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Johnston to contract his lines and take a position of great strength, with
Kenesaw as his salient.
From this lofty height he could look down upon the entire host of his antagonist, and his batteries could hurl terrible plunging shot and shell.
His right was bent back so as to cover
Marietta, and his left was behind
Nose Creek, in a position to cover the railway leading from
Marietta to the
Chattahoochee.
For three weeks, at the period we are considering, rain fell copiously, almost without intermission, drenching the contending armies, and flooding the whole country.
“During our operations about
Kenesaw,” said
Sherman, “the weather was villainously bad,” the rain “rendering our narrow, wooded roads, mere mud gullies, so that a general movement would be impossible.”
Yet he did not cease his labors, and every hour his army worked closer to the lines of his antagonist.
McPherson watched
Kenesaw, and worked his left forward.
Thomas, in a sort of grand left wheel, swung round, with his left on
Kenesaw, touching
McPherson, while
Schofield moved to the south and east along the old Sandtown road. Finally, when
Hooker had considerably advanced his line, with
Schofield on his right,
General J. B. Hood, leading his own corps and detachments from others, sallied out and attacked the Nationals,
with the intention of forcing a passage through
Sherman's line, between
Thomas and
Schofield.
Although his movement was sudden and unexpected, he was received with a terrible return blow, which made him recoil in great confusion, leaving, in his retreat, his killed, wounded, and many prisoners, in the hands of the Nationals.
He had aimed his blow chiefly at the division of
Williams, of
Hooker's corps, and
Hascall's brigade of
Schofield's, in comparatively open ground.
Those gallant troops so punished his audacity, that
Sherman said he could not expect
Hood to repeat his mistake “after the examples of
Dallas and the
Kulp House.”
The struggle was brief and sanguinary, and is known as the battle of the
Kulp House.
The repulse of
Hood inspirited the Nationals.
Taking advantage of that feeling,
Sherman prepared to assault the
Confederates.
Both armies believed it was not his policy to assail fortified lines, as
Grant was doing north of
Richmond.
They were soon undeceived.
He regarded
Johnston's left center as the most vulnerable point in his line, and on the 24th of June he ordered an assault to be made upon it there, on the 27th,
with the hope of breaking through it and seizing the railway below
Marietta, cut off the
Confederate left and center from its line of retreat, and then, by turning upon either part, overwhelmn and destroy the army of his antagonist.
The assault was made at two points south of
Kenesaw, and was sadly disastrous.
The
Nationals were repulsed, with an aggregate loss of about three thousand men, among them
General C. G. Harker and
D. McCook killed, and many valuable officers of lower grade wounded.
This loss was without compensation, for the injury inflicted upon the
Confederates, who were behind their breastworks, was very slight.
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