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The authorities at
Washington, at this time, were greatly perplexed by the military situation.
No logic seemed sufficiently subtle to penetrate the real designs of the
Confederates in the field.
Spies and deserters from
Lee's army, reported at the capital that he was receiving re-enforcements from
Bragg, and from the
Atlantic coast, to enable him to make another and more
successful invasion of
Maryland and
Pennsylvania.
The slight resistance offered to
Burnside, and the abandonment of
Chattanooga without a struggle, made the rumor appear plausible.
Halleck questioned the propriety of allowing
Rosecrans to pursue
Bragg, and telegraphed
to him to hold firmly the mountain-passes in the direction of
Atlanta, to prevent the return of the
Confederates until
Burnside could connect with him, when it would be determined whether the Army of the Cumberland should penetrate farther into
Georgia.
He also mentioned the reports that
Bragg was sending troops to
Lee. On the same day, he ordered
Burnside to hold the mountain-passes in
East Tennessee, to prevent access to or from
Virginia, and to connect, with his cavalry at least, with
Rosecrans.
In reply to
Halleck,
Rosecrans said he did not believe any troops had been sent to
Lee by
Bragg.
On the contrary, there were indications that
Bragg himself was being re-enforced from
Mississippi, and was preparing to turn the flanks of the Army of the Cumberland and cut its communications; and he suggested the propriety of ordering some of
Grant's troops to cover the line of the
Tennessee River, westward, to prevent a raid on
Nashville.
This was followed by an electrograph from
General Foster, at Fortress