Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 3.

[111] whole number about twenty-six thousand. He was directed to begin the assault at about eight o'clock in the morning,

Nov. 30, 1863.

when the batteries of the center and right were to open on the foe. Sedgwick was to strike Lee's left an hour later, when, it was hoped, Warren's attack would cause the weakening of that wing; and French, with his own broken corps and a part of the First, under Newton, who was only to menace at the beginning, was to advance and attack Lee's center when the assault on his right and left should be successful. The National cavalry was ordered to keep Lee's horsemen from Meade's communications.

At the appointed hour, Meade's batteries on left and center were opened, and the skirmishers of the latter dashed across Mine Run, and drove back those of the Confederates. But Warren's guns

Position of the armies at Mine Run, Nov. 80.

were not heard. Sedgwick was in readiness, and anxiously waiting to perform his part, but Warren's guns were yet silent. The mystery was solved at a few minutes before nine o'clock, when Meade received a message from Warren, saying he had found Lee's position much stronger than he expected, and had taken the responsibility of suspending the attack. Meade hastened to the left, and found that his foe, informed of the massing of troops on his right, had concentrated his own forces there, men and guns, in formidable array. Meade was satisfied that Warren had behaved prudently, and he ordered a general suspension of operations for the attack. French and Sedgwick fell back, and Meade that day studied well the chances for success. He found that the opening of his batteries had given Lee hints to strengthen his defenses on his left, and he was doing so with energy. Indeed Lee's position was growing stronger every hour, while Meade's strength was diminishing, for his rations were nearly exhausted, and his supply-trains were beyond the Rapid Anna. To bring, these over might expose them to disaster, for winter was at hand, and rains might suddenly swell the streams and make them impassable. Considering the risks, Meade determined to sacrifice himself, if necessary, rather than his army, by abandoning the enterprise at once. This he did. He recrossed the Rapid Anna,

Dec. 1, 2

without being followed or molested, and went into winter quarters on his old camping grounds between that stream and the Rappahannock. He desired