Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 3.

[555] men, from the same causes, had dropped by the way, and thousands had let their muskets fall and left them because they could not bear them and walk. They had begun their retreat with only one ration; and so poor and exhausted was the country through which they moved, that there was a famine after the first day's march. The horrors of that retreat, after leaving Amelia Court-House--the troops without supplies, without sleep, harassed in front, rear and flank, and compelled to fight when hardly able to walk — were among the most terrible on record; and the fortitude of the soldiers that endured it was truly sublime.

On the night of the sixth, after Lee's army was across the Appomattox, a council of his general officers was held. Lee was not present. They agreed that all was lost, and that a capitulation was inevitable. Famine had caused nearly one-half of their soldiers to drop their arms, because they could not carry them. Their cannon must all be lost if they should attempt. a rapid flight, because they had no draught-animals sufficient to drag them. They came to ,the conclusion that a surrender, on the best obtainable terms, would be the wisest course, and that decision they communicated to their General-in-chief¹ by the hand of General Pendleton. Lee refused to listen favorably to the opinions of his officers, and professed not to then. see the, necessity for a surrender. Davis, his colleague, was then at Danville, trying to reorganize the “Government;” and they seem to have agreed to continue the contest “so long as there was a man left in the Confederacy.”

The remains of Lee's army were now in a compact mass on the stage and plank roads to Lynchburg, a few miles north of Farmville, with strong intrenchments covering these roads, and batteries commanding, over a considerable distance, the way of approach by the Nationals from the Appomattox. He resolved to make further efforts to escape, and success in battle on the 7th

April, 1865.

encouraged him. Humphreys had crossed the Appomattox with the Second Corps, and resumed pursuit with the divisions of Miles and De Trobriand. He soon found himself confronted by Lee's intrenched army. He thought a flanking of the position would be the most effectual way of dislodging his antagonist, but he perceived that it could not be done with his single corps. He therefore resolved to assault, and ordered Barlow up to attack the front, while Miles should assail the Confederate left. The latter did so before Barlow came up, and was repulsed with a loss of about six hundred men.² When Barlow got into position it was too late to attack that night, and the assault was postponed until morning. On the same day Sheridan had dispatched two divisions of cavalry, under Merritt, to Prince Edward Court-House, to oppose the retreat, of Lee on Danville, and a third division, under Crook, was sent to Farmville, where it crossed with difficulty, the horsemen being compelled to ford the Appomattox. Pushing on toward the left of Humphreys, Crook fell