and will, as I have before said, be glad to place my army and myself under your command in that contingency. The very names of yourself and General Breckinridge would bring thousands to our ranks, and carry dismay to those of the enemy. You speak in your dispatch of the frightful amount of sickness in General Breckinridge's division. I fear that the sweltering heats of this latitude will soon begin to tell fearfully upon my own ranks, and am, for that reason, the more anxious to take them northward, where, too, we may gain accessions from those Tennesseeans and Kentuckians who have seen and felt the wretchedness of Northern domination.

Captain Loughbrough will deliver this communication to you, and explain more particularly the condition of things in this vicinity. Please inform me, by telegraph, of your determination, so that in the event of its being favorable, we may concert a plan of operations.

I am. General,

With the profoundest respect,

Your obedient servant,

General: In view of the operations from here it is very desirable to press the enemy closely in West Tennessee. We learn their forces there are being rapidly reduced, and when our movements become known it is certain they must throw more forces into Middle Tennessee and Kentucky or lose those regions. If you hold them in check, we are sure of success here; but should they reinforce here so as to defy us, then you may redeem West Tennessee, and probably aid us by crossing the enemy's rear.

I cannot give you specific instructions, as circumstances and military conditions in your front may vary materially from day to day. To move your available force to Holly Springs by railroad, thence into West Tennessee, co-operating with General Price, who will move soon towards Corinth; or to move to Tupelo by rail and join Price are suggestions only. Positive instructions, except to strike at the most assailable point, cannot be given when so little is known, and when circumstances may change daily. Of course, when you join Price, your rank gives you command of the whole force. I enclose a copy of Captain Jones' inspection report. Many of the points in it require your immediate attention: 1st. Most important is the prompt reduction of your light artillery. You have enough for an army of one hundred thousand men. It is impossible to keep it all up and be effective. To keep it all ineffective must be avoided. Eight batteries of four (4) guns each is ample for your present force. As you cannot discharge the companies without authority from the War Department, I suggest that you dismount them, giving such horses and material as they have to make other corps effective, and transfer the officers and men to your heavy batteries, relieving infantry; or you could arm them as infantry and put them in the field. Some companies, I see, are still being equipped. Put a stop to it immediately. Other parts of the report, too, require your prompt consideration, especially in the staff department. The reports from the Medical Inspector, coming in, are equally unsatisfactory.

Your short time in command and close engagement at Vicksburg have allowed you but little time for these matters, but I trust you will be able, through intelligent and effective staff officers, in correcting some of the evils soon. It is with deep regret I see you lose General Villepigue,