Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 3.

[252] （3.) The concentration of the forces west of the Mississippi, and such other force as should be assigned to this duty from General Sherman's command, in such a manner as to expel the enemy from Northern Louisiana and Arkansas; (4.) Such preparation and concert of action among the different corps engaged as to prevent the enemy, by keeping him constantly employed, from operating against our positions or forces elsewhere; and (5.) That the entire force should be placed under the command of a single general. Preparations for a long campaign was also advised, and the month of May was indicated as the point of time when the occupation of Shreveport might be anticipated.¹ “Not one of these suggestions,” said General Banks, in his report, “so necessary in conquering the inherent difficulties of the expedition, was carried into execution, nor was it in my power to establish them.”

The general plan laid out was for Admiral Porter to move from Vicksburg with a powerful fleet of armored gun-boats and transports, carrying ten thousand men of Sherman's old army, under General A. J. Smith, and, passing up the Red River, capture Fort de Russy, and join Banks at Alexandria. The latter was to march overland from the Atchafalaya to Alexandria with his disposable force, say sixteen thousand men, while General Steele, with about fifteen thousand men, operating independently, should move directly on Shreveport from Little Rock. The Confederates in that region, according to the most reliable reports, were disposed as follows: Magruder, with about fifteen thousand effective men, was in Texas, his main body covering Galveston and Houston; Walker's division, about seven thousand strong, was on the Atchafalaya and Red River, from Opelousas to Fort de Russy; Mouton's division, numbering about six thousand men, was between the Black and Washita rivers, from Red River to Monroe;

Frederick Steele.

and Price, with a force of infantry estimated at five thousand, and of cavalry from seven to ten thousand, held the road from Monroe to Camden and Arkadelphia, in front of Steele. Magruder could spare ten thousand of his force to resist an attack from the east, leaving his fortifications on the coast well garrisoned, while Price could furnish at least an additional five thousand from the north, making, with those in the vicinity of the Red River, an army of from twenty-five to thirty thousand men — a force equal to any that could be brought against them, even with the most perfect unity and co-operation of commands.² Considering this disposition of the Confederate forces, we perceive that the problem was presented by authority for solution,--How shall the National forces achieve a victory in the campaign by threatening Shreveport with forty thousand men, so disposed in parts