Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 10.
Frank Moore, Ed.

General: I have the honor to make the following report of the battle of Corinth:

Having established batteries at Port Hudson, secured the mouth of Red River and the navigation of the Mississippi River to Vicksburg, I turned my especial attention to affairs in the northern portion of my district.

On the thirtieth day of August I received a despatch from General Bragg, informing me that he was about to march into Kentucky, and would leave to General Price and myself the enemy in West Tennessee. On the fourth day of September I received a communication from General Price, in which was enclosed a copy of the despatch from General Bragg above named, making an offer to co-operate with me. At this time General Breckinridge was operating on the Mississippi River, between Baton Rouge and Port Hudson, with all the available force I had for the field; therefore I could not accept General Price's proposition. Upon the return, however, of General Breckinridge, I immediately addressed General Price, giving my views in full in regard to the campaign in West Tennessee, and stating that I was then ready to join him with all my troops. In the meantime orders were received by him, from General Bragg, to follow Rosecrans across the Tennessee River into Middle Tennessee, whither it was then supposed he had gone. Upon the receipt of this intelligence I felt at once that all my hopes of accomplishing anything in West Tennessee, with my small force, were marred. I nevertheless moved up to Davis' Mill, a few miles from Grand Junction, Tennessee, with the intention of defending my district to the best of my ability, and to make a demonstation in favor of General Price; to which latter end, also, I marched my whole command, on the twentieth day of September, to within seven miles of Bolivar, driving three brigades of the enemy back to that place, and forcing the return from Corinth of one division (Ross's) which had been sent there to strengthen Grant's army.

General Price, in obedience to his orders, marched in the direction of Iuka, to cross the Tennessee, but was not long in discovering that Rosecrans had not crossed that stream. This officer, in connection with Grant, attacked him on the nineteenth day of September, and compelled him to fall back towards Baldwin, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. On the twenty-fifth day of the same month I received a despatch, by courier, from General Price, stating that he was at Baldwin, and was then ready to join me with his forces in an attack on Corinth, as had been previously suggested by me. We met at Ripley, on the twenty-eighth of September, according to agreement, and marched the next morning towards Pocahontas, which place we reached on the first of October. From all the information I could obtain, the following was the “situation” of the Federal army at that time: Sherman at Memphis, with about six thousand men; Hurlbert, afterwards Ord, at Bolivar, with about eight thousand; Grant (headquarters at Jackson), with about three thousand; Rosecrans at Corinth, with about fifteen thousand; together with the following outposts, viz.: [635] Rienzi, twenty-five hundred; Burnville, Jacinto, and Iuka, about six thousand. At important bridges, and on garrison duty, about two or three thousand, making in the aggregate about forty-two thousand (42,000) men in West Tennessee. Memphis, Jackson, Bolivar, and Corinth were fortified, the works mounting siege guns, the outposts slightly fortified, having field-pieces. Memphis, Bolivar, and Corinth are in the arc of a circle, the chord of which, from Memphis to Corinth, makes an angle with due east line about fifteen degrees south. Bolivar is about equidistant from Memphis and Corinth, somewhat nearer the latter, and is at the intersection of the Hatchie River and the Mississippi Central and Ohio Railroad. Corinth is the strongest, but the most salient point. Surveying the whole field of operations before me, calmly and dispassionately, the conclusion forced itself irresistibly upon my mind that the taking of Corinth was a condition precedental to the accomplishment of anything in West Tennessee. To take Memphis would be to destroy an immense amount of property, without any adequate military advantage, even admitting that it could be held, without heavy guns, against the enemy's guns and mortar boats. The line of fortifications around Boliver is intersected by the Hatchie River, rendering it impossible to take the place by quick assault, and reinforcements could be thrown in from Jackson by railroad, and, situated as it is, in the angle of the three fortified places, an advance upon it would expose both my flanks and rear to an attack from the forces at Memphis and Corinth.

It was clear, to my mind, that if a successful attack could be made upon Corinth from the west and north-west, the forces there driven back on the Tennessee and cut off, Bolivar and Jackson would easily fall, and then, upon the arrival of the exchange prisoners of war, West Tennessee would soon be in our possession, and communication with General Bragg effected through Middle Tennessee. The attack on Corinth was a military necessity, requiring prompt and vigorous action. It was being strengthened daily under that astute soldier, General Rosecrans; convalescents were returning to fill his ranks; new levies were arriving to increase his brigades, and fortifications were being constructed at new points, and it was very evident that unless a sudden and vigorous blow could be struck there at once, no hope could be entertained of driving the enemy from a base of operations so convenient; that in the event of misfortune to Bragg, in Kentucky, the whole valley of the Mississippi would be lost to us before winter. To have waited for the arrival, arming, clothing, and organization of the exchanged prisoners would have been to wait for the enemy to strengthen themselves more than we could possibly do. With these reflections, and after mature deliberation, I determined to attempt Corinth. I had a reasonable hope of success. Field returns at Ripley showed my strength to be about twenty-two thousand men. Rosecrans at Corinth had about fifteen thousand, with about eight thousand additional men at outposts, from twelve to fifteen miles distant. I might surprise him and carry the place before these troops could be brought in. I therefore marched towards Pocahontas, threatening Bolivar, then turned suddenly across the Hatchie and Tuscumbia and attacked Corinth without hesitation, and did surprise that place before the outpost garrisons were called in. It was necessary that this blow should be sudden and decisive, and if unsuccessful, that I should withdraw rapidly from the position between the two armies of Ord and Rosecrans. The troops were in fine spirits, and the whole Army of West Tennessee seemed eager to emulate the armies of the Potomac and of Kentucky. No army every marched to battle with prouder steps, more hopeful countenances, or with more courage than marched the Army of Tennessee out of Ripley, on the morning of the twenty-ninth day of September, on its way to Corinth. Fully alive to the responsibility of my position as commander of the army, and after mature and deliberate reflection, the march was ordered. The ground was well known to me, and required no study to determine where to make the attack. The bridge over the Hatchie was soon reconstructed, and the army crossed at four o'clock A. M., on the second of October. Adams' brigade of cavalry was left to guard this approach to our rear, and to protect the train which was parked between the Hatchie and Tuscumbia. Colonel Hawkins' regiment of infantry, and Captain Dawson's battery of artillery, were also left in the Boneyard road, in easy supporting distance of the bridge. The army bivouacked at Chewalla, after the driving in of some pickets from that vicinity by Armstrong's and Jackson's cavalry. This point is about ten miles from Corinth.

At daybreak on the third the march was resumed, the precaution having been taken to cut the railroad between Corinth and Jackson with a squadron of Armstrong's cavalry. Lovell's division in front kept the road on the south side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Price, after marching on the same road about five miles, turned to the left, crossing the railroad, and formed line of battle in front of the outer line of intrenchments, and about three miles from Corinth. Lovell formed line of battle, after some heavy skirmishing (having to construct a passage across the dry bed of Indian Creek for his artillery, under fire), on the right and in front of the same line of intrenchments.

The following was the first order of battle: The three brigades of Lovell's division, Villepigue's, Bowen's, and Rust's in line, with reserve in rear of each; Jackson's cavalry brigade on the right in echelon. The left flank of the division on the Charleston Railroad. Price's corps on the left, with the right flank resting on the same road. Maury's division on the right, with Moore's and Phifer's brigade in line; Cabell's in reserve. Hebert's division on the left, with [636] Gates and Martin's brigade in line; Colbert's in reserve. Armstrong's cavalry brigade on the extreme left, somewhat detached and out of view. Hebert's left was masked behind a timbered bridge, with orders not to bring it into action until the last moment. This was done in hopes of inducing the enemy to weaken his right by reinforcing his centre and left, where the attack was first to be made, that his right might be forced.

At ten o'clock all skirmishers were driven into the intrenchments, and the two armies were in line of battle, confronting each other in force. A belt of fallen timber, or abatis, about four hundred yards in width, extended along the whole line of intrenchments. This was to be crossed. The attacked commenced on the right by Lovell's division, and extended gradually to the left, and by half-past 10 o'clock the whole line of outer works was carried, several pieces of artillery being taken. The enemy made several ineffectual efforts to hold their ground, forming line of battle at advantageous points, and resisting obstinately our advance to the second line of detached works. I had been in hopes that one day's operations would end the contest, and decide who should be the victors on this bloody field; but a ten miles' march over a parched country, on dusty roads, without water, getting into line of battle in forests with undergrowth, and the more than usual activity and determined courage displayed by the enemy, commanded by one of the ablest Generals of the United States army, who threw all possible obstacles in our way that an active mind could suggest, prolonged the battle until I saw with regret the sun sink behind the horizon as the last shot of our sharpshooters followed the retreating foe into their innermost lines. One hour more of daylight, and victory would have soothed our grief for the loss of the gallant dead who sleep on that lost but not dishonored field. The army slept on their arms within six hundred yards of Corinth, victorious so far.

During the night three batteries were ordered to take position on the ridge overlooking the town from the west, just where the hills dip into the flat extending into the railroad depot, with instructions to open on the town at four o'clock A. M. Hebert on the left was ordered to mass part of his division on his left; to put Cabell's brigade in echelon on the left also (Cabell's brigade being detached from Murray's division for this purpose); to move Armstrong's cavalry brigade across the Mobile and Ohio railroad, and, if possible, to get some of his artillery in position across the road. In this order of battle he was directed to attack at day-break with his whole force, swinging his left flank in towards Corinth, and advance down the Purdy ridge. Lovell on the extreme right with two of his brigades in line of battle, and one in reserve, with Jackson's cavalry on the extreme right on. College Hill, his left flank resting on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, was ordered to await in this order, or to feel iris way along slowly with his sharpshooters until Hebert was heavily engaged with the enemy on the left. He was then to move rapidly to the assault, and force his right inwards across the low grounds south-west of the town. The centre, under Maury, was to move at the same time quickly to the front, and directly at Corinth. Jackson was directed to burn the railroad bridge over the Tuscumbia, during the night. Daylight came, and there was no attack on the left. A staff officer was sent to Hebert to inquire the cause. That officer could not be found.

Another messenger was sent, and a third; and about seven o'clock General Hebert came to my headquarters and reported sick. General Price then put Brigadier-General Green in command of the left wing; and it was eight o'clock before the proper dispositions for the attack at this point were made. In the mean time the troops of Maury's left became engaged with the enemy's sharpshoooters, and the battle was brought on, and extended along the whole centre and left wing, and I regretted to observe that my whole plan of attack was, by this unfortunate delay, disarranged. One brigade after another went gallantly into the action, and pushing forward through direct and cross-fire, over every obstacle, reached Corinth, and planted their colors on the last stronghold of the enemy. A hand to hand contest was being enacted in the very yard of General Rosecrans' headquarters, and in the streets of the town. The heavy guns were silenced, and all seemed about to be ended when a heavy fire from fresh troops from Iuka, Burnsville, and Rienzi, that had succeeded in reaching Corinth in time, poured into our thinned ranks. Exhausted from loss of sleep, wearied from hard marching and fighting, companies in regiments without officers, our troops (let no one censure them) gave way. The day was lost! Lovell's division was at this time advancing pursuant to orders, and was on the point of assaulting the works when he received my orders to throw one of his brigades (Villepigue's) rapidly to the centre to cover the broken ranks thrown back from Corinth, and to prevent a sortie. He then moved his whole division to the left and was soon afterwards ordered to move slowly back, and take position on Indian Creek, and prevent the enemy from turning our flank. The centre and left were withdrawn on the same road on which they approached, and being somewhat in confusion on account of loss of officers, fatigue, thirst, want of sleep, thinned ranks, and the nature of the ground, Villepigue's brigade was brought in opportunely and covered the road to Chewalla. Lovell came in the rear of the whole army, and all bivouacked again at Chewalla. No enemy disturbed the sleep of the weary troops. During the night I had a bridge constructed over the Tuscumbia, and sent Armstrong's and Jackson's cavalry, with a battery of artillery, to seize and hold Rienzi until the army came up, intending to march to and hold that point, but after consultation with General Price, who represented [637] his troops to be somewhat disorganized, it was deemed advisable to return by the same road we came, and fall back towards Ripley and Oxford. Anticipating that the Bolivar force would move out, and dispute my passage across the Hatchie bridge, I pushed rapidly on to that point, in hopes of reaching and securing the bridge before their arrival; but I soon learned, by couriers from Colonel Wirt Adams, that I would be too late. I nevertheless pushed on with the intention of engaging the enemy until I could get my train and reserve artillery unparked and on the Boneyard road to the crossing at Crumb's Mills (this road branches off south from the State-line road, about two and a half miles west of the Tuscumbia bridge, running south or up the Hatchie). No contest of long duration could be made here, as it was evident that the army of Corinth would soon make its appearance on our right flank and rear. The trains and reserve artillery were therefore immediately ordered on the Boneyard road, and orders were sent to Armstrong and Jackson to change their direction, and cover the front and flank of the trains until they crossed the Hatchie, and then to cover them in front until they were on the Ripley road. The enemy were then engaged beyond the Hatchie bridge by small fragments of Maury's division as they could be hastened up, and were kept in check sufficiently long to get everything off. General Ord commanded the forces of the enemy, and succeeded in getting into position before any number of our travel-worn troops could be got into line of battle. It is not surprising, therefore, that they were driven back across the bridge, but they maintained their position on the hills overlooking it, under their gallant leader, General Price, until orders were sent to fall back and take up their line of march on the Boneyard road, in rear of the whole train. At one time, fearing that the enemy, superior in numbers to the whole force I had in advance of the train, would drive us back, I ordered General Lovell to leave one brigade to guard the reserve to Tuscumbia bridge, and to push forward with the other two to the front. This order was quickly executed, and very soon the splendid brigades of Rust and Villepigue made their appearance close at hand.

The army corps of General Price was withdrawn, and Villepigue filed in and took position as rear guard to the army against Ord's forces. Rust was ordered forward to report to General Price, who was directed to cross the Hatchie at Crumb's mills, and take position to cover the crossing of the teams and artillery. Bowen was left at Tuscumbia Bridge, as a rear guard against the advance of Rosecrans from Corinth, with orders to defend that bridge until the trains were unparked and on the road. Then to cross the bridge and burn it, and to join Villepigue at the junction of the roads. In the execution of this order, and whilst in position near the bridge, the head of the Corinth army made its appearance and engaged him, but was repulsed with heavy loss, and in a manner that reflected great credit on General Bowen and his brigade. The army was not again molested on its retreat to Ripley, nor on its march to this place. The following was found to be our loss in the severest conflicts with the enemy, and on the march to and from Corinth, viz.: killed, 594; wounded, 2,162; prisoners and missing, 2,102. One piece of artillery was driven in the night by a mistake into the enemy's lines and captured. Four pieces were taken at the Hatchie bridge, the horses being shot. Nine wagons were upset and abandoned by teamsters on the night's march to Crumb's mills. Some baggage was thrown out of the wagons, not amounting to any serious loss.

Two pieces of artillery were captured from the enemy at Corinth by General Lovell's division, one of which was brought off. Five pieces were also taken by General Price's corps, two of which were brought off. Thus making a loss to us of only two pieces. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded, by their own accounts, was over three thousand. We took over three hundred prisoners. Most of the prisoners taken from us were the stragglers from the army on the retreat.

The retreat from Corinth was not a rout, as it has been industriously represented by the enemy, and by the cowardly deserters from the army. The division of General Lovell formed line of battle, facing the rear on several occasions, when it was reported the enemy was near; but not a gun was fired after the army retired from the Hatchie and Tuscumbia bridges. Nor did the enemy follow, except at a respectful distance. Although many officers and soldiers who distinguished themselves in the battle of Corinth, and in the affair of Hatchie bridge, came under my personal observations, I will not mention them to the exclusion of others, who may have been equally deserving, but who did not fall under my own eye. I have deemed it best to call on the different commanders to furnish me a special report, and a list of the names of the officers and soldiers of their respective commands who deserve special mention. These lists and special reports I will take pleasure in forwarding, together with one of my own, when completed; and I respectfully request that they may be appended as part of my report. I cannot refrain, however, from mentioning here the conspicuous gallantry of a noble Texian, whose deeds at Corinth are the constant theme of both friends and foes. As long as courage, manliness, fortitude, patriotism, and honor exist, the name of Rogers will be revered and honored among men. He fell in the front of the battle and died beneath the colors of his regiment, in the very centre of the enemy's stronghold. He sleeps, and glory is his sentence.

The attempt at Corinth has failed, and in consequence I am condemned, and have been superceded in my command. In my zeal for my country, I may have ventured too far with inadequate [638] means, and I bow to the opinion of the people whom I serve. Yet I feel if the spirits of the gallant dead who now lie beneath the batteries of Corinth, see and judge the motives of men, they do not rebuke me, for there is no sting in my conscience. Nor does retrospection admonish me of error or of a disregard of their valued lives.

Very respectfully, sir, I am,

Your obedient servant,

Major: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this army, connected with the several engagements at Corinth and Davis' bridge, of the third, fourth, and fifth instants. Having arranged with Major-General Van Dorn to unite my forces with his for active operations, I joined him at Ripley on the twenty-seventh ultimo. My force at this time consisted of effective infantry, 10,498; effective cavalry, 2,437; effective artillery, 928 men and forty-four guns, including two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and four rifled pieces of three and five-eighths calibre. The infantry was divided into two divisions, commanded by Brigadier-Generals Maury and Hebert. Maury's division consisted of three brigades, commanded by Brigadier-General Moore and Acting Brigadier-Generals Cabell and Phifer. Hebert's division consisted of four brigades, commanded by Brigadier-General Green and Colonels Martin, Gates, and Colbert. The cavalry, except such companies as were on detached service, was under command of Acting Brigadier-General Armstrong. The artillery was apportioned as follows, with Maury's division: Hoxton's battery, Lieutenant Tobin commanding; Bledsoe's battery; McNally's battery, Lieutenant Moore commanding; Lucas' battery, and Sengstack's battery; Hoxton's and Brown's battery; Sengstack's batteries were held as reserves, under command of Lieutenant Burnett, acting Chief of Artillery of the division. With Hebert's division were Wade's, Landis', Guibo's, Dawson's, and King's. The cavalry force, under General Armstrong, reported to the Major-General commanding the combined forces, and afterwards acted under orders direct from him.

On the morning of the thirtieth ultimo we took up the line of march in the direction of Pocahontas, which place we reached on the first instant, and from which we moved upon the enemy at Corinth, bivouacking on the night of the second instant at a point nearly opposite to Chewalla — having left one regiment of infantry and a section of artillery with the wagon train as a guard. At four o'clock on the morning of the third instant, we resumed the march; my command moving on the main Pocahontas and Corinth road, in rear of General Lovell's. At a point about a mile and a half from the enemy's outer line of fortifications, my command made a detour to the left, with instructions to occupy the ground between the Memphis and Charleston and Mobile and Ohio Railroads. This done, my line, Maury occupying the right and Hebert the left, with Cabell's and Colbert's brigades in reserve, fronted the enemy's works in a south-easterly direction, the right resting upon the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. While these dispositions were making General Lovell engaged the enemy upon our right; all being now ready for the attack, my line was ordered forward at about ten o'clock A. M. Almost simultaneously with the movement the opposed armies became engaged in a desperate conflict along the whole extent of my line. My command had scarcely cleared the position of its first formation, when entering an abatis of more than three hundred yards it became unmasked before a position naturally exceedingly formidable, and rendered trebly so by the extent of felled timber through which it must be approached; and the most improved and scientifically constructed intrenchment, bristling with artillery of large calibre, and supported by heavy lines of infantry. My troops charged the enemy's position with the most determined courage, exposed to a murderous fire of musketry and artillery. Without faltering they pressed forward over every obstacle, and with shouts and cheers carried, in less than twenty minutes, the entire line of works; the enemy having fled, leaving in our hands many prisoners and two pieces of artillery--one a four inch Parrott gun, the other a twenty-four-pounder howitzer. Our loss in this attack was comparatively small. This is attributable to the impetuosity with which the charge was made and the works carried. It becomes my painful duty, in this connection, to revert to the distinguished services of two gallant officers who fell in this engagement: Colonel John D. Martin, commanding a Brigade of Mississippians, and Lieutenant Samuel Farrington, of Wade's battery. Colonel Martin fell mortally wounded while leading the charge against an angle in the enemy's works, exposed to the fire of enfilading batteries. The gallant bearing of this officer upon more than one bloody field had won for him a place in the heart of every Mississippian and the admiration and confidence of his superior officers. Lieutenant Farrington was struck and instantly killed by a shot from a rifled gun, while bringing one of the guns of his battery into position. This gallant soldier and courteous and chivalrous gentleman, forgetful of personal interest and mindful of the necessities of the service only, resigned a Lieutenant-Colonelcy in the service of his State for a Lieutenancy in the Confederate service, and gave up his life a glorious sacrifice upon the altar of his country's honor, in the seventh of the battles in which he has been conspicuous for cool, determined, and effective bravery. Though young, his country mourns no more valiant defender, his command no abler commander, his friends [639] no worthier recipient of their affection. The outer works being in our possession my line moved forward in pursuit of the retreating enemy until within about one mile of Corinth, where the enemy was encountered in position and in force. The necessary disposition being made, my whole line again moved forward to the attack at about three o'clock P. M. Here the fighting was of unparalleled fierceness along the whole extent of my line. The position of the enemy along the entire length of his lines was covered by fencing, heavy timber, or underbrush; while portions of my troops advanced through open fields exposed to a deadly fire of batteries, operating over the enemy's line of infantry. Here, as in the assault upon the outer works, we had little artillery in action, it being impossible to procure such positions for my batteries as would enable them to co-operate effectively with the infantry. After continuous and most desperate fighting along the whole extent of my line, of nearly two hours duration, the enemy, notwithstanding his lines had been trebled by reinforcements, was driven from his positions and forced to take refuge in his innermost works in and around the town.

The troops of my command having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the heavy fighting through the day, were withheld from immediate pursuit, and the delay in procuring the necessary supply of ammunition forced me to close the fight for the day. My troops were withdrawn for cover, and laid on their arms during the night, in the position from which the enemy had been driven. About four o'clock on the morning of the fourth, three batteries of my command were placed in position and opened fire upon the town, under the immediate orders of the Major-General commanding. About day-light orders were received to advance my whole line. In the execution of this order a delay was occasioned by the illness of Brigadier-General Hebert, commanding a division. He was necessarily relieved from duty. The command devolved upon Brigadier-General Green, who moved forward as soon as he could make the necessary disposition of his troops. It was after nine o'clock when my line became generally and furiously engaged with the enemy in his innermost and most formidable works, from which his infantry and artillery could jointly operate against my troops. Here, as in the previous actions, my artillery could not be effectively brought into action, and but few of the guns were engaged. The fighting, by my command, was almost entirely confined to the infantry. My men pressed forward upon the enemy, and with heavy loss succeeded in getting into the works, having driven him from them, capturing more than forty pieces of artillery, and forcing him to take refuge in the houses of the town, and in every place that would afford protection from our galling fire. He was followed and driven from house to house with great slaughter. In the town were batteries in mask, supported by heavy reserves, behind which the retreating enemy took shelter, and which opened upon our troops a most destructive fire at short range. My men held their positions most gallantly, returning the fire of the enemy with great spirit until portions of them exhausted their ammunition and were compelled to retire. This necessitated the withdrawal of the whole line, which was done under a withering fire. The attack was not resumed, and we fell back to our supply train, the men being almost exhausted from exertion and want of food and water. General Villepigue's brigade moved over to our assistance, but did not become engaged, as the enemy was too badly cut up to follow us. We fell back in order to obtain water, some six miles from Corinth, where we bivouacked for the night, bringing off all our artillery and arms save one rifled piece, which had been inadvertently driven into the enemy's line while going into battery before daylight in the morning, and had been left. We brought off, also, the two guns captured at the outer line of fortifications on the third. It is impossible for me to do justice to the courage of my troops in these engagements, nor can I discriminate between officers and commands where all behaved so nobly. This is the less necessary, as the operations of my command were under the immediate observation of the Major-General commanding. For minute details of the actions, and particularly of the artillery, of the third and fourth instants, as well as for instances of personal and distinguished gallantry, I beg leave to refer the Major-General commanding to the reports of commanding officers herewith enclosed. On the morning of the fifth instant we resumed the march in the direction of Pocahontas, my command moving by division. Maury's in front, each in rear of its ordnance and supply train, except Moore's brigade, which constituted the advance guard. After crossing the Tuscumbia, Moore's brigade was hurried forward to protect Davis' bridge across the Hatchie, which was threatened by an advance of the enemy. It being found that the enemy was in force, the remainder of Maury's division was ordered forward, and finally I was ordered to move up the whole of my command. Moore's brigade, with a section of the St. Louis battery, and Sengstack's battery, were thrown across the Hatchie, but the enemy having possession of the heights commanding the crossing, as well as the position in which these troops were placed, and it being found that he was in very heavy force, it was deemed advisable to cross the Hatchie by another road, and these troops were withdrawn after serious loss to the east side of the Hatchie, where, being joined by Cabell's and Phifer's brigades, and assisted by the batteries of McNally, Hogg, Landis, and Tobin, they effectually checked the advance of the enemy. Green's divisions, which had been delayed by passing the wagon train that had unparked near the Tuscumbia, arriving on the ground, was formed in line of battle, but the enemy making no further effort to advance, the whole of my command was moved [640] off by another route, General Lovell's command being in our rear.

This was our last engagement with the enemy. In this last engagement we lost four guns, occasioned by the killing of horses. Our whole wagon train came off without molestation or loss, except of a few wagons that were broken down, and had to be abandoned.

The history of the war contains no bloodier page, perhaps, than that which will record this fiercely contested battle. The strongest expressions fall short of my admiration of the gallant conduct of the officers and men under my command. Words cannot add lustre to the fame they have acquired through deeds of noble daring, which, living through future time, will shed about every man, officer and soldier, who stood to his arms through this struggle, a halo of glory as imperishable as it is brilliant.

They have won to their sisters and daughters the distinguished honor, set before them by a General of their love and admiration, upon the event of an impending battle upon the same fields, of the proud exclamation, “My brother, father, was at the great battle of Corinth.” The bloodiest record of this battle is to come. The long list of the gallant dead upon this field will carry sorrow to the hearthstone of many a noble champion of our cause, as it does to the hearts of those who are to avenge them. A nation mourns their loss, while it cherishes the story of their glorious death, pointing out to their associate officers in this mighty struggle for liberty the pathway to victory and honor. They will live ever in the hearts of the admiring people of the government, for the establishment of which they halve given their lives. Of the field officers killed, were Colonel Rogers, Second Texas infantry, who fell in the heart of the town, of eleven wounds; Johnson, of Twentieth Arkansas, and Daly, of the Eighteenth Arkansas; Lieutenant-Colonels Maupin, First Missouri cavalry, dismounted, and Leigh, Forty-third Mississippi; Majors Vaughan, Sixth Missouri infantry; Doudell, Twenty-first Arkansas, and McDonald, Fortieth Mississippi. Many of my ablest and most gallant field officers are wounded, several mortally. Of this number are Colonels Erwin, Sixth Missouri infantry; Macfarland, Fourth Missouri infantry; Pritchard, Third Missouri infantry; Moore, Forty-third Mississippi, and McLean, Thirty-seventh Mississippi; Lieutenant-Colonels Pixler, Sixteenth Arkansas; Hedgespeth, Sixth Missouri infantry; Serrell, Seventh Mississippi battalion; Lanier, Forty-second Alabama; Hobson, Third Arkansas cavalry; Matthews, Twenty-first Arkansas; Campbell, Fortieth Mississippi, and Boone; and Majors Senteney, Second Missouri infantry; Keirn, Thirty-eighth Mississippi; Staton, Thirty-seventh Alabama; Timmins, Second Texas; Jones, Twenty-first Arkansas; Russell, Third Louisiana, and Yates; and McQuiddy, Third Missouri cavalry. For other casualties in officers and men, I beg leave to refer to lists enclosed. I cannot close this report without recognizing the eminent services and valuable assistance of Brigadier-Generals Maury, Hebert, (whose services I regret to have lost on the morning of the fourth, by reason of his illness), and Green, commanding divisions. I bear willing testimony to the admirable coolness, undaunted courage, and military skill of these officers in disposing their respective commands, and in executing their orders. Through them 1 transmit to Brigadier-General Moore, and acting Brigadier-Generals Cabell, Phifer, Gates, and Colbert, my high appreciation of their efficient services on the field.

Their skill in manoeuvring their troops, and promptness and gallantry in leading them through the most desperate conflicts, elicit my highest admiration. And of my troops as a body, I can say no juster or more complimentary words than that they have sustained and deepened and widened their reputation for exalted patriotism and determined valor.

To my personal staff I return my thanks for their promptness in the delivery of my orders, and their gallant bearing on the field.

All of which is respectfully submitted,

Major: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my division in the recent operations around Corinth. On the second instant the division repaired and crossed the Tuscumbia bridge, fifteen miles from Corinth, and moved forward, the cavalry under Armstrong and Jackson in advance. We moved to Chewalla, skirmishing lightly with the enemy several hours, and occupied the camp just abandoned, capturing some tents, quartermaster's and commissary's stores. On the third we moved forward, Villepigue's brigade in advance, skirmishing more heavily with a force of the enemy composed of two regiments of infantry, a section of artillery, and some cavalry, until we drove them across Indian Creek. At this point artillery fire became more frequent. Here we took an abandoned twelve-pounder howitzer. The bridge was repaired, under fire, and I crossed the whole division, consisting of Rust's brigade on the right, Bowen's in the centre, and Villepigue's on the left. The enemy occupied with his artillery a high hill at the crossing of the State line road with the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, with rifle-pits extending north and south, affording, with the hill, a strong position for about three thousand five hundred men. The skirmishers were there reinforced, and the whole line ordered to the assault, with reserve behind each brigade. The conflict was short and bloody. Our troops, emerging from the dense undergrowth, [641] rushed upon the hill and rifle-pits with the most determined gallantry, routed and drove off the enemy, causing them in their hasty retreat to abandon a twenty-pounder Parrott gun and caisson, with the limber of another gun. In this assault the following regiments are named as particularly distinguishing themselves, viz.: the Ninth Arkansas, Colonel Dunlop, and Third Kentucky, Colonel Thompson, of Rust's brigade; the Twenty-second Mississippi, Captain Lester commanding; Caruthers' Mississippi battalion, and the First Missouri regiment, Colonel Riley, of Bowen's brigade; and the Third Mississippi, Colonel Hurst, of Villepigue's brigade. The hill was carried mainly by the Ninth Arkansas and Twenty-second Mississippi, each vieing with the other in the dashing gallantry of their charge. The enemy's camps, half a mile beyond the position, were taken and held by the First Missouri regiment. Rust and Villepigue were thrown in advance, in line of battle, and Bowen's was posted on the hill until we should hear from Price's command on our left. On our right front was a strong redoubt well flanked with infantry and with an abatis of felled timber, half a mile in width, extending around it in one direction, but with no obstructions to the north, in the direction of Price's right. This fact I communicated to the Major-General commanding, and shortly afterwards the work was attacked and gallantly carried, from its right rear, by Moore's brigade, while Bowen was ordered to turn its left with his brigade from our side. Having replenished our ammunition, the whole division was moved forward and formed in line of battle on the bridge south of the railroad, Villepigue and Bowen in front and Rust in reserve. I received orders from the General commanding to move forward cautiously, feeling our way along the ridge to develop the position of the enemy.

Before advancing far, night put an end to the operations of an arduous and fatiguing, but glorious day.

In the night I was notified by the commanding General that early in the morning Price would open with a large battery of artillery and then attack in force with his left, and that while thus engaged my division should pass forward and attack with vigor on our right. Accordingly, at daylight, the division was moved forward, in line, along the ridge, for a mile and a half, with some very heavy firing of infantry on Villepigue's left, and artillery on Bowen's right. Rust, hitherto in reserve, moved up and occupied the centre, the line advancing until within a few hundred yards of two strong works of nine guns each, protected by heavy infantry forces. While reconnoitring these positions, with a view to the assault, I received an order from the commanding General to detach my strongest brigade to the support of Price's centre, which was being overpowered by large reinforcements of the enemy. This order was obeyed, and I was about to move the remaining brigades to the left, to close the gap made by detaching Villepigue, when the further order was received to retire, covering the retreat of the army. The division was withdrawn from under the very guns of the works without the slightest confusion, and in the most excellent order. Villepigue crossed the railroad, and with his artillery, under Major Watts, put an effectual check upon the pursuit by the enemy's cavalry.

Rust's brigade was put in position on the hill carried the day before, until everything had been withdrawn across Indian Creek, when he followed, bringing up the rear to Chewalla, where the division was reunited. The march was resumed on the fifth, this command acting as the rear guard to the army. Before reaching Tuscumbia bridge an order was received from the General commanding to press forward, with two brigades, to the support of Price, who was checked by large reinforcements of fresh troops at Hatchie bridge. Leaving Bowen's brigade as a rear guard on the Corinth road, Villepigue and Rust were pushed forward rapidly. The former, arriving first, was put in line of battle on the road to Hatchie bridge, to hold the enemy in check in that direction, while Rust was directed to proceed with General Price, in advance, to the crossing at Crumb's Mills, where it was decided to pass the army over.

Villepigue held the enemy back with skirmishers. Bowen, however, was attacked in force, on the other road, but repelled the attack, with great slaughter to the enemy and but little loss to his own command. They were clear from the field when he crossed the Tuscumbia and burned the bridge, all the wagons having been passed over in safety. The Fifteenth Mississippi distinguished itself particularly on this occasion. From the Hatchie to Hickory Flat (forty miles） this division continued as the rear guard to the army, frequently forming line of battle when the enemy was reported to be coming too near, cheerfully toiling along through heat and dust and undergoing long marches, loss of sleep, and want of food, with a fortitude worthy of the most unqualified admiration. Good order, discipline, and subordination suffered no detriment under this severe and trying ordeal.

To the commanders of brigades, Generals Rust, Villepigue, and Bowen, my thanks are especially due. Displaying their well-known and approved gallantry on the field, they evinced sound judgment, discretion, and ability in handling their troops, both in action and on the march, achieving signal success with small loss. The admirable condition in which the division returned to this point is the best proof of their merits. Surgeon Hawes, chief medical officer of the division, performed his duties quietly, systematically, and with the utmost efficiency. Our wounded, with very few exceptions, were brought to this depot. My thanks are due to the officers of my staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Ivy, Captain Toutant, and Captain Quitman, for their assistance in the field, and in the conduct of the retreat. Being few in number, additional labor devolved upon them. Their duties were performed [642] cheerfully, coolly, and with a deliberate gallantry which caused me to repose the greatest confidence in them. The following named commanders of regiments are mentioned particularly by their brigade commanders for their courage and efficiency: Captain Ashford, Thirty-fifth Alabama; Colonel Dunlop, Ninth Arkansas; Captain Lester, Twenty-second Mississippi; Colonel Riley, First Missouri; Colonel Hurst, Thirty-third Missouri; Colonel Shelby, Thirty-ninth Mississippi. For the names of other officers who particularly distinguished themselves, you are respectfully referred to the reports of the brigade commanders herewith transmitted. Colonel Jackson, commanding cavalry brigade, acted under my orders during a portion of the time, always displaying a coolness, courage, and efficiency for which he has heretofore been remarkable. The loss in my command, during the operations, was seventy-seven killed, two hundred and eighty-five wounded, and about two hundred missing.

Respectfully submitted,

Colonel: In response to Major-General Lovell's circular of this date, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade near Corinth, on the second, third, and fourth inst. Moving from the Hatchie on Thursday, the second, my brigade in advance, when within eight miles of Corinth our cavalry came up with the enemy, and reported his presence. In obedience to orders I immediately formed my brigade in line of battle, and threw forward two companies of the Ninth Arkansas as skirmishers. Advancing rapidly, encountering no opposition except a few straggling shots which were not responded to, we came directly upon an abandoned camp of the enemy, in which were a redoubt or two, and some rifle-pits. These were all abandoned, and after passing them, without halting an instant, some half mile or more, we were ordered to bivouac in line of battle. At four o'clock on the morning of the third, the division moved, General Villepigue in front, towards Corinth. When within three miles of the town, General Villepigue's skirmishers encountered those of the enemy. This was on the extreme right of the line adopted by the General commanding the division. This being my position, I immediately formed my men in front of the supposed position of the enemy, relieving General Villepigue. Major Gibson was ordered to deploy his (Fourth Alabama) battalion as skirmishers, which order was promptly executed. The Ninth Arkansas, Colonel Dunlop, was on my left, and Third Kentucky, Colonel Thompson, on my right. The Seventh Kentucky, under Colonel Crosslove, was held in reserve.

These dispositions being made, an advance was ordered. Colonel Thompson on the extreme right, with a considerable interval between his regiment and the balance of the brigade, was purposely put in motion a short time before the other regiments were ordered forward. In a very short time the skirmishers of the opposing forces engaged each other. The engagement soon became general. On the right the firing between Colonel Thompson, Third Kentucky, and what was supposed to be two regiments of the enemy, posted on the south side of the M. & C. R. R. was extremely animated. While following up the Ninth Arkansas and Thirty-first and Thirty-fifth Alabama regiments in the direction whence came terrific volleys of shell, grape, and canister, I sent a staff officer to Colonel Thompson to know if he could continue to advance against the apparent odds opposed to him. He was pressing steadily forward, but was apprehensive his right might be turned. I instantly ordered the reserve regiment, Seventh Kentucky, to his support. Officers and men seemed impatient for the order, and rushed impetuously forward, but only reached the scene of conflict to witness the flight of the enemy from it. Meanwhile the left wing advanced through a heavy fire of artillery and musketry towards the enemy's battery and the infantry that (behind trenches) supported it. The dense forest through which we passed, while it lasted, was a partial protection. As we emerged from it with an unbroken line, in full view of the enemy in its strong position, beyond a deep cut in the railroad, not more than sixty yards distant in a straight line, the officers and men were subjected to a test that it is rarely the lot of soldiers to undergo. They were equal to the occasion. [643] For a moment it appeared that the entire line would be swept away. The gaps that the enemy's artillery ploughed through the ranks were closed up with the coolness and steadiness of veterans of a hundred fields. On my left, Captain D. H. Norwood, and Lieutenants Kennebrow and Moore fell, killed, and Lieutenants Ken and Baily, of the Ninth Arkansas regiment, wounded, while on my right Captain Fulton was killed, and Captain Mitchell and Lieutenants Hunter, Lawler, and Collice, of the Thirty-fifth Alabama regiment, were severely wounded, bravely leading, and by their example inspiring their men with their own unquailing courage. In a few seconds I here lost over a hundred men and officers. To have halted or hesitated would have brought certain destruction upon my command. I ordered bayonets fixed and a charge made upon the battery. The order was obeyed with cheers and yells, and by making a detour to the left, to avoid the deep cut in the railroad, the Ninth Arkansas was soon in possession of the enemy's strong position (we had assaulted and taken one fine gun which the enemy was unable to get off), closely followed by the Thirty-fifth Alabama, under Colonel Crump. After advancing some three hundred yards down the railroad, I halted and formed my men and marched again to the south side of the railroad, and remained in position until a fort and large camp in front of us was evacuated, in consequence of a most determined attack by a portion of General Price's command, on their rear. Late in the evening I was ordered forward, and bivouacked in line of battle in the midst of the forts and camps of the enemy, and inside of an abattis which extended entirely around their exterior line of defence.

On the morning of Saturday, the fourth, the whole division advanced in line of battle towards the fortifications of the enemy on College Hill; General Villepigue on the left, General Bowen on the right, in front, and my own brigade following close in the rear, as a reserve, to support either or both as occasion might require. When within two or three hundred yards of several forts behind which long lines of infantry behind formidable looking breastworks, with abattis again in front, were plainly visible. The enemy opened a most rapid fire from their artillery, which my entire command sustained with the most gratifying steadiness, not an officer or man leaving his position or exhibiting, so far as I could perceive, the least discomposure. About nine and a half o'clock I moved my brigade to the front and left of the advance line occupied by General Bowen, who was ordered far to the right, and General Villepigue was withdrawn to reinforce a portion of General Price's line, which, after the most stubborn and heroic resistance to greatly superior numbers, of what was afterwards known to be fresh troops, was wavering. In a very short time it was announced by the Major-General commanding, that our friends on the left had been compelled to give way and abandon the field, and I was ordered to fall back to the position first taken from the enemy, near where the road from Chewalla to Corinth crosses the railroad, and there form line of battle in the most advantageous position to cover the retreat of our army. In perfect order, but as quickly as possible, I selected a line of great strength, with skirmishers displayed on a line a mile in extent and three-quarters of a mile in advance of my main line, from which I could repel an advance of the enemy upon the two roads, and the railroad leading to Corinth, and awaited the withdrawal of our forces. Remaining exactly forty minutes after Colonel Riley passed, I moved my brigade in the direction taken by our retreating columns until I came to the field hospital, where I found eight wounded soldiers, only three of whom were willing to be moved. Two of them I had carried beyond the reach of the enemy on litters, the third was able to ride on a caisson. I then continued my march without again confronting the enemy during the entire retreat. The good conduct of officers and men in performing the responsible duty of rear guard to a retreating army, cannot be too highly commended. There was not a semblance of panic or disorder, or even unusual excitement during the entire retreat, upon which my brigade marched in better order and with more deliberation than it had done at all before, or has done since. The signal good conduct which they displayed on the field of battle or in the face of dangers and death, and the fortitude and constancy with which they sustained themselves afterwards under privations and hardships and sufferings more trying to the soldier than the most appalling dangers, are, I trust, only an earnest to the country of what she may expect from them in the future. In conclusion, it is only necessary to say of the Third Kentucky, that Colonel Thompson, and the men and officers under him, fully sustained the reputation they had won on other fields. The only regret of Colonel Crosslove and his men, of the Seventh Kentucky, when ordered to the support of the Third, was that this regiment stood so little in need of it. The conduct of the Thirty-fifth Alabama, commanded by Captain Ashford, though deprived by illness of their accomplished Colonel (Robertson), could not have been improved by the presence of any officer. The Fourth Alabama battalion, under Major Gibson, deployed as skirmishers, performed well the part allotted to them. The Ninth Arkansas, under Colonel Dunlop, who was conspicuous for the activity and gallantry displayed in keeping his men in line, and moving steadily forward in the face of the deadly fire of the enemy's artillery, won the applause and admiration of all who witnessed its conduct. Its colors were borne by their intrepid Sergeant, John M. Pearce, up wards and onwards without faltering during the hottest of the fire, while his comrades were falling thick and fast around him. When all behaved so well, the commanding General will not hazard injustice by mentioning those who particularly attracted [644] his notice. I regret that a sense of duty to the service and of justice to the balance of the brigade, will not allow me to bestow the same unmixed praise upon the Thirty-first Alabama regiment. A portion of this regiment, in spite of the gallantry of their Colonel and his efforts to make them do their duty, following the example of some of its commissioned officers, behaved disgracefully. At a most critical moment it broke in disorder and all efforts to restore it were unavailing. I called the attention of their Colonel to the misconduct of several officers, whose example was evidently demoralizing to the men, and ordered them to surrender their swords and leave the field. Upon their earnest entreaties to be tried again, I permitted them to retain their swords and remain, with the hope and belief that hereafter their conduct may be in harmony with the brave members of the same regiments, whose conduct could not suffer by comparison with other commanders in the brigade.

I withhold their names, though there can be no controversy as to the regiments that were first in the strong position abandoned by the enemy and in possession of the Lady Richardson, which in their flight they left behind them. It is due to the right wing of General Bowen's admirable brigade, the Twenty-second Mississippi, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lester, to acknowledge that their advance upon our left and the right of the enemy's battery, attracted a portion of its fire, in concert with our advance greatly facilitated its capture, and entitles them to a full share of the honor.

I would here express my obligations to Captain Fall and Lieutenants Anderson, Ayers, and Bertrand, of my staff, for the prompt and intelligent manner in which they executed my orders. Lieutenant Sweeny, in command of the Hudson battery, attached to my brigade, had no opportunity to participate in the action, but executed quickly and cheerfully every order addressed to him.

Casualties on the field and upon the retreat, twenty-five killed, one hundred and seventeen wounded, and eighty-three missing.

The dense forest of heavy timber and thick undergrowth, under cover of which the brigade advanced until within a few rods of the enemy's battery, accounts for the comparatively small number of killed and wounded.

Sir: I have the honor to forward herewith reports from my several commands in regard to the part taken by them in the actions of the third, fourth, and fifth instants, at and near Corinth. It will be seen that, passing over the deployments between Chewalla and the creek west of Corinth, where the enemy's outposts were driven in with little or no resistance, this brigade first formed line of battle to the east of Cypress Creek, with Rust's brigade on its right and Villepigue's on the left. A heavy line of skirmishers, composed of the First Missouri regiment and the Mississippi battalion of sharpshooters, proceeding in advance, supported by the Twenty-second and Fifteenth Mississippi regiment in line, and the Sixth Mississippi regiment (Colonel Lowry), and Watson battery (Captain Bursley) in reserve.

The line advanced steadily, forcing back the enemy's sharpshooters into their intrenchments, and pushing on, charged their works, capturing their battery at the salient near the railroad, and driving their entire infantry force from the trenches. Rust's and Villepigue's carrying the trenches in front of them about the same time, rendered the work comparatively easy for my brigade. The Twenty-second Mississippi regiment, Captain Lester commanding, deserves special mention for their gallant charge on this occasion. The Mississippi battalion of sharpshooters, Captain Caruthers commanding, were conspicuous for their coolness and courage, also for joining the Twenty-second Mississippi regiment in the charge in which they captured the battery. The First Missouri regiment, gathering in, charged, while deployed as skirmishers, and drove the enemy from the trenches before I could reach the position with the Fifteenth Mississippi regiment, which was advancing towards the same point. The First Missouri regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Riley commanding, proceeding onward, drove the enemy from one of their encampments nearly a mile inside of their works, holding the same, under fire, until the second line of battle was formed, towards sunset, for the attack on the right. The enemy having abandoned the works on our right, the second line, above alluded to, advanced and occupied their encampments, capturing a few stragglers in the evening. On the morning of the fourth, the brigade was formed in accordance with instructions received the night before, immediately in advance of the encampment occupied, and advanced steadily with Villepigue on its left and Rust in reserve, the whole moving together. Arriving within six hundred yards of a strong redoubt, supported on the right and left by a similar work, with a formidable line of infantry intrenched connecting them, it was halted, and after a protracted skirmish, which failed to develop the enemy's strength on the position, I determined, in absence of the Major-General commanding, to feel them more effectually and force them to show their strength. The Watson battery (four guns) was ordered to open on the works immediately in our front, and during the second round was answered by a terrific cannonade from the right, [645] left, and front, convincing me that the information given that there were only three guns at this point was erroneous; as I had thus developed at least twenty. The battery was ordered to the rear, and after the firing abated slightly I moved the brigade a short distance to the rear near Rust's line, in order to take advantage of the ground and save it from a repetition of the galling fire which had opened upon them.

The brigade's loss, during this shelling, was about fifty men killed and wounded, and the whole command deserves special commendation for their coolness under fire. After remaining for some time (two hours) in the new position, our skirmishers keeping up a continuous fire on our front and right, and after Villepigue had repelled the attack made on his line and moved to the left, my brigade was ordered to the rear, while Rust formed line of battle beyond, at the salient near the railroad crossing. The First Missouri regiment, deployed as skirmishers, covered the rear of both brigades. The command, after a successful evacuation, camped at Chewalla about sunset. Detailed, on the morning of the fifth, as the rear guard of the army, the brigade left its encampments, in rear of the train, at about ten A. M., marching slowly, very much annoyed and delayed by the wagons. At twelve M., the enemy's advance overtook us, and I formed line of battle with the Mississippi battalion and one section of artillery, under Lieutenant Barlow, in advance, our line then fronting the enemy. The attack was made by their cavalry and vigorously repulsed by two companies of Jackson's cavalry and the Mississippi battalion, and their rout completed by the rapid and effective fire of Lieutenant Barlow's section. Resuming the retreat we were not again molested until compelled to halt, for several hours, at the Tuscumbia River bridge, allowing the wagons to cross. The enemy arrived at our position near the bridge about sunset. Deploying, they endeavored to turn my left in order to cut me off from the bridge, at the same time advancing strongly on my front and centre. After heavy skirmishing, well maintained on both sides, and some artillery firing by the enemy, they advanced boldly in front of my centre, opposite the Fifteenth Mississippi regiments Taking command of this regiment in person, I advanced it about fifteen paces, and then poured a deliberate, well-aimed, and simultaneous volley. This fire, which was handsomely seconded by several rounds of canister by Binley's first section under Lieutenant Toledano, on our immediate right which enfiladed their line,followed up by a rapid, well-aimed, and continuous file fire from the Fifteenth Mississippi regiment, must have proved destructive, as the advance was not only thus checked, but their whole force fled from the field. I then crossed the Tuscumbia at my leisure, tore up and burnt the bridge, obstructed the ford near by, and joined the division about three miles beyond. My loss in the action of the Tuscumbia was two or three killed and eight or ten wounded. This brigade was subsequently detailed as the rear guard of the army, but had no other engagement with the enemy. I have the honor to transmit herewith a full list of the killed, wounded, and missing in the three days actions alluded to. The officers of my staff were present, and untiring in the discharge of their respective duties. In addition to the assistance given by my Adjutant-General, Captain Hutchinson, my Inspector-General, Captain Percy, and Lieutenant Carter, Aide-de-Camp, I am indebted to Caldwell, of the Watson battery, for bearing orders in the field. All of these gentlemen were conspicuous for coolness and courage during the action, and on the retreat.

In closing, I would call the attention of the division commander to the unexampled courage and endurance displayed by the troops, who, under hardships and privations which can only be appreciated by those who experienced them, never faltered in the discharge of their arduous duties. The exceptions mentioned in the report of Colonel Farrel, Fifteenth Mississippi regiment, were conspicuous in a brigade which acted so well that they deserve to be immediately punished. I know of no better way of rewarding the two thousand brave men than by casting out the two or three cowards who happen to be among them. I, therefore, recommend that Second Lieutenant S. T. Clark, Company A, Fifteenth Mississippi regiment, be dismissed in disgrace, and that Corporal Bennett, and privates Applegate and Spiney, Company B, be drummed out of the service, and their names published with the sentence attached.

Very respectfully,

Colonel: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Second brigade, in the actions before Corinth, on the third and fourth instants:

In approaching Corinth on the third instant, the Second brigade was in advance. An outpost of the enemy was met about five miles from the fortress, and driven into the outer intrenchments without much opposition. On reaching a creek about three miles from the fortress, and quite near the outer intrenchments, the march of the column was delayed for some time by the enemy's artillery, and from the bridge over the creek having been destroyed. The passage, however, was effected in good time, and the brigade was engaged in heavy skirmishing with the enemy until the other brigades of the division had crossed and taken up their positions. [646] The whole division then advanced, the Second brigade being on the extreme left. The enemy were driven steadily before us until we came in view of the outer intrenchments or riflepits. Our onward course was here checked for a short time, in consequence of the deadly fire of the enemy, and the nature of the obstructions in front of us.

After a slight pause, the Thirty-third Mississippi (Colonel D. W. Hurst, commanding) charged the intrenchments, and drove the enemy from them in gallant style. In consequence of the dense thickness of the undergrowth, I had lost sight of all of my regiments except the Thirty-third Mississippi; so that after capturing the intrenchments, considerable time elapsed before my scattered regiments could be collected and the line re-formed. During the rest of the day the brigade was engaged in executing orders from the Major-General commanding the division, but was not actively engaged with the enemy. Early the following morning, the brigade advanced as directed until under the fire of the enemy's artillery, which, together with the fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, was very heavy, causing many casualties. Under the circumstances, the conduct of the troops was excellent, and could not be surpassed. Later in the morning it became necessary to fall back from this advanced position, to defeat an attempt of the enemy to turn my left flank, which was accomplished in good order, and the enemy repulsed in gallant style, and with considerable loss. This last action having caused the whole left wing of the army to attack the enemy's right, the enemy did not again appear in my immediate front, and the brigade remained idle until ordered across the railroad to cover the movements of the left wing of the army, which had been withdrawn. While performing this service, the enemy's cavalry once appeared in sight, and it became necessary to disperse them, which was done by Major G. O. Watts, by a few rounds from one of his batteries. I wish to mention for conspicuous gallantry Colonel D. W. Hurst, Thirty-third Mississippi regiment, who drove the enemy from their intrenchments, at the head of his regiment, with empty guns; Colonel W. B. Shelby, Thirty-ninth Mississippi regiment, who rallied his men at great personal risk from a partial disorder into which they had been thrown by a flank fire of the enemy. The following officers of my staff were with me on the field, and rendered me important service in conveying orders, etc.: Captain Kinlock Falconer, Assistant-Adjutant General, and Major J. P. Carr, A. C. S., and Captain Belton, A. Q. M.

I transmit the reports of the different regimental commanders, giving detailed operations of the respective commands. I also enclose a list of the killed, wounded, and missing.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Captain: I have the honor to report that this division of the Army of the West moved from Ripley towards Corinth on the thirtieth September, numbering three thousand eight hundred and ninety infantry, five light batteries of four guns each, and eight hundred and eightyone cavalry. On the morning of October third we moved, at daylight, from our camp near Chewalla to attack the enemy in Corinth. The division was formed in line of battle near Walker's house, north of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Moore's brigade, with its right resting near the railroad; Phifer's brigade was formed on Moore's left, extending to Hebert's division; and Cabell's brigade was held in reserve. The line faced Corinth and the enemy's advanced line of intrenchments.

The sharpshooters of Moore's and Phifer's brigades, under Colonels Rogers, Sherman, and Bridges, soon became briskly engaged with those of the enemy, and forced them back into their intrenchments. At ten A. M. our whole line moved forward, and the strong outworks of the enemy were carried without check. Moore and Phifer at once pushed on towards Corinth in pursuit of the retreating enemy. When within a little more than a mile of the town they were halted. Moore was moved towards his right to unite with the line of General Lovell, which was advancing along the south side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and soon encountered a heavy force of the enemy, whom, after a fierce contest, he drove before him. Soon afterwards he was reinforced by two regiments of Cabell's brigade, under Colonels Johnson and Dockery. The advance was then resumed, and Moore soon became hotly engaged with the enemy, occupying a field-work, or intrenched camp. This he carried by assault, capturing the camp and its stores. Phifer, advancing, was met near the Mobile and Ohio Railroad by a strong force of the enemy, whom, after an obstinate combat, attended with a heavy loss on both sides, he drove back into Corinth, and was then halted, with his left resting within four hundred yards of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, his right being a little thrown back. Cabell was sent to support Phifer's right, now separated by a wide space from Moore, and was soon afterwards withdrawn to support Hebert's, who was threatened by a flank movement of the enemy towards his extreme left. About dark Moore was drawn in towards his left, until his line united with Phifer's; and the troops lay on their arms in these positions all night. Just before daylight, Major Burnett placed the batteries of Tobin, Sengstack, and McNally upon an advanced ridge about six hundred yards from Corinth, and opened fire upon the town. One of their pieces, [647] while taking position, being thrown by Captain Tobin rather too far beyond his support, was surprised and captured by the enemy's sharpshooters. Captain Tobin was made prisoner at the same time. At daylight all of those guns were withdrawn, and the fire of the division was maintained by the sharpshooters only, who, boldly and incessantly, under Rodgers, Sherman, and Bridges, harassed the enemy. I had been ordered to await the attack of Hebert's division on my left before advancing to storm the town. Soon after nine o'clock the firing upon my left became sharp, and Moore and Phifer were at once advanced. Cabell's brigade was moved closer up and held in reserve. In a few minutes the fusilade became general along the whole line of the Army of the West; and Cabell's brigade was ordered in to support of Gates' brigade, the next on Phifer's left. The brigades of Generals Moore, Phifer, and Cabell were gallantly led by their commanders to the assault of the enemy's work in the heart of Corinth. They carried them, planted their colors within them, drove the enemy from them, and held them until forced back by the overwhelming reserves of the enemy. The division was then re-formed and marched back to encamp near Chewalla. Next morning it moved towards Pocahontas. When within five miles of Davis' bridge, couriers from Colonel Wirt Adams, who had been guarding that point, apprised us that the enemy was advancing in force to seize it before we could cross. Moore's brigade, now reduced to about three hundred men, was pushed forward, and with the St. Louis battery and two guns taken from the enemy at Corinth. (all under Major Burnett's orders), marched across the bridges and formed with the view of storming the heights of Matamoras; but they were too few and too late. The enemy's artillery and infantry, already in position, swept them away and were close upon the bridge before Phifer's brigade, commanded by Colonel Ross, could cross and form and meet them. (We lost four of our guns here.) Nothing remained for us now but to dispute the enemy's passage over the bridge, and to hold him in check as long as possible. This was gallantly done for more than an hour by the remnants of Moore's, Phifer's, and Cabell's brigades, and by the batteries of Hogg, Sengstack, Dawson, Lieutenant Moore and Lieutenant Miles, superintended by Major Burnett. They were all then ordered,to retire and take up a position within the timber. This was done in good order, and the enemy not advancing, the whole division was withdrawn and put upon the march by another route, our rear being covered by General Villepigue's brigade, Last night the division bivouacked at this point. I enclose herewith the reports of the several brigade commanders, and refer you to them for more detailed accounts of these actions than I can give. I can bear honest testimony to the fidelity and valor of the officers and troops under my command. The instances of gallant conduct would include too many for me to mention here.

But there are two men of humble rank whose conspicuous courage and energy at Davis' bridge attracted general attention and admiration. One is Earnest Goolah, chief bugler of Ross' regiment; the other is Benjamin J. Chandler, a private of Company C, Slemm's cavalry. I recommend them to the most favorable considerations of the General commanding as worthy of the honors due to conspicuous courage upon the battle-field. My staff officers were always prompt, intelligent, and gallant.

I enclose the reports of our losses. You will observe that they have been very heavy. But, sir, we remember that our noble dead fell in the streets and in the innermost fortifications of Corinth, and that our torn colors have floated in triumph over the very stronghold of the foe.

I am, sir, very respectfully yours,

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by that portion of the army under my command in the recent engagement at Corinth:

On the morning of the third instant, being in command of the Third brigade of the First division, commanded by Brigadier-General Hebert, I was ordered to take position on the left of the Fourth brigade, forming a line in front of and about three or four hundred yards from the enemy's outer breastworks. Scarcely was the line formed when the enemy opened upon us with great fierceness a fire of shell and grape, doing us, however, but little harm — wounding a few men. About twelve o'clock we were ordered to advance; our skirmishers being in front of our lines, soon drove the enemy's skirmishers inside of the fortifications, where they endeavored to make a stand, and opened upon us with musketry. We continued to advance rapidly; the enemy fled and we took possession of the fortifications. The order being still to move forward, we moved in line until we came to an open field, where the enemy opened upon us a murderous fire from two batteries placed upon a hill beyond. I halted the brigade and ordered Captains Landis and Geuber, with their batteries, to take position and fire upon the enemy. We here had a brisk artillery fight which lasted about three-quarters of an hour. Our batteries having driven those of the enemy from their position,I then advanced my brigade until I came to another field where I found the enemy in line, under the cover of a fence on the far side of the field, awaiting our approach. Here we saw danger ahead, with a battery and a line of infantry firing upon us from the left, and a heavy fire in front. We moved forward at double-quick across the open field to meet the [648] enemy. Here was an unceasing fire of musketry for about one hour and a half, and as we would break the lines of the enemy they would bring fresh troops. I sent to Colonel Gates, whose brigade was not engaged, to try and relieve us of the cross-fire on the left, which he did by sending to my support the Second Missouri infantry, Colonel Cockerel commanding. We then soon succeeded in driving the enemy from the field, but not until we had lost many brave and gallant officers and soldiers. During this engagement I was enabled to see the whole length of my brigade, consisting of three Missouri and two Mississippi regiments, and I am proud to say there was no faltering, but all seemed eager for the combat. And nobly did they sustain it; no troops could have done better, nor could I distinguish between the regiments which behaved the most gallantly; each did vigorously the work assigned it. In this charge we lost largely in officers. Colonels Erwin and McFarland and Lieutenant-Colonels Ferrell and Hedgespeth were wounded. Colonel Ferrell fell while urging his men forward; He was at least twenty yards in advance of his command. I fear he will never again be able to take the field. In him we lose a gallant officer. Lieutenant-Colonel Leigh of the Forty-third Mississippi fell while gallantly leading his wing of the regiment. Major McQuiddy was severely wounded. Major Vaughn, of the Sixth Missouri, was killed. While leading this charge several officers of the line were killed, among whom were the following: Captain Taylor, Captain McKinney, and Captain Graves.

After the enemy fell back and the firing ceased, we gathered up the wounded and advanced our lines some two hundred yards beyond where the enemy had fought us, and slept on our arms all night.

About daylight, leaving our skirmishers out, we fell back about one hundred yards under cover of the hill, in order to get some refreshments. Before we were done eating the enemy opened their batteries, upon us most furiously.

Just at this time I received a message from General Hebert informing me that he was unable to take the field, and that the command of the division would devolve upon me; in a few minutes I received an order from General Price placing me in command.

The command of the Third brigade now devolved upon Colonel Moore of the Forty-third Mississippi regiment.

At the time of assuming command I found the brigades placed as follows: the Third brigade on the left of General Phifer, its left resting near the Mobile and Ohio Railroad; First brigade (Colonel Gates) on its left, fronting the railroad; the Fourth brigade (Colonel McLean) on its left ; and the Second brigade (Colonel Cobbert) in reserve. I immediately sent for the Second brigade and placed it in line where the Third was, and held the Third in reserve. In this position we skirmished for a short time with the enemy. Receiving word from Colonel McLean (commanding Fourth brigade) that there was danger of his left being turned by the enemy, and that if attempted he would be unable to prevent it, I ordered the Second to move to the left of the Fourth, placing the Third in its original position. I then ordered a forward movement, directing the Second and Fourth to move forward in echelon, throwing the left forward so as to come to a charge at the same time of the right.

At the time I ordered the forward movement I sent for reinforcements, believing that we would need them, for I could see the enemy had two lines of fortifications bristling with artillery and strongly supported by infantry. Our lines moved across the railroad, advancing slowly and steadily, our skirmishers constantly fighting with those of the enemy, driving them back. When within about two hundred yards the command was ordered to charge at a double-quick. The whole line now moved forward with great rapidity. Officers and .men all seemed eager to be foremost in reaching the fortifications, but it was a hard road to travel, climbing over logs, brush, and fallen timber, while masked batteries of the enemy opened upon us at almost every step with great slaughter, but nothing daunted the divisions pressed forward. The First brigade (Colonel Gates commanding) arriving at the fortifications drove the enemy from their intrenchments, taking about forty pieces of artillery. The Fourth and Second brigades having worse roads, and the distance being greater, only a portion of them were able to reach the intrenchments, and the left being in danger of being outflanked, fell back. Lieutenant Colonel Maupin of the First Missouri cavalry (serving as infantry), fell while gallantly leading his regiment in the charge on the enemy's fortifications, bearing his regimental colors. Colonel Moore, I fear, was mortally wounded while leading the Third brigade on a charge in town; he fell near the depot and was left on the field.

Colonel McLean commanding Fourth brigade was severely wounded in the charge. Major McQuiddy, who was wounded on the day before in the arm, but would not leave his command (Third Missouri cavalry), was severely wounded in the thigh. Major Yates, of the Thirty-sixth Mississippi, was also wounded, as was also Colonel Pritchard, of the Third Missouri infantry. Reinforcements again being sent for, General Cabell came up with his brigade, but before he could get to the fortifications, Colonel Gates' ammunition was exhausted and he fell back. The fire then became terrific. General Cabell was unable to retake the fortifications, and the whole line fell back on the hill, in rear of the batteries. Here I received orders to move the division back on the hill beyond the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Before reaching that point, I received an order to continue the march until further orders.

We encamped early in the evening on the right of the road opposite. Sunday morning I [649] was ordered to resume the march, marching in the rear of General Maury's division. Before reaching the Hatchie, I received an order to push forward, “that General Maury's division had engaged the enemy on the Hatchie, and needed assistance.” I pushed forward as rapidly as the men could possibly travel; when we arrived, however, we found General Cabell's force falling back in good order. I was ordered to form on the left of a road in a field, behind a fence. We threw out skirmishers, who soon engaged those of the enemy, and drove them back. The Fourth brigade came upon a body of the enemy's skirmishers, charged and repulsed them. We here lay still for about half an hour, the enemy in sight, every minute expecting to move forward, but instead, we received orders to “fall back,” which we did without any interruption of the enemy, though they still continued throwing shell as they had been doing all the time; here I had three or four men slightly wounded, I was then ordered to move my division out on the “Boneyard road.” At the crossing of the Hatchie I received orders to proceed to the Ripley road, and bivouack for the night, which I did in line along the road towards Pocahontas, throwing out pickets to give notice of the approach of the enemy. The next morning I resumed the march in good order towards Ripley. During the fight and on the retreat, both officers and soldiers have shown themselves as brave as the most sanguine could desire. All did their duty well, and were I to particularize I would not know where to begin. I cannot, however, refrain from acknowledging my obligations to Captain Wm. B. Pittman, for his promptness in carrying an order through the field when the very atmosphere seemed filled with shot, shell, grape, and canister; also to Major Theo. Johnson, who acted as voluntary aid, and who conveyed orders with great despatch through the hottest firing regardless of danger.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Captain: I have the honor to report the part taken by my command in the engagements before Corinth, on the third and fourth, and at the Hatchie bridge, on the fifth instant.

My brigade consisted of the Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first Arkansas regiments, Jones' battalion of Arkansas volunteers, Rapley's battalion of sharpshooters, and the Appeal battery, under Lieutenant Hogg. These regiments were small, making an aggregate of thirteen hundred and sixty-seven (1,367) effective men. On the third instant, in obedience to orders from Brigadier-General Maury, commanding division, my brigade, after crossing the Mississippi and Charleston Railroad, was held in reserve to support the brigades of Generals Moore and Phifer, that was ordered to advance and attack the enemy. I remained within supporting distance of the two brigades with my whole brigade until half-past 3 o'clock, when I was ordered to send two regiments to support General Moore on the right. I sent, at once, the Nineteenth Arkansas regiment, under Colonel Dockey, and the Twentieth Arkansas, under Colonel H. P. Johnson, who became, after arriving on the field of battle, quickly engaged with the enemy, driving the enemy before them with great loss; our loss being small, not over five killed and ten wounded in each regiment After these regiments had been sent off, I received an order from the division commander to move, with the remainder of my brigade, to the support of General Phifer. This order was obeyed promptly. After arriving on the field I found General Phifer's brigade, although much exhausted from heat and dust, had driven the enemy within less than eight hundred (800) yards of their breastworks around the city of Corinth. I immediately formed my line of battle, threw my skirmishers to the front, and engaged the enemy's skirmishers, which enabled General Phifer to withdraw his brigade. After his brigade had been withdrawn, I advanced with my skirmishers, fighting the enemy as far as I deemed it prudent with the small force I lead. I therefore contented myself with holding the position I had, and watching the movements of the enemy, my skirmishers in the meantime keeping up a brisk fire with the enemy's sharpshooters. I am confident they did terrible execution with the enemy's skirmishers. I then captured two fine ambulances and nine prisoners; the enemy during this time kept up a constant fire of grape and canister, which, although furious, did but little harm, as my loss was only two privates killed and five wounded. I was here struck myself on the foot with a spent Minnie ball, which gave me a great deal of pain at the time, but did not disable me. About sundown, after the enemy had drawn all their infantry and artillery inside the inner works, I received an order to report, with my brigade, to General Hebert, on the extreme left, to guard the crossing of a road leading from the Purdy road across to the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. I reported, as directed, to General Hebert, who gave me the necessary instructions, and ordered me (by the consent of General Armstrong) to retain a section of Kink's artillery and Colonel McCulloch's regiment of cavalry. Alter making such a disposition of the forces under my command, placing out my pickets to watch the movements of the enemy, and protect our left from a flank movement of the enemy, I remained there until seven o'clock A. M., on the fourth, when I was ordered by General Hebert to move up and report to General Green, to whom he had (being sick) turned over the command of the division. I moved up, as ordered, and reported to General Green [650] who ordered me to remain in supporting distance of his brigade, at the same time informing me that I would be subject to orders from my own division commander, Brigadier-General Maury. A short time had elapsed before I received an order from General Maury to move as near General Phifer as I could, taking advantage of the ground to protect my men from a terrific fire of artillery, which I was exposed to from a battery of the enemy on the south side of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. I placed my brigade on the side of a hill protecting them as much as possible from this furious discharge of grape, canister, and shell, that was kept up without a moment's cessation, sufficient to demoralize any troops except such as the troops which composed my brigade. This was within less than seven hundred (700) yards of the breastworks and the town of Corinth, where the First Missouri brigade, under Colonel Gates, was hotly engaged. About eleven o'clock A. M., I received an order from General Maury, delivered by Captain Flowerree, Adjutant-General, to move rapidly to the support of Colonel Gates, who had entered the enemy's breastworks and could not hold it for the want of ammunition. This order was received with a shout by the whole brigade, who had stood this terrible cannonading for more than an hour. Immediately after receiving the order, I moved by the left flank, at double-quick, until I crossed the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. After crossing the railroad, through a terrible fire of artillery, I faced to the front and moved on the enemy's works, the left in the open field and the right and centre through a skirt of woods about fifty yards wide, expecting to find the Missouri brigade. This brigade had, however, fallen back, taking a road on my extreme right. Instead of meeting the Missouri brigade as I had been informed I would, I found the enemy in line of battle just outside of the timber, and about three hundred yards in front of the breastworks. My left became engaged at once, after facing to the front, and the whole line in a few minutes afterwards, when I gave the word “charge.” As soon as the command was given, the whole line moved at double-quick, almost as one man, shouting “Butler,” and driving them until they reached the crest of the enemy's breastworks, where a greater force than I had driven in sprang up, delivering a tremendous volley in the very faces of the greater part of my whole line, which was at that time subject to fire, from the left front of the bastion near the college, as well as to the artillery fire from the battery on the south side of the railroad, and on the left of the work charged. A part of the Twentieth Arkansas regiment, under Colonel Johnson, went over the works inside of Corinth. The numbers of the enemy being so great in front, at the same time being exposed to such a dreadful cross fire of musketry and artillery on my flanks and rear, that my men were compelled to fall back with a very heavy loss of killed and wounded, officers and men.

The courage and daring of my men, who shot the enemy down in their trenches, is beyond all praise; the ground in front of the breastworks was literally covered with the dead and wounded of both friend and foe, the killed and wounded of the enemy being nearly, if not fully, two to one. Those left presented the appearance of men nearly whipped, and convinced me that it was nothing but their reinforcements and superior numbers that kept them from a total rout. My loss, in officers especially, was, I regret to say, very great at this time; a great many, both officers and privates, were wounded and taken prisoners. I lost here three brave and valuable field officers killed--Colonel H. P. Johnson and Major Dane W. Jones, Twentieth Arkansas regiment, and Major Dowdle, Twenty-first Arkansas, and Colonel Daly, Eighteenth Arkansas, mortally wounded (since dead). Lieutenant-Colonel Matheny, Twenty-first Arkansas, wounded. Captain Lynch, Eighteenth Arkansas, and Captain Atkins, Rapley's battalion, two gallant officers, were killed. Colonel Cravens, Twenty-first Arkansas, acted nobly, and had his horse shot under him. Colonel Dockey, Lieutenant-Colonel Disunke, Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, Major Williams, and Major Wilson, distinguished themselves by their gallantry and daring; also, Captain Ashford, who commanded the battalion of sharpshooters (Major Rapley being absent, sick). After being repulsed by an overwhelming force, I received an order to fall back with what was left of my brigade, with the remainder of the army, which I did, taking all the knapsacks and blankets I could with me to the camp on Chewalla, on the south side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, where we remained until the morning of the fifth. I only numbered, all told, on the morning of the fifth, previous to marching to Davis' bridge, across the Hatchie River, five hundred and fifty (550) men. Mine was the rear brigade in the division, and was, owing to the order of march of that day, some distance in rear of the advance brigade, which became engaged with a greatly superior force of the enemy immediately after crossing the Hatchie River. When the cannonading was first heard in front. I was then crossing the Tuscumbia River, a distance of five miles. I received an order from General Maury, while crossing the river, to move rapidly to the front to the support of General Moore. I moved forward, then, as rapidly as possible, at the double-quick most of the way, until I reached the field of battle, which was then on the east side of the river, and where General Phifer's brigade, with my battery of artillery, which I had sent in the advance, was hotly engaged with the enemy. I immediately, after ascertaining the position of the enemy, formed line of battle, and placed my line on the right of General Phifer's brigade. The enemy opened fire on us at once; we replied instantly, and continued to keep up a perfect musketry duel for about an hour, when I found my cartridges giving out. I immediately issued about ten (10) rounds of cartridges to the men and renewed the fire, which was continued until the enemy ceased [651] firing (except their skirmishers) and my cartridges had given out. I sent word to General Maury that my ammunition had given out, and that I could only hope to hold the ground with the bayonet should the enemy's cavalry attempt to charge us. General Maury then ordered me to fall back to the timber and get ammunition. After receiving this order, I withdrew my men in good order, with a loss of not more than two killed and eight wounded, a thing unprecedented, considering the obstinacy of the fight that had been going on for nearly an hour and a half. While withdrawing my men, my horse, who had become very frantic, fell on me and injured my thigh and hip very seriously, completely paralyzing my left leg. I, however, formed my line and gave the command of the few that were left to Colonel Dockey, as I was unable to walk. In this action, as well as in the engagements of Friday and Saturday, I cannot particularize. Every officer and man seemed willing and anxious to meet the enemy, and the daring and gallant charge made on the enemy's breastworks, and the obstinacy with which they stood in an open field and fought the enemy partly concealed in the woods, for an hour and a half, at Hatchie River, will bear testimony to the fact, and give them a just claim to the admiration and gratitude of their State and country, and will cause them to mingle their tears with the survivors for the heroes who have fallen. My personal staff, Major John King, Adjutant-General, Captain Balfour, Inspector-General, and Lieutenant Marshall Hairston, A. D. C., were all distinguished for their daring and bravery. I am under many obligations for the promptness with which they assisted me in every engagement; also, to my volunteer Aids, Lieutenant Shepherd and Mr. Templeman, who were conspicuous for daring and gallantry in every engagement, under every fire. Major Hooper, Brigade Quartermaster, and Major Smith, Brigade Commissary, as well as the Surgeons of the whole brigade, deserve my especial thanks for the zeal and energy displayed in the field and everywhere during the whole expedition.

Captain Burnett, Chief of Artillery, and Lieutenant Hogg, commanding Appeal battery, with his officers and men, deserve special notice for the skill. and efficiency with which they handled the battery and poured the shot and shell into the enemy's ranks.

Before closing, I must return my sincere thanks to the officers and men who have survived, for the promptness, daring, and cheerfulness with which they have executed every order, and ask them never to forget the daring and heroism of the noble dead. Arkansas, though for a time cast in gloom for her lost sons, can look with pride to the daring and gallantry of her sons, and console herself with the happy thought that her soldiers are equal to any and second to none amongst those who are battling for Southern independence.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this brigade in the action on the third, fourth, and fifth instants.

This brigade was composed of the following regiments, to wit: Second Texas, Colonel W. P. Rogers; Lyle's Arkansas regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Pennington; Boone's Arkansas regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Boone; Thirty-fifth Mississippi regiment, Colonel Wm. L. Barry; Forty-second Alabama regiment, Colonel John W. Portis; Bledsoe's battery, Captain H. M. Bledsoe--making five regiments and one battery; total effective strength, eighteen hundred and ninety-two (1,892), about.

On the morning of the third we formed in line of battle near the road leading from Pocahontas to Corinth, and distant about one-half mile from the enemy's outer works. Our brigade here occupied the right of the line formed by Maury's division, our right resting on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and Lovell's forces on our right beyond the road. Soon Lovell's forces engaged the enemy, and our brigade was ordered forward across a corn-field to their support, with instructions to halt on reaching the timber on the opposite side, and await further orders. On reaching the point designated, a part of the Second Texas and one company of the Thirty-fifth Mississippi were thrown forward as skirmishers, and at once engaged the enemy's sharpshooters, when they were driven back within their intrenchments. We here lost a few men, and Major W. C. Simmons, commanding the skirmishers, was wounded. We were now ordered forward to assault the enemy's works. We advanced in a well-preserved line of battle, considering the difficulties of the ground, and on reaching the fallen timber, in front of the enemy's intrenchments, we charged and carried the works with but little opposition, except on our left, where the Forty-second Alabama was exposed to a heavy fire, though their loss in killed and wounded was but eight or ten, including one officer. This regiment advanced with remarkable steadiness, this being their first engagement. Advancing about one-fourth of a mile we were halted to form a junction with Lovell's forces, now on our right, which we failed to do. Our skirmishers again soon engaged the enemy and were driven back on our line, which led to a severe but short engagement, in which we soon routed the enemy and drove them from their position. Here an unfortunate mistake was committed, the Forty-second Alabama firing on our skirmishers, mistaking them for the enemy, and killing and wounding several officers and men. At this time a heavy cannonading was kept up at some distance to our right, from a strong work of the enemy about two hundred yards south of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Being now reinforced by Colonel Johnson's and Colonel Dockey's Arkansas regiments [652] we changed directions to the right, and throwing forward the left wing, moved in the direction of the firing. We soon reached the railroad, having our line nearly parallel to it, and in crossing, the enemy opened on us a most terrific fire from the brow of a hill not more than seventy-five yards distant. The enemy opposed to us with a heavy force, being formed in two lines, the front lying on the ground and the other firing over them. This awful fire staggered us but for a moment, and as soon as our line was steadied a little, we charged, drove them from the position, and carried their works, capturing a few prisoners, and taking a large camp with their supplies of commissary and quartermaster's stores. On discovering our approach, the enemy removed and saved their guns. This we found to be a strong work in a firm position, and well constructed. From the position, we judged this to be the point from which a cannonading had been kept up during the day.

Being now separated from our division, and night approaching (it being between three and four o'clock), we despatched Lieutenant McFarland to report to General Maury our success, and asked for orders. In the course of half an hour General Lovell and staff came up, and, on consultation, we agreed to form a line of battle perpendicular to the railroad, our left resting on the road, and advance towards Corinth. In about an hour his forces came up, and moved to our right. At about dusk, while awaiting for a notification from General Lovell to advance, which he said he would give when ready, we received orders from General Maury to rejoin the division, and take position on Phifer's right, which brought us on the hill in sight of Corinth, about an hour and a half after dark, where we slept on our arms until morning.

At early dawn on the morning of the fourth, our batteries having been placed in front of our lines, to open fire on Corinth, the brigade was moved by the left flank and placed in rear of Phifer's, sheltered by timber in front. When the firing from the batteries ceased, we moved forward and took position obliquely to the right and front of Phifer's. Our skirmishers were again thrown forward, and kept up a sharp engagement with the enemy until about ten o'clock. We had been previously notified by General Maury that we would advance when Hebert's division made the attack on our left — our brigade being supported by Cabell's on the right and Phifer's on the left. About ten o'clock the firing on our left became heavy, and we at once gave the command, “forward,” sending Lieutenant McFarland to notify General Maury of our advance movement. We had not gone one hundred yards before the enemy seemed to discover our designs, and at once opened upon us and kept up the severest fire I ever imagined possible to concentrate on one point in front of a fortification. Yet we suffered but little, being protected by the timber, until we reached the fallen timber and open space which extended about one hundred yards in front of their works.

On reaching this point we charged and carried the enemy's works, the whole extent of our line, and “penetrated to the very heart of Corinth,” driving the enemy from house to house, and frequently firing in at the windows and driving them out. The enemy were driven from the breastworks in great confusion, leaving their guns, some with their teams still hitched, while others had their horses cut loose and ran off. Our men brought off two or three horses which they found hitched in the streets near the Corinth House, their owners being absent The Forty-second Alabama, from their position in line, were brought in front of a strong bastion, the walls of which they found too high to scale, but rushing to the embrasures they fired three or four volleys, driving the enemy from their guns, and then entering the works mounted the parapet and planted their flag on the walls. After entering the works we found ourselves opposed by an overwhelming force, and being without support and our line being broken and disordered in the assault, we had no alternative but to fall back, which was done. Our loss in this assault was very severe. Three of the five regimental commanders were either killed or wounded. I can bear testimony to the coolness and gallantry with which our men and officers made this assault. I do not believe that any troops ever displayed greater courage in so desperate a charge. This was our last engagement in the vicinity of Corinth. Our division being reformed we fell back on the road to Pocahontas and bivouacked for the night. At an early hour, on the morning of the fifth instant, our brigade was ordered to the front to act as an advance guard; when within two or three miles of Davis' bridge across Hatchie, received orders to push forward, cross the bridge, form a line of battle on the right of the road, and then advance, take and hold the Heights of Matamoras, which commands the crossing at Davis' bridge. We pushed forward with all possible despatch, but the men being greatly exhausted and weak for the want of food, and the previous two days hard marching and service, when we reached the crossing and formed line, we did not have more than two hundred and fifty or three hundred men in ranks. We formed on the right, opposite the battery established by Major Burnett on the left of the road. As we filed off to the right, the enemy's batteries opened on us from the hill at Matamoras. The Second Texas, being in the rear, was cut off by the fire, and did not form in line with the other regiments. Our position was now in a narrow strip of woods, with open fields in front and rear, that in front extending up to the enemy's position. We had been ordered to advance with our left on the road, which would have carried us through the open fields up to the very muzzles of the enemy's guns.

Being now satisfied that the hill was occupied [653] in force, and to advance with our small force would only prove its total annihilation, we despatched Lieutenant McFarland to the rear for reinforcements, and to report to the commanding General that we not only could not advance, but we thought we could not hold our present position long without assistance.

During this time the enemy continued to pour a heavy fire into the battery and woods occupied by our line, in which we lost several men killed and wounded. The batteries being soon withdrawn, the enemy soon gave us their whole attention, but we still held our position until they reached our left flank and poured into us a most destructive fire. This threw our line into some confusion; but, rallying, we moved to the left, faced the enemy, and opened on them.

We had not fired more than two or three rounds before a perfect shower of balls was poured into our right flank from the direction of the corn-field which was at first our front. I am satisfied that this fire came from a line which had been previously formed in the field, and had been concealed by lying down in the grass and corn. We now saw that we must either fall back or be surrounded. The order was given, and the bridge being now swept by the enemy's fire, the men crossed at such points of the stream as they found to be most convenient. In crossing, many of them lost their guns. This manner of crossing caused the men to become much scattered, but as they were collected, they joined Cabell's and Phifer's brigades and continued the fight. Our loss at the bridge was considerable, making the entire loss of the brigade during the three days fight very heavy, as will be seen by the accompanying report. It is impossible at present to make an accurate report of the killed, wounded, and missing in battle, as the Thirty-fifth Mississippi dispersed after the fight at Davis' bridge, there being now present some forty men, and one line-officer, Lieutenant Henry. From the best information we can obtain we are assured that many of the officers and men have gone to their homes. This conduct on their part is astonishing and unaccountable, for the regiment acted nobly and did good service during the three days fighting. It is to be regretted that their commander, Colonel Barry, was not present, he having been sent to Corinth, under flag of truce to bury the dead. He is a gallant and efficient officer, of whom his State may well be proud.

Without a single exception, to our knowledge, the officers, one and all, did their duty nobly during the severe engagements. If I mention one in this connection, I must mention all or do injustice. Corporal J. A. Going, of the Forty-second Alabama, deserves particular notice. He was color-bearer, and though once shot down, he gallantly bore the flag through the fight on the fourth.

Private Morgan, of Company H, Boone's regiment, is reported as having acted with great gallantry. The flag of Lyle's regiment was torn into tatters by the enemy's shots, and when last seen, the Color-bearer, Herbert Sloane, of Company D, was going over the breastworks, waving a piece over his head and shouting for the Southern Confederacy.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Major: I have the honor to make report of the operations of my brigade of cavalry (First Mississippi cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. Montgomery, and my own regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Stocks), at the late battle of Corinth and retreat from that place.

During the battle my brigade was divided; squadrons attached to brigades of infantry and acting on the flanks. With eight companies I made a reconnoissance south of Corinth, engaged the enemy's cavalry and repulsed them in gallant style. Returning, I advanced the command to the fortifications on College Hill, where I engaged the enemy in force after the main body of our troops had withdrawn. I then withdrew my command without serious loss and brought up the rear of the army. I was then ordered to Rienzi, under General Armstrong; received orders countermanding that move on our arrival at Kossuth.

The firing having commenced at Davis' bridge, near Pocahontas, we proceeeded with both commands to the Ripley and Pocahontas road; advanced up that road to within one mile and a half of Pocahontas, threatening the enemy's rear, engaging them in a brilliant skirmish, which was a move very favorable towards saving the train of wagons. I held that position all night with my brigade, and fell back before the enemy next day. From that time the brigade was engaged in bringing up the rear of the army, skirmishing all the time with the enemy to Ripley.

Owing to unavoidable circumstances, the brigade was without rations for three days. The officers and men all behaved with coolness and gallantry, and suffered all the hardships incident to the march, with a spirit worthy of good soldiers. Where all behaved so well, it would be difficult to mention by name. I would especially notice, however, Lieutenant Henry W. Watkins, Company A, Jackson's regiment cavalry; also, Corporal Brochus and Privates Britton and Barton, Company C, same regiment; also, Captain Gadi Herron, Lieutenant Cravens, and Lieutenant Foote, First regiment Mississippi cavalry. The latter (Lieutenant Foote) engaged the enemy's advance and checked them [654] in a most gallant manner. The report from Armstrong's brigade does not mention any one especially by name. They all behaved with coolness and gallantry.

I am, Major, with high respect,

Your obedient servant,

General: I telegraphed you yesterday that despatches from General Bragg make it almost impossible for me to reinforce General Breckinridge. He says, very pointedly, that West Tennessee is now open to my army, intimating that he expected me to enter it; and I do not feel at liberty to disregard such an intimation, when I consider the very important relations which this army bears to that in East Tennessee. I cannot get possession of the railroad before Thursday. It will then take at least a week to transport to this point the troops, etc., which will be brought hither preparatory to a forward movement. I regret very much that I have to submit to this unavoidable delay, and I cannot think of protracting it, except under compulsion of the greatest necessity. To attempt to reinforce General Breckinridge would protract it indefinitely. The success of the campaign depends now upon the promptness and boldness of our movements, and the ability which we may manifest to avail ourselves of our present advantages. The enemy are still transporting their troops from Corinth and its vicinity eastward. They will, by the end of this week, have reduced its force to its minimum. We should be quick to take advantage of this, for they will soon begin to get in reinforcements under the late call for volunteers. The present obstructed condition of the railroad is another reason for instant action. In fact every consideration makes it important that I shall move forward without a day's unnecessary delay. I earnestly desire your co-operation in such a movement, and will, as I have before said, be glad to place my army and myself under your command in that contingency. The very names of yourself and General Breckinridge would bring thousands to our ranks, and carry dismay to those of the enemy. You speak in your dispatch of the frightful amount of sickness in General Breckinridge's division. I fear that the sweltering heats of this latitude will soon begin to tell fearfully upon my own ranks, and am, for that reason, the more anxious to take them northward, where, too, we may gain accessions from those Tennesseeans and Kentuckians who have seen and felt the wretchedness of Northern domination.

Captain Loughbrough will deliver this communication to you, and explain more particularly the condition of things in this vicinity. Please inform me, by telegraph, of your determination, so that in the event of its being favorable, we may concert a plan of operations.

I am. General,

With the profoundest respect,

Your obedient servant,

General: In view of the operations from here it is very desirable to press the enemy closely in West Tennessee. We learn their forces there are being rapidly reduced, and when our movements become known it is certain they must throw more forces into Middle Tennessee and Kentucky or lose those regions. If you hold them in check, we are sure of success here; but should they reinforce here so as to defy us, then you may redeem West Tennessee, and probably aid us by crossing the enemy's rear.

I cannot give you specific instructions, as circumstances and military conditions in your front may vary materially from day to day. To move your available force to Holly Springs by railroad, thence into West Tennessee, co-operating with General Price, who will move soon towards Corinth; or to move to Tupelo by rail and join Price are suggestions only. Positive instructions, except to strike at the most assailable point, cannot be given when so little is known, and when circumstances may change daily. Of course, when you join Price, your rank gives you command of the whole force. I enclose a copy of Captain Jones' inspection report. Many of the points in it require your immediate attention: 1st. Most important is the prompt reduction of your light artillery. You have enough for an army of one hundred thousand men. It is impossible to keep it all up and be effective. To keep it all ineffective must be avoided. Eight batteries of four (4) guns each is ample for your present force. As you cannot discharge the companies without authority from the War Department, I suggest that you dismount them, giving such horses and material as they have to make other corps effective, and transfer the officers and men to your heavy batteries, relieving infantry; or you could arm them as infantry and put them in the field. Some companies, I see, are still being equipped. Put a stop to it immediately. Other parts of the report, too, require your prompt consideration, especially in the staff department. The reports from the Medical Inspector, coming in, are equally unsatisfactory.

Your short time in command and close engagement at Vicksburg have allowed you but little time for these matters, but I trust you will be able, through intelligent and effective staff officers, in correcting some of the evils soon. It is with deep regret I see you lose General Villepigue, [655] as I consider him equal to any officer in the service. Brigadier-General Duncan, and perhaps others exchanged, will soon be with us, when you shall be attended to.

I am, General,

Most respectfully and truly yours,

General: We move from here immediately — later, by some days, than expected, but in time, we hope, for a successful campaign. Buell has certainly fallen back from the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and will probably not make a stand this side of Nashville, if there. He is now fortifying at that place.

General E. K. Smith, reinforced by two brigades from this army, has turned Cumberland Gap, and is now marching on Lexington, Kentucky. General Morgan (Yankey) is thus cut off from all supplies. General Humphrey Marshall is to enter Eastern Kentucky from Western Virginia. We shall thus have Buell pretty well disposed of.

Sherman and Rosecrans we leave to you and Price, satisfied you can dispose of them, and we confidently hope to meet you upon the Ohio.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

Just finished whipping the enemy in from off Bolivar. Ran in town. I believe they will leave the country. West Tennessee is almost free of the invaders. All needed is an advance of the infantry. They estimate their force at ten thousand. I believe they have only about six thousand. Captain Pryor will give you the details. I send seventy-one prisoners to General Villepigue--four commanding officers. There are strong works in the rear of Bolivar, and I did not enter the town, as it would only have caused them to shell it, without giving me any advantage.

You will hear from us again in a day or two.

General : I received, last night, a despatch of which the following is a copy:

Liquatchie Valley, August 29.
To General Sterling Price:

Buell's force is in full retreat upon Nashville, destroying their stores. Watch Rosecrans and prevent a junction; or if he escapes you follow him closely.

Braxton Bragg.

1 feel that this order requires me to advance immediately, and I shall have my whole command ready to move in three days. That portion of my cavalry which did not accompany General Armstrong, has been ordered forward to Booneville, and General Little is moving his division to Guntown and Baldwin. I hope that nothing will prevent you from coming forward without delay, with all your disposable troops. Be pleased to telegraph your determination in such way, however, that it will not be understood by others, and to write to me fully by my Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant Wood, who will land this to you.

I enclose for your information copies of a letter from General Bragg, dated August twenty-seventh, and of a despatch from General Armstrong, announcing the result of an engagement in front of Bolivar.

I am, General, with the greatest respect,

Your obedient servant,

General: One of your staff officers, Colonel Lomax, having requested me to do so, I state, for your information, that I can put in the field thirteen thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, and eight hundred artillery, effective total; that they are supplied with transportation and ammunition, as prescribed in General Bragg's last general orders; that subsistence has been provided to the first day of October; that the commissary trains will transport seven days provisions, and that I will have arms for all my troops, including those exchanged prisoners that General Bragg has been ordered to be sent to me.

I am, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

General: I have received your reply to my letter of the second instant, and regret very [656] much that you cannot move in this direction at once.

I feel that General Bragg's instructions and the situation of affairs within my district, alike compel me to keep near the line of the road. If I move towards Holly Springs, as you suggest, I not only endanger the safety of the road, which is essential to the supply of my army, but I expose my supplies of every kind, and the valuable workshops and public property at Columbus and Gainesville, to destruction by the enemy. I learn that a cavalry force of thieves, seventeen thousand strong, is even now within forty-eight hours march of Columbus.

General Bragg's orders also compel me to keep close watch upon Rosecrans, and I hear that he is now at Iuka, and crossing his army at Eastport. I am, therefore, pushing my army slowly forward, and shall remove my own headquarters to Guntown on Sunday; I shall then determine by what route to advance. I shall keep you fully advised of my movements, so that we may co-operate or unite our forces, as may be most advisable.

I am, General, very sincerely,

Your friend and obedient servant,

Rosecrans has gone westward with about ten thousand men. I am ready to co-operate with you in an attack upon Corinth. My courier awaits your answer.

General: I entered this town with my army on last Sunday morning. The rear guard of Rosecrans' army evacuated it at my approach, and are retreating westward. I telegraphed you immediately, proposing a combined movement upon Corinth, and sent the despatch by special messenger to Guntown, with instructions to forward it to you immediately, and to await your reply. This has not been received yet. I hope that you will answer me at once, for General Bragg has just sent me another despatch, in these words:

en route to Kentucky, September 12, 1862.

By the proceedings of a council of war in Nashville, captured by us, it seems Rosecrans, with part of his army, is there. I have anxiously expected your advance, and trust it will not longer be delayed.

Braxton Bragg.

I cannot remain inactive any longer, and must move, either with you against Rosecrans, or towards Kentucky. The courier who takes this to you will bring your reply.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

I will make the movement proposed in your despatch of the sixteenth instant. Enemy concentrating against me. Please make demonstration towards Rienzi. Have written by courier. Send your telegrams to Tupelo.

I will leave here on Friday morning, twentieth. Wrote you this morning stating that I would meet you at Ripley. As you know more of the country, if any point be better state it, and I will meet you there.

A few days ago the enemy's strength was thirty-five thousand. I learn that they are leaving in the direction of Jackson, and whether we attack them or not before receiving our exchanged prisoners, it is important that we should unite.

General: We have driven and drawn the enemy clear back to the Ohio. Push your columns to our support and arouse the people to reinforce us. We have thousands of arms without men to handle them.

Nashville is defended by only a weak division, Bowling Green by only a regiment. Sweep them off and push up to the Ohio. Secure the heavy guns at these places and we will secure the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. All depends on rapid movements. Trusting to your energy and zeal, we shall confidently expect a diversion in our favor against the overwhelming force now concentrating in our front.

Respectfully and truly yours,